

**Fanfare for the Future
Volume Two**

Occupy Vision

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Dedicated to the idea that “another world is possible” and even more so, to the practice to “make another world real” and to all those who wish for, believe in, and try to advance related endeavors. And to enlarging the Occupy Movement. And to founding an International Organization for Participatory Society.

Oh the fishes will laugh
As they swim out of the path
And the seagulls they'll be smiling.
And the rocks on the sand
Will proudly stand,
The hour that the ship comes in.

And the words that are used
For to get the ship confused
Will not be understood as they're spoken.
For the chains of the sea
Will have busted in the night
And will be buried at the bottom of the ocean.

A song will lift
As the mainsail shifts
And the boat drifts on to the shoreline.
And the sun will respect
Every face on the deck,
The hour that the ship comes in.

- Bob Dylan

Introduction

*“Do you suppose I could buy back my introduction to you?”
- Groucho Marx*

Sharing a social theory such as marxism, anarchism, feminism, or the approach taken in volume one of Fanfare, Occupy Theory, rarely yields one correct comprehensive shared analysis. The results of sharing a theory are typically way less complete and accurate than that.

A shared social theory certainly helps focus our attention on important aspects of what we are considering and attunes us to finding certain patterns that are typically present and powerful. However the same social theory could help two groups of people analyze the same situation, and the two groups might wind up differing about important insights.

Having a shared theory means the group would agree on concepts and on much analysis as well. However, they might apply their shared concepts to different issues or include different aspects, - due to bringing different backgrounds - and they might, therefore, rally to different agendas. In this way, they might differ so greatly regarding social change activities that they would have a hard time even minimally working together. Consider all the leninist, trotskyist, marxist, anarchist, and even feminist groups that share theory but clash due to having different priorities.

The biggest differences among folks who share a social theory are usually about aims and methods. For one thing, aims, or what we in this book call vision, is not just about applying theory. Aims are about analyzing what is out there, yes, but they are also about

what we want. For that reason they are about coupling values with guiding concepts. They are about having or applying concepts.

Two groups with the same basic concepts about society and history might easily have different values if they haven't explicitly settled on shared ones.

Two groups that have different values, even using the same conceptual framework, will often arrive at different approaches to social change due to settling on different aims and methods and such differences will often preclude working together. It follows that to agree on views sufficiently to unite people seeking social change to be able to work together well, we need to go beyond sharing concepts to also sharing vision and strategy.

Okay, but why specifically is having a shared vision important? Why can't we just have our shared way of looking at reality that we developed in volume one of *Fanfare*, apply it as we proceed, agree on what's horribly wrong and why, and then think through different tactics we might use to try to alleviate suffering and its causes? Why not act in the knowable present? Why waste time looking into a fuzzy future we might disagree about?

First, we should acknowledge that contemporary social change activists typically neglect the task of developing a serious shared vision of what they ultimately want. Furthermore, as a result of this neglect, the contemporary Left are often unable to draw on any compelling vision to inform their strategy. Contemporary social change activists, instead, most often face reality as it impacts them today, and then march toward immediate short-run aims for next week or next month by making immediate tactical choices. They live and fight in the present, albeit often under difficult conditions that impose many constraints. That's hard enough, they think. Why do they need anyone telling them to hold on, you must live with one foot in future, not with both feet in the present? They not only feel too time-pressed to spread themselves that thin, they feel like it wouldn't help enough to warrant even a fraction of the time required. They feel that the future is, well, the future - and beyond our ken.

Of course, some contemporary social change activists, especially the more traditional type, may urge that this is an

inaccurate, and even unfair, picture of the Left. They may urge that they do, in fact, have a vision and that they do, in fact, use it to inform their organization and strategy. In short, they feel that they are already doing what we urge here.

However, if you ask these Leftists for a description of their vision they will typically answer vaguely, mainly specifying that the future will be democratic. Furthermore, they will often add that because the future they desire will be democratic it would be authoritarian for them to say anything about how future democratic power should be utilized by future people. They claim that advocating a meaningful, participatory democracy is a sufficient vision for the Left.

This has considerable appeal. Certainly people living now should not decide what future people must have as their policies. That would usurp future people's prerogatives. But what if we consider a real life possibility and see if asserting a desire for democracy really provides a sufficient vision to inspire and guide us. Take the economy, for example. The primary functions of the economy are production, consumption and allocation. This means, for those who advocate democracy as their vision, that we need to democratize production, consumption and allocation.

So far, so good. However, this assertion of desire doesn't tell us what we have to achieve - even the minimum features - to ensure economic democracy so future workers and consumers rule their own circumstances rather than being ruled over.

Saying we are for democracy not only doesn't specify choices future folks ought to make once they are empowered (which is good), it also doesn't specify the critical changes needed so that future folks will be empowered (which is not good). Favoring democracy only raises more questions, such as what ensures that future people can democratically control production, consumption, and allocation? And, indeed, as will hopefully become clearer, this is the type of question we need to answer if we are to have a vision sufficient to inspire and guide current activism without usurping the prerogatives of future people.

Why Have Shared Vision?

*"A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even
glancing at."
- Oscar Wilde*

Our claim is that having a shared vision of, at least, the defining features of what we are trying to attain, is critically important to three key needs we have: generating and sustaining motivation, collectively getting somewhere desirable, and even effectively understanding the present.

Vision Counters Cynicism

*"In every cry of every Man,
In every Infants cry of fear;
In every voice, in every ban,
The mind-forg'd manacles I hear."
- William Blake*

When Margaret Thatcher, former British Prime Minister said, "There is no alternative," the slogan was quickly abbreviated to TINA. TINA celebrated the permanence of the system that Thatcher loved and which we endure. Thatcher's claim, provided with a little context, was that any effort to escape our current system would yield even worse outcomes than we now endure. She didn't say our world is wonderful. No one can say that about rampant poverty, war, and indignity and be credible. It would be like saying cancer is delightful. Thatcher said, instead, that what we have is the best possible system - however horrible it often is. That is like saying cancer, however horrible, is unavoidable because any effort to avoid it will only make things worse.

Actually, Thatcher isn't the only one who believes the current society is the best of a bad lot. At some deep level, most people tend to feel that however abysmal things often are under capitalism, representative democracy, etc., they would get much worse if we tried to dramatically change the system.

If Thatcher and most people believe her fatalistic claim, it would logically warrant never trying to change anything socially fundamental. To seek systemic social change, however well

motivated, would be counter productive. And since most people believe TINA is true, most people avoid even thinking about serious change.

Once you think TINA is true, passivity not only makes sense, it closely accords with caring about people. By implying that efforts to attain an alternative social system would only make people suffer more, belief in TINA makes passive acceptance a morally sound choice.

What won't overcome TINA, however, is descriptions of how bad things are or explanations of how socially ingrained suffering is. This type of commentary is actually more likely to enforce TINA, just like claims that cancer is horrific and unavoidably built into the essence of biological systems would tend to enforce not fighting it.

The first thing that compelling and convincing vision can achieve is to counter TINA. Vision can erase hopelessness and passivity.

This point bears emphasis. The cynicism of modern times is evident. People believe that "everything is broken," but most people just accept the situation. We call this cynicism. In fact, however, it isn't cynicism but is instead a mistaken, though quite rational, calculus.

For most people, poverty, injustice, and indignity are built into the fabric of reality. To their thinking, it makes no more sense to try to systemically escape those ills than it would make to try to systemically escape gravity, or courageously blow into the wind, or form a committed and energetic movement against the world's worst killer - aging. Why be a fool chasing the impossible? Why fight to improve life if it will only make life worse? If you believe in TINA, passivity isn't cynical, it is sensible.

Imagine hearing someone prove that aging harms and finally kills more people than any society, disease, army, or even than all three combined, and then says come join me in my militant movement against aging. You don't drop everything and sign up to march and rally. You instead question the person's sanity. About aging, you accept that there is no socially accessible alternative and that fighting it is idiocy. When people who believe TINA hear

social critics list society's faults and hear us say join us in our movement to win a new society, they question our sanity.

The despair and rampant hopelessness of today's social life is the strongest barrier to justice. Convincing and compelling vision can uproot that despair and is for that reason our most important bludgeon with which to blast through to social change activism. So reason one for having shared vision is to overcome defeatism.

Vision Guides Practice

*"There is nothing like a dream to create the future.
Utopia to-day, flesh and blood tomorrow."*

- Victor Hugo

The second reason we need vision is to orient our choices so they actually go somewhere we wish to be. To seek social improvements without knowing where we are going, what constitutes a viable improvement, and what would institutionally insure the longevity of that improvement, is a fool's errand.

If you set out on a journey, is it enough to know that you don't want to be where you start? And that the means of transport are car, train, or plane? No, you must also know where you want to go. Embarking matters, but destination matters too.

In trying to fundamentally change society one can't succeed by oneself. Fundamental social change requires huge numbers of people working together. If Joe has a vision, but Sarah doesn't, Sarah can't be part of seeking to attain vision in the same way as Joe. If they both have a vision, but what they desire is significantly different and contrary, then how are they to work together to get to both visions, when attaining only one or the other is possible?

One person can escape the psychological straitjacket that is TINA by having a vision, even if no one else shares it. No one else needs to even know about the person's beliefs and yet that person is convinced there is an alternative. However, thousands and millions of people cannot work together, with all of them playing an informed collaborative role in a collective endeavor, unless they seek at least the key features in unison. Thus, they can't have millions of visions, or thousands, but ultimately need one - at least regarding centrally defining features.

Shared vision guides collective practice toward ends we actually want to attain. Our second reason for vision is to motivate and orient shared activism.

Vision Informs Judgement

"The assumption that what currently exists must necessarily exist is the acid that corrodes all visionary thinking."

- Murray Bookchin

Here is an unexpected visionary bonus. It turns out visionary thinking isn't just thinking about vision.

It is one thing to understand a family, say, or a market, or some other structure or network of structures in society. It is another thing to have a judgement about them - to like them or to dislike them.

When TINA is true for some part of a society, then we might not like that part, but we must not reject it because doing so would only lead to even worse outcomes. Here is an example. We don't like production because it inevitably generates at least some pollution, takes some time and energy, and so on. But obviously we cannot reject production, per se. We must, instead, minimize pollution, minimize time and energy spent, etc., while also getting the fruits of production that we want, including the pleasure of work well done. Vision helps to inform our understanding so we know what we ought to reject.

Often seeing what is right in front of us is vastly easier if we have something different against which to consider it. Sometimes this is another comparable entity that already exists. Other times, however, it is a conception, a creation, a vision. Either way, it becomes easier to extend, enlarge, and enrich our analysis of the present by considering it against alternative possibilities to see the contrasts, and, in those contrasts, to find indicators of the logic of both the present and the future.

At the risk of jumping steps a bit - imagine someone trying to understand workplaces or families. They may take for granted or overlook the implications of various elements, even while understanding others. Now imagine there is a different type of family or workplace available to look at - either in our mind,

because it is a vision, or in the real world, because someone has created a model for the future in the present. We see some old features missing and some new features present and we see very different outcomes. We suddenly realize the contingent origins of current outcomes that we previously mistakenly considered inevitable.

Some critics might argue that all three the points highlighted above can be achieved using only values like solidarity, equality etc., as a guide for movement building. In this view, values inform analysis which in turn is used to agitate for rebellion. Rebellion leads to revolution when our values are employed to help guide our creation of a new set of social institutions. This, the critic claims, would be a successful revolution brought about without having shared institutional vision.

Advocates of vision can reply that while values are important they are unlikely to prove sufficient. Highlighting the horrors of the system by employing value informed analysis doesn't alone rebut the TINA doctrine, and may even reenforce it. A much more powerful approach comes in the form of presenting an alternative system based on our values, but including institutions able to implement them.

With regards to getting somewhere desirable, values can help us move in the right direction. Nevertheless, at some point we need to go beyond values and actually build new institutions. This requires having vision for these new institutions.

Finally, advocates of vision feel that the development of vision helps improve our understanding of what is wrong with the current system by virtue of the clarity that is gained by being able to see a clear contrast between institutions we have and institutions we want. Such a clear contrast is not really possible when relying on values only.

How Much Vision? Avoiding the Debts

"To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle requires creative imagination and marks real advances."

- Albert Einstein

Those who reject having, using, or even caring at all about vision, don't typically do so because they deny that vision can help overcome hopelessness. They don't deny it can guide practice. They don't deny that it can inform our ability to understand current relations. Rather, their issue is that none of the above benefits addresses their main fears. Instead of contesting the benefits of vision, they typically accept all three, not least because the three benefits are so obviously true it would be ridiculous to deny them. They argue against vision, instead, for entirely different reasons.

The core of their legitimate and sensible concern about vision is a worry that seeking vision will overextend our capacities into domains we cannot know. It will risk elitist intellectual and operational calamity, and it will immorally violate our activist mandate. These are very serious debits, and we will see that it is true that seeking vision can, indeed, have all these negative effects. More, if the negative effects were not only possible, but unavoidable, then they could, if bad enough, overcome the benefits of vision, which would leave us stuck between having vision and with it suffering overextension, calamity, and immorality, or rejecting vision and without it suffering hopelessness, directionlessness, and diminished understanding. So we must examine each debit in turn, hoping to escape its implications.

Overextension

*"Well, I try my best
To be just like I am
But everybody wants you
To be just like them."
- Bob Dylan*

The critic's concern with overextension is that we can't reliably know the future. In trying to provide a vision for the future we will make serious errors such as overlooking conditions we don't yet realize and acting on false predictions. This sounds right. But is it?

If we said we can describe the future in great detail, more or less proposing a detailed blueprint of tomorrow and then tomorrow's tomorrow, that would be absurdly beyond our current

capacities. The critic would be right we could not successfully do that. No one could.

However, what if we are more modest? What if we only describe a few key features about the future that we can, in fact, understand? And what if we acknowledge and even celebrate that beyond those few features, the future will be whatever it will be, subject to choices and dynamics we cannot yet foresee? Then, if we thoughtfully choose a list of key features to focus on, we may be able to attain the benefits of vision - hope, orientation, and understanding - without incurring the cost of going beyond our capacities.

This type of navigation between worthy vision and over extension actually occurs all the time in any kind of planning aimed at future outcomes. Sometimes people planning future outcomes think they know what they don't and even can't know, but other times people do it perfectly reasonably. So the legitimate and justified advisory to the visionary from the vision critic is that we should worry about overextension. The legitimate and justified answer is that we should not overextend. Fair enough.

But it goes too far to then claim that everything anyone might say about the future is an overextension displaying unwarranted hubris. If we can identify key aspects of values and institutions that are essential if the future is to have the defining virtues we desire, if we can compellingly understand and describe just those key aspects, and if we always remain open to learning that we need to refine our views - then we can arrive at a vision that doesn't overreach. Can we do all this? We will see. But our need for hope, orientation, and understanding are far too great to give up without trying.

Intellectual and Operational Calamity

"Facts are ventriloquist's dummies. Sitting on a wise man's knee they may be made to utter words of wisdom; elsewhere, they say nothing, or talk nonsense."

- Aldous Huxley

Having a vision can lead a person down a path of thinking they know the future. Others who disagree must be wrong - even ignorant or dumb. This surety and dismissiveness can become habitual proportionately as vision becomes part of a person's identity. My having a vision can lead me to think that anyone who sees things differently is attacking my identity, and then to my attacking back. Vision, in short, can lead to dogmatism and sectarianism.

More, in practice, vision can not only lead to nasty behavior about ideas, it can lead to horrible behavior about policies as well. The dogmatic holder of a particular vision can impose their views on reality despite their views being clearly flawed or even horribly detested by others. We have all seen all this in Stalinism and in various fundamentalist stances, but also in lesser, though still quite disturbing, variants.

The visionary becomes wedded to his or her views and becomes an imposer of outcomes that didn't have to be and that shouldn't have been. And people suffer.

If dogmatism and the derivative imposition from above of structures that violate the will of those affected were inexorable outcomes of having vision, then the critics of vision would be right.

The bad news is all these feared ills are real and possible. The critic of vision is not a naysayer making up problems. The problems are real. The good news is, the problems are not inevitable.

As we discussed in volume one of *Fanfare*, *Occupy Theory* - while it is not easy, having a personally growth oriented intellectual approach and institutional means of dissent and diversity can, together, sufficiently diminish the probability of negative trends to make the pursuit of shared vision acceptable.

Fair enough, you might say, but what about the related problem of elitism? Once we have vision, and we make it important to what we are doing, don't we run a new risk that those who know the vision can feel overly important, and maybe become a new elite. Can't participation become two tiered between those

who know and can apply the vision, and those who only watch the visionaries and wait for instructions?

Again, our critic is not fear-mongering. This kind of elitism can, and has, happened. But is the alternative to have no vision - or is it to have vision (and strategy too) in ways that enhance rather than diminish participation and that challenge and undercut rather than obscure and enforce elitism?

How can we do that? By avoiding unnecessarily difficult language and using concepts that are easily understood. By sharing our vision as widely as possible. By aggressively respecting and fostering criticism and debate. Winning social justice requires vision - but not vision for a few. We need vision able to be used by and refined by all those involved in social change efforts.

Immorality

*"Does it follow that I reject all authority?
Perish the thought. In the matter of boots,
I defer to the authority of the boot-maker."
- Mikhail Bakunin*

The third worry about vision is moral. Oddly, this one seems to be least understood, even by anti-sectarian and anti-elitist commentators. Suppose we develop a brilliant vision. We share it. We work to implement it. We are flexible and anti dogmatic about it. That sounds great, right? Well, not so fast say the critics. Who are we to impose our will on future citizens?

Imagine our coming to the conclusion that the future economy should have a work day that is five hours, not eight or three. Or imagine we conclude that the future economy should produce this output, but not that output. Or the future school should be taught this, but not that. Or that all future religious celebrations should be on weekends, but not weekdays.

Vision can morally overextend even if it is personally and institutionally flexible in its creation and application. The third flaw that often cripples work based on vision is therefore that vision can be immoral in the precise sense of current people deciding future people's lives and options. Even with the best

intentions and insights, this is some people in the present imposing their will on other people in the future.

Is this avoidable? Yes and no.

No, it is not avoidable. If we have and we implement a vision, surely it is true that we have made some decisions that are going to contour and impact people in the future.

Yes, it is avoidable. Suppose the vision is only about attaining that which will allow, and even guarantee, that future people will be in position to control their own destiny. Suppose, in other words, that the vision is precisely about attaining only the changes in social institutions that have to occur if future people are to maximally control their own lives and options. In that case, it doesn't make much sense to see the vision and its implementation as limiting future people. On the contrary, the vision is empowering them - and doing no more than empowering them. The vision implements only those new institutions and roles which are essential to future people's self expression.

Vision can go too far, but if we limit vision to:

- what we can reasonably know
- we keep refining it
- we personally and collectively protect dissent and elevate diversity while sharing vision
- we confine our vision to what is essential to future freedom
- we leave it to future people to decide all the contours of their own lives

...then we can have vision and benefit from it without suffering undue losses.

Arriving at Vision

"And you, are you so forgetful of your past, is there no echo in your soul of your poets' songs, your dreamers' dreams, your rebels' calls?"

- Emma Goldman

How do we arrive at vision? How do we bend our minds, converse, assess, test, and arrive at a worthy vision which we can widely share to gain hope, orientation, and understanding? It seems quite daunting.

As with most problems, there are many conceivable approaches, but here is at least one particular answer that outlines the approach we mostly take in the next few chapters.

At the outset, we already have in hand the perspective we began developing in volume one of *Fanfare*, *Occupy Theory*. Beyond that, first, we settle on some guiding values. What is it that we desire from society and its four spheres?

This "values task" is not, we should be clear, a factual undertaking. It is about deciding what we like - not about deciding what is, or even deciding what could be. One person may like one thing. Another person may like something else. There is no way to claim the former is right, the latter is wrong, or vice versa. We are talking about preferences. We can, however, explore the moral logic and the likely social implications of various values and give context to our reasons for preferring some values over others.

Second, once we have established guiding values - not so many that our list is unworkable and not so few that it doesn't sufficiently guide us - we can move on to social relations. What are society's central functions? The main ones, our conceptual perspective already tells us, are economic, kinship, cultural, and political. They arise inexorably from our being human and thus having human needs and potentials.

But then how can society accomplish its central economic, kin, cultural, and political functions consistent with and even propelling our values? This will occur if the roles that define our society's institutions call forth from us behaviors and develop in us motives, habits, and inclinations consistent with our preferred values. It will not occur if our institution's roles undercut or even obliterate the values we prefer by inculcating in us motives, habits, and inclinations contrary to those values.

So, beyond values, the second step is about conceiving new institutions and roles, while rejecting roles and institutions that violate our values. We must advocate roles and institutions that

propel our values and that are even essential to attaining our values, but without overextending into domains where we can have no confidence or into matters about which we should not be making judgements for future people. And we should also work to ensure that our vision is accessible and manageable for all who seek social change.

The procedure is easy to state, and, surprisingly, you may also find, it is not all that hard to do. We can occupy vision, on behalf of creating a new world, by our own will and exertion. No enemy prevents us from arriving at vision.

Chapter One

Visionary Patterns

*"One can never consent to creep
when one feels an impulse to soar."
- Helen Keller*

This chapter seeks a short list of values to guide our efforts to envision core institutions for a future desirable society. We list seven values - a short list just sufficient to inform our efforts. The values each correspond to an aspect of life and, perhaps unsurprisingly, most of the values are commonplace and uncontroversial. These values will later guide our search for worthy institutions, where we will have to refine and apply them to the particular spheres of life we are dealing with.

Relations Among People: Solidarity

*"If we don't stand for something, we may fall
for anything."
- Malcolm X*

Societies and each of their four spheres affect how people interrelate. Do institutions cause us to treat each other instrumentally, as means to ends? Do we scramble over each other, some winning only when others lose? Do our roles cause us to become isolated and individualistic - even anti social - in the worst sense?

Well, yes, those debits are normal to contemporary life. But what values would we rather have to organize relations among people? What do we value regarding relating to others? Our answer is we value solidarity.

Other things being equal, we want our institutions - in all of society's defining spheres of life - to cause us to have shared, rather than contending, interests. We want our daily activities to make us more, not less, concerned with the well being of others. We prefer empathy to antipathy.

We want institutions which cause looking out for ourselves and looking out for others to be almost always the same thing and to be, at least, non conflicting.

I benefit, then others benefit too. Others benefit, then so do I. None of us should benefit at the expense of others. All of us should benefit to the advantage of others. Society should promote solidarity. Institutions in each sphere should cause people to have compatible rather than opposed interests so that each benefits from other's gains, rather than some gaining as others lose.

Solidarity is our first value, and it isn't controversial. Indeed, one would have to be a psychopath to say that other things equal, one prefers anti sociality to solidarity.

Options for People: Diversity

*"A fashion is nothing
but an induced epidemic."
– George Bernard Shaw*

Society and its defining institutions dramatically impact the range of available options people can choose from. None of us live forever. We can't enjoy doing every conceivable thing. None of us are omniscient. We can't always know for sure the best way to proceed.

If everyone does the same things you do - if we all act alike, all follow one path, all explore one solution, all implement one approach - then all other possibilities are gone for each of us. There are two very serious problems with trends toward homogeneity.

With homogeneity, we lose the benefit of vicariously enjoying what we ourselves can't, or don't have time, or don't wish to do. We can only vicariously enjoy acts that we don't undertake. We can only learn their lessons, enjoy their beauty, be edified by their wisdom, if others undertake them. And that requires diversity.

With homogeneity, we also suffer more when there are mistakes because don't have a fallback position to adopt when a preferred approach proves faulty. We don't have other options which we can switch to because if society is typically homogenous, then when we choose a wrong path, everyone else is on that wrong path, too.

Our value for options is diversity. It doesn't mean we should multiply available paths without limit just for the sake of a higher tally. But it does mean we should studiously avoid narrowing options at the expense of enjoying vicariously what others can do as well as being prepared to correct faults. And it means this for each of our four spheres.

No one who is mentally stable and remotely insightful would say that, other things equal, they would prefer a society which systematically reduces available options and homogenizes outcomes as compared to a society that promotes diversity. Everyone would say that, other things equal, they prefer a society that systematically diversifies options in the name of plentiful variation and preparedness. We enjoy other peoples' contrasting and sometimes clashing choices. We don't put all our eggs in one basket. We have options. This is the meaning of diversity, our second value, and there is no need for extensive argument on its behalf, because it is uncontroversial.

Distribution of Circumstances and Benefits: Justice

*"Charity should be abolished and replaced by justice."
- Norman Bethune*

Now comes our first controversial value. Society and its defining institutions dramatically impact the distribution of material and situational responsibilities and benefits that people enjoy or suffer in their daily lives.

How much stuff do you get? What is the norm guiding what you get? What circumstances do you find yourself in? What is the rationale for your being in those circumstances? Do you get more or less than others? Why? In disputes, how is the redress of

grievances assessed? What levels of punishment, when is punishment warranted or imposed? What level of redress or reward, when redress or reward are warranted, should be given?

Our distributional value is about allocation of responsibility and benefits in all aspects of life. We call distributional outcomes that are fair - when you get that and I get this, and we both respect the outcome - just. We call distributional outcomes that we do not like unjust. In other words, we all agree to call our distributional value justice.

We also agree that what makes a particular distribution of benefits and burdens just, is that it is fair. This is circular, yet also true and will enrich or clarify the definition for some people. We want the amount that each person receives - whether in the form of material reward or desirable circumstances - to be commensurate to one's efforts in fulfilling one's responsibilities.

In a very real sense, justice is about each person getting a fair and essentially equal overall mix of benefits minus burdens. If we outlay more from our lives in taking on burdens, we should get back additional benefits to bring us back to an average or fair weight of both combined.

People are entitled, by being members of society, to a fair benefit for a fair effort. To get more benefits, we must endure more burdens. To endure fewer burdens, we must receive fewer benefits. Gain and loss should not be by luck. It should not be by taking or being taken, by demanding or being demanded. It should not be due to advantage, innate or otherwise. Fairness is that we are all equally respected and treated.

Society, in essence, has much that is burdensome to endure and much that is rewarding to enjoy. If we endure some of what's burdensome, we get to enjoy some of the benefits. The gain weighs against the cost. If we do more that needs doing, we get more benefit. If we do less, we get less benefit. If, worse still, we violate our responsibilities and not only don't add to but actually reduce society's bounty by irresponsible behaviors, then we suffer penalties. This is what we typically mean by justice. Justice is fair apportionment of burdens and benefits and it is the basic norm we shall have in mind and apply, yielding slightly different insights

and aims, in each of the four spheres due to their specific attributes. Though most details will have to wait for institutional discussions still to come, we can elaborate at least a bit more, here, this value being the most technically complicated and experientially varied of those we will seek to fulfill.

Consider economics. The issue of justice in the economy is about what income and circumstances we enjoy by virtue of fulfilling our economic responsibilities. We will deal with certain critical aspects of circumstances when we discuss economic institutions, but pending those refinements, we are asking, what is a just result regarding income distribution and circumstances? In essence, the net benefit for each person - subtracting the costs of their time and effort at work from the gains of income - ought to be the same, which is to say, it ought to be equitable or just.

The economy produces lots of stuff. Think of the output as a giant pie. What size piece do we each receive? That's income distribution. Of course, what we really get is not a giant slice of pie but a bunch of goods and services - clothes, housing, food, movies, transport, electricity, medical care, or whatever.

There are five norms of remuneration any economist has ever advocated for what should determine the income (or share of pie) people receive:

- the amount our property produces
- the amount we are strong enough to take
- the amount we ourselves produce by our efforts and sacrifices
- the level of our efforts and sacrifices as long as we are producing desired results
- and/or our need.

There are two primary considerations we have to consider in judging these norms:

- the morality of a norm for the person receiving the share of pie it implies and for all those who then get their pie from what is left, and

- the incentive effects of a norm for the size of the whole pie and thus for what anyone can receive.

Which option, or combination of options, is equitable for determining income distribution? In our view, it is remuneration for need when one cannot work and remuneration for duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially valued labor, when one can work - that is equitable. Thus, from our list above, remuneration for effort and sacrifice doing socially useful labor. We reject remuneration for property, power, and/or output as not yielding fair benefits minus burdens for each person. All this will be investigated next chapter - as well as addressing additional details regarding equity of circumstance and the incentive aspect of the various norms. But the idea should be clear - we develop values, we explore them, and we use them as a guide in defining institutions.

For kinship and culture, the key justice focus is the apportionment of benefits and responsibilities to people in their kinship and cultural practices. For kinship, do men and women, children and elderly people, gays and straights - both in the home and in kinship institutions more broadly, as well as in the rest of society - have a mix of responsibilities and benefits that distribute fairly from person to person? Within cultural communities, the same calculus needs to apply, but it also needs to apply between communities, so that different communities have the same security and potential to pursue their cultural practices vis a vis needed resources, space, safety, etc.

Regarding polity - assuming all the above are dealt with, and thus assuming that legislation abides just norms - the remaining issue is largely one of justice in the oft-used sense of determining just results of conflicts. This is partly about dealing with violations of social laws and norms and partly about resolving disputes with benefits and responsibilities. Legal justice means arriving at results that apportion benefits and punishments appropriately given past actions and future situations as well as given agreed norms and laws. Is that vague? Yes, but that is the nature of judicial applications - the range of issues is so broad, that what justice means judicially is largely contextual.

To avoid this chapter becoming too long, each of the four applications of justice will be clarified and enriched when we deal with the key defining features of a worthy vision for each of the four spheres in coming chapters. For now, justice is a value we will place in our toolbox to use in developing our vision for society.

Influence over Decisions: Self Management

*"I am truly free only when all human beings around me, men and women alike, are equally free."
- Mikhail Bakunin*

Society and its defining institutions affect the amount of say each person has in determining outcomes. What is our value for the level of decision making that people should have?

Many decision making values are propounded. Of course one wants good, insightful, caring decisions. Typically people say they want democracy, which is one person, one vote, majority rules. Others might say, well, yes, but sometimes it is better to have autocracy - an elite, however small, deciding, because they know best. Another stance is that we should mostly all agree. Or, even if we don't precisely all agree, no one should be so distraught that they want to block a choice others agree on - and thus we should decide by consensus. And then there are combinations and variants - such as needing two-thirds, or 60% or three-quarters - in favor for some decision to be enacted. Variations also arise in how long deliberations should last, who should partake in deliberations and representation - concerning issues of efficiency and how to locate and utilize expertise - and other factors, as well.

Our thinking, however, is a bit different. What do we want vis a vis decisions? What is the aim for how much say people should have? We certainly want good decisions, of course. But we also want people to have an appropriate say. Suppose we focus on the latter aim first.

What is appropriate say?

Again, this is a value - not a factual question. We can agree, hopefully, after considering options and implications, but we cannot claim a proof.

Suppose I work with a bunch of people and I want to wear brown socks instead of black or green socks, or I want to wear no clothes instead of clothes. Or say I want to put up a picture of my mate on my wall, or I want to put a stereo on my shelf and play it - very loud. Some decisions are different than others. Almost everyone would say I should get to decide alone about my socks, and my mate's picture. No one else should have a say, just me. I do it - you might even say, like Stalin - definitively dictating the results. Most would say, however, that I can't decide to go nude and dictate that outcome, alone - and certainly I can't decide to listen to loud music and dictate that outcome alone.

The difference is that some decisions affect just me - or nearly so. Other decisions affect many other people, and not just me. About the former type of decision, we tend to say, go for it. About the latter type, we tend to say, hold on, others have to be allowed to influence that decision too. Why?

The answer that strikes us as the underlying value that most of us most often feel is that people should have a say in decisions in proportion to the degree they are affected by them - or as nearly to that as we can sensibly manage without wasting time seeking a non-existent and picky perfection. Let's call that value self management.

With that value guiding us, we will use majority rules, or two-thirds, or consensus not as a matter of principal, but because one or the other best approximates self management. Sometimes, as with the sock decision, we will opt for a dictatorial approach. Other times we will favor more inclusive modes of arriving at preferences.

Self management is something we take more or less for granted inside groups of friends and even, to an extent, with peers at work and in other venues. Only in particular institutions with particular role structures that apportion influence differentially, do we typically drop our allegiance to self management.

Well, is there something wrong with self management? What controversy does it arouse? Should it be dropped?

The rejectionist case is that self management dilutes the quality of decisions. The idea is that some people are better at

decisions - the experts. So to get the best, or even just good, decisions we need to give experts disproportionate say based on their skills at decision making - even when they are not most affected by the decisions.

That is the logic. What are its merits?

We should be careful here. We do prefer good decisions to bad ones. And expertise is important when making good decisions. But what is often needed is expert knowledge of implications, and once we consult experts and have that information at our disposal, why should the experts be given more say than is warranted by how much they will be affected? This would only make sense if understanding the implications - even after they were clearly spelled out - required the expert's knowledge. Typically, it doesn't.

And we have to be careful about the word "understand" here. If the experts say the bridge will collapse if we make decision X, and the bridge will be fine if we make decision Y - we don't have to be able to replicate or fully understand how they arrived at their conclusion. We have to be able to judge if they are reliable, and we have to be sure the situation doesn't give them perverse motives, and then decide how we feel about the bridge failing as compared to the bridge persisting in place.

Notice, if anyone really accepted the logic that says experts need to decide, it would not only rebut the merits of self management, but also the merits of democracy.

There is another hole in this critical mindset, once one seriously considers it. There is a particular kind of information, very relevant to arriving at good decisions, which not only requires expertise, but for which the only way to account for this knowledge is by allotting influence according to the norms of self management.

While one component of deciding if we should or shouldn't do X is what will be the implications of doing X, perhaps determined by experts, a second component is, how do I, you, and others feel about X's implications. And regarding our own preferences, each of us is the world's foremost expert. So, it follows that when discussing options and deliberating about them it is very important to consult those with special relevant knowledge, including often

giving them more time and space to explain their insights than many other folks enjoy to offer their comments. But when we are actually tallying opinions to settle on a decision, then paying attention to expertise means we must let each person determine their own preferences and register them. That is the only way to tally preferences accurately.

So, as with all values, it comes down to whether we like self management or not, ethically and pragmatically, given its implications for the quality of decisions, the degree of participation, etc. Hopefully, as we see self management's implications for institutions unfold, its merits will become obvious. But clearly, self management means basically the same thing in each of the four spheres - when economic, kinship, cultural, and political decisions are to be made, methods should give people a say that is roughly proportionate to the degree they are affected.

Relations to Nature: Stewardship

*"We do not inherit the land from our ancestors,
we borrow it from our children."
- Native American Proverb*

People and the environment exist entwined. There is us. There are our artifacts. And there is the rest. But, of course, nature impinges on and helps define us and we impinge on and help define nature - both to such an extent that viewed differently, there is really only one highly entwined whole. Still, regarding what we broadly mean by nature, what is the value we would like to see a new society abide and even foster?

The usual answer from virtually everyone who addresses this issue is sustainability. We should behave in ways that allow us to continue behaving. We should not behave in ways whose implications, over time, are to disrupt nature so much that our behaving is no longer possible. I can't see how anyone could question this value other than from the direction of saying it isn't enough. Sustainability says, taken literally, society should not

commit suicide by way of environmental degradation. Well, yes, of course.

Can we go beyond this? Yes, though not with great precision. We could say, and I think we ought to say, we want stewardship. This word implies we are not only relating to the environment for the continuation our own future, but also for the effect on us and on the environment insofar as it creates a new context at all. Does a proposed act's impact on the environment benefit or hurt human growth and development. If it benefits us, okay. If it hurts us, then there needs to be larger, offsetting benefits or we should desist.

Even more, however, the word stewardship conveys that humans are taking responsibility for the environment beyond considering nature's impact on us. Seeking to be good stewards opens the possibility that we seek to preserve, protect, and even nurture aspects of nature in their own right. What aspects? Well, that's a future decision. Perhaps it will be obvious at times. Perhaps it will be contentious. Maybe species. Maybe natural environments.

The point of the value is to say we recognize that change in the environment due to our actions rebounds on us, and we should take that into account. We shouldn't commit environmental suicide and, indeed, we try to affect the environment in ways beneficial for the human community. We also consider environmental, and particularly natural, forms and conditions. We act on behalf of the environment like we act on behalf of future generations - because neither can speak for themselves.

Our guess is that as with Solidarity and Diversity, Stewardship is also uncontroversial, save in disputes about specific implementations. Other things equal, only an odd person would say let's joyously pillage the environment to death.

Internationalism

"The individual whose vision encompasses the whole world often feels nowhere so hedged in and out of touch with his surroundings as in his native land."

- Emma Goldman

In one sense, our value for international relations can be said to be just the other values writ larger. But, to keep our eyes on the issue, which is what concepts are for, we will give this value its own name and clarify it a bit. We can call it Internationalism, where being internationalist means that each society should regard the world arena as its social context and should wish to be comfortable and benefit by its relations to other societies, but also to have other societies do likewise.

What hurts everybody is when the international arena yields hostilities waged by sword or by pen. So we need international solidarity. But what constitutes it?

To homogenize the world would be to rob it of its richness and suffer horrible loss due to diminished vicarious experiences and a cessation of experiment and exploration of alternatives. We need international diversity. We don't want hostility, we want sociality. We need solidarity. Fairness for anyone requires fairness for everyone, so we also need international justice. Surely people in the world should all have the same norm for degrees of influence over their own and world affairs. Thus we should favor international self management. The ecology of the planet obviously requires the same attentiveness as the ecology within any one country - so we favor international stewardship.

Internationalism means each nation respects, learns from, and assists other nations so that there are steadily diminishing and then no new emergence of significant differences in per capita wealth, influence, or circumstances from nation to nation, yielding a condition of mutual aid, learning, and peace.

These international aims are familiar aspirations, posed and preached in many versions, that we think pretty much everyone caring and sensible would align with - other things equal. Of course, other things are typically not equal, and wide allegiance to internationalism typically disappears whenever the self interested domestic pursuits of any one nation can be advanced by imperial behavior toward others - most often as an outgrowth of domestic social structures. So the basis of internationalism is ultimately to (a) clean up the domestic front by achieving the values above in each society, and (b) establish not only a norm, but also means of

fulfilling those values internationally as well. Clearly this entails focusing on the institutional conditions of internationalism, which applies to all the other values as well.

Where We Fit: Participation

*"The heart has its reasons
which reason knows nothing of. "
- Blaise Pascal*

When we soon examine the implications of implementing the above values throughout each of society's four spheres and two contexts, we will see that their establishment implies and requires the elimination of divisions of people into opposed sectors along kinship, community, political, or economic lines. This entails what we call feminism, intercommunalism, participatory politics, and participatory economics replacing sexism, homophobia, racism, ethnocentrism, classism and other forms of cultural, gender, political, and economic oppression with the pursuit and fulfillment of solidarity, diversity, justice, and self management. We will see what this looks like, and institutionally requires, in coming chapters.

How do we arrive at vision for all this? The task is to respect and apply the values discussed above. In the domain of society and history, if a particular set of institutions violates one's values in unjustifiable ways, especially if the violation is extreme and intrinsic, then those institutions are not worthy of support. To reject oppressive institutions is morally and logically consistent. Anything less is hypocrisy.

If I say that I value solidarity but I advocate social relations that produce anti sociality - it means I am seriously confused, lying, or delusional. The same applies if I advocate diversity, justice, self management, stewardship, or internationalism, but support institutions that obliterate one or more of these values, not merely when there is some worthy reason why it must temporarily be done, but centrally, perpetually, and inexorably, with reasons that themselves violate the values.

If we take this brief chapter seriously, we are all potential revolutionaries, because we reject the defining institutions of modern societies due to the central, uncorrectable, and inexorable ways they violate our values.

Chapter Two

Beyond Class Rule is Parecon

"If all economists were laid end to end, they would not reach a conclusion."

- George Bernard Shaw

As per the logic of the past two chapters, our visionary task is to conceive institutions consistent with our values for each major social sphere of society. Dealing with economy means conceiving economic institutions for production, consumption, and allocation. We call our economic vision, which has come into being over the last twenty years or so, participatory economics, or parecon for short.

Parecon's Values

"Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen six, result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pound ought and six, result misery."

- Charles Dickens

Translating our preferred values, which we proposed last chapter, into their meaning in the economic sphere will get us started toward arriving at an economic vision.

Solidarity

"Sociability is as much a law of nature as mutual struggle... mutual aid is as much a law of animal life as mutual struggle."

- Peter Kropotkin

The first value we settled on addressed relations among people. In capitalist economics, to increase your income and power you must ignore the horrible pain suffered by those left below or even help push them farther down. This is not rhetoric, it is the logic of the roles owner and worker and buyer and seller. Greed is good, runs the mantra.

In contrast to the capitalist rat race, a good economy should be a solidarity economy generating sociality rather than anti-social greed. A good economy's institutions for production, consumption, and allocation should, therefore, by the roles they offer, propel even anti-social people into having to address other people's well being if they are to advance their own well being. Getting ahead in a good economy should derive from, and depend on, others getting ahead as well. When we act to better our lot, in a good society, we become more solidaritous with others rather than having to pervert ourselves to be hostile to others.

Interestingly, this first economic value, so contrary to the capitalist logic of "me first and everyone else be damned," is entirely uncontroversial. Who would argue that an economy would be better if it produced, in the process of delivering the goods, more hostility and anti-sociality in its participants than if it produced more mutual concern in its participants? Who would rather live in a hostile dystopian realm of nastiness than in a realm of mutual aid? We desire solidarity, not anti-sociality.

Diversity

*"So long as the water is troubled it cannot become stagnant."
- James Baldwin*

Our second value has to do with the options people encounter in their economic lives. Capitalist market rhetoric trumpets opportunity but capitalist market discipline curtails satisfaction and development by replacing what is human and caring with what is commercial, profitable, and in accord with existing hierarchies of power and wealth. In the process of doing this, market diversity is constrained to not include humane options. We get Pepsi and Coke but we do not get soda that takes into account the well being of

soda producers, soda consumers, or the environment. The tremendous variety of tastes, preferences, and choices that humans naturally display are truncated by capitalism into conformist patterns imposed by advertising, narrow role offerings, and coercive marketing environments that produce commercial attitudes and habits. Yes, we get variety in the Mall and the corporate workplace, but there are tight constraints on just how varied they are and, in particular, these constraints rule out options that account for human well being and development for all above profit and power for the few.

In capitalism, those who control outcomes seek the most profitable method instead of many parallel methods suiting a range of priorities. They seek the biggest, quickest, brightest of almost everything, if that is what they can sell most widely - without undercutting hierarchies of power and wealth. This virtually always crowds out more diverse choices that would support greater and more widespread fulfillment and, most important, affect people's knowledge, skills, confidence, and ties in ways contrary to elite domination. People do this not because they have anti-social and homogenist genes, but because their positions as owners of capitalist firms requires these choices.

In the economy that we seek, given our values, we instead want economic institutions that not only wouldn't reduce variety but that would emphasize finding and respecting diverse solutions to problems. A good economy would recognize that we are finite beings who can benefit from enjoying what others do that we ourselves have no time to do, and that we are fallible beings who should not vest all our hopes in single routes of advance but should instead insure against damage by exploring diverse parallel avenues and options. Even when we think there is one best way most of the time, in fact, it is not the case. We should rarely, if ever, put all our eggs in one basket, shutting down all other options.

Diversity, like solidarity, is uncontroversial. Again, it would be perverse to argue that all other things equal, an economy is better if it homogenizes and narrows options than if it diversifies and expands them. Though we should add, this doesn't imply that we

think all things are equally desirable, or that adding option after option is better than not ruling out some options. In particular we should rule out options whose inclusion tends to rule out many or even most other options. And we should also rule out options that violate other values we hold dear. Not confining ourselves to narrow single conceptions isn't the same thing as everything is welcome.

Equity

"The love of money as a possession—as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the enjoyments and realities of life—will be recognized for what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity."

- John Maynard Keynes

The third value we discussed earlier was equity or fairness regarding what each actor enjoys. This value, particularly applied to economics, is more controversial and it will need extra attention.

Capitalism overwhelmingly rewards property and bargaining power. It says those who own productive property deserve profits based on the productivity of that property. And those who have great bargaining power - from a monopoly of knowledge or skills, access to better tools or organization, being born with special talents, or being able to command with brute force - are entitled to receive whatever they can take.

Obviously real fairness entails eliminating the property and power roads to well being. But, more positively, equitable economic institutions should not only not obstruct equity, they should propel it.

So what is equity? Well, it can't be equitable that due to having a deed in your pocket you earn 100, 1000, or even 10 million times the income some other person earns who works harder and longer. To inherit ownership - and by virtue of that ownership vastly exceed others in circumstance and influence - cannot possibly be equitable.

And it also can't be equitable to reward power with income. The logic of the Mafia - which is the same as the logic of Wall Street which is the same as the logic of the Harvard Business School - are that each actor should earn as remuneration for their

economic activity whatever they are strong enough to take. This norm promotes not equitable outcomes, but thuggery. If your union is stronger, you get more - if weaker you get less. If you have a monopoly on some assets that convey power, you can take more, if you don't, less. If your constituency suffers some denial in society - due to sexism, say, or racism - your power is lower than many others, and you can take less. Since we are civilized, we of course reject all this.

What about output as a basis for income? Should people get back from the social product an amount determined by what they produce as part of that social product? After all, what reason can justify that we should get less than what we contribute? In that case, someone is taking part of the wealth I create. Or what reason could justify that we should get more than our own contribution? I am going to take some of the wealth others create. Shouldn't we each get an income based only on the amount we produce?

This seems obvious to many caring and humane people - including most anti capitalists through history. But is it morally or economically sound? Suppose Jack and Catherine do the same work for the same length of time at the same intensity. If Catherine has better tools with which to generate more output, should she get more income than Jack who has worse tools and, as a result, generates less output even though he is working as hard or harder? Some may say yes. Others may say no. This is about what we prefer. All we can do to choose a norm for remuneration is to look at the implications of any proposed preference and spell them out more carefully, and then decide what we do, or do not, like.

Should someone who happens to be employed producing something highly valued be rewarded more than someone who is employed producing something less valued? Even though the latter is still socially desired and important to provide? Even if the less productive person works equally hard and equally long and endures similar conditions as the more productive person?

Similarly, should someone who was lucky in the genetic lottery, perhaps inheriting genes for big size, musical talent, tremendous reflexes, peripheral vision, or conceptual competency, get rewarded more than someone who was genetically less lucky?

In this case, it isn't that you luckily have better tools or luckily happen to be producing something of great value, it is that you were born with a wonderful attribute you didn't do anything to get. Why on top of the luck of your genetic inheritance, should economic institutions reward you with greater income as well? There is no incentive effect or high morality in such a choice.

In light of the implicit logic of all these examples, we should consider the idea that to be equitable, remuneration should be for effort and sacrifice in producing socially desired items.

If I work longer, in this view, I should get more reward. If I work harder, I should get more reward. And if I work in worse conditions and at more onerous tasks, I should get more reward. However, I should not get more for having better tools, or for producing something that happens to be valued more highly, or for having innate highly productive talents. Nor should I get more even for the output of learned skills - though I should be rewarded for the effort and sacrifice of learning those skills. Nor, of course, should I get more for work that isn't socially warranted.

Unlike our first two values, solidarity and diversity, this third economic value of remuneration for effort and sacrifice is quite controversial.

Some anti-capitalists think that people should be rewarded for the overall volume of their output, so that a great athlete should earn a fortune since people in society highly value watching him or her play. A good doctor should earn way more than a hard-working farmer or short-order cook, since an operation that saves a life is more valued than a dinner or some additional corn. An equitable economy, however - or, at any rate, a participatory economy - rejects that norm.

Participatory economic equity, as advocated in this chapter, instead requires that assuming comparable intensity and duration of work, a person who has a nice, comfortable, pleasant, and highly productive job should earn less than a person who has an onerous, debilitating, and less productive - but still socially valuable and warranted job - due to the sacrifice endured. The participatory economy rewards effort and sacrifice endured producing socially valued labor. It does not reward property,

power, or output. You have to produce socially valued output commensurate to the productivity of your tools and conditions, otherwise you are wasting assets and not benefiting society. You are not remunerated in accord with the value of your output, but in accord with the effort and sacrifice you expend generating that output.

Two other anti-capitalist stances regarding remuneration claim many advocates, and we should consider those too. The first says work itself is intrinsically negative. Why should anyone thinking about a better economy think in terms of organizing or apportioning work? Why not just eliminate work?

This stance correctly notices that our efforts to innovate should seek to diminish the onerous or otherwise adverse features of work. But it moves from that worthy advisory to suggesting that we should entirely eliminate work, which is obviously nonsense.

First, work yields results we can't do without. The bounty that work generates justifies the costs of undertaking it. In a good economy, people would desist from excess work rather than suffer only insufficient returns for it. We expend our effort and make associated sacrifices only up to the point where the value of the income we receive outweighs the costs of the exertions we undertake. At that point, we opt for leisure, not for more work. I want some stuff, so I am going to work, but I don't want so much stuff that I will work myself at all hours, at a breakneck pace, or in odious conditions. Nor will I forget that it is desirable to change work to make it more pleasurable, less painful, interesting, social, less boring and fragmenting, more sustainable, less pollutive, more productive, less wasteful.

As the famed geographer and anarchist Peter Kropotkin argued:

“Overwork is repulsive to human nature - not work. Overwork for supplying the few with luxury - not work for the well-being of all. Work, labor, is a physiological necessity, a necessity of spending accumulated bodily energy, a necessity which is health and life itself.”

In other words, the merits of work are not solely in its outputs, but also in the process and the act itself. We want to eliminate

work that is onerous and debilitating, but we do not want to eliminate work, per se. We need to keep work, partly because of the outputs, but also partly because of the fulfillment that comes from the labor itself. So about the advisory that we should reject work per se, we instead reject the rejecting of work per se.

The second anti-capitalist remunerative stance claims that the only criteria for remuneration ought to be human need. We should follow the advisory, “From each according to ability, to each according to need.”

What this stance, rightly, highlights is that people deserve respect and support by virtue of their very existence. If a person can’t work for reasons of health, surely we don’t starve them or deny them income at the level others enjoy. Their needs, modulated in accord with social averages, should be met. If, likewise, someone has special medical needs, these should also be met.

So far, so good. The problem with rewarding need arises not when we are dealing with people who are physically or mentally unable to work, for which the advisory makes perfect sense, but when we try to apply the norm to people who can work but choose not to.

For example, can I forego work and still benefit from society’s output? Can I forego work and consume as much I choose? If we say yes, then why won’t people choose to work relatively little and yet consume a whole lot?

Usually what those who advocate payment for need and people working to capacity have in mind, is that each person will responsibly opt for an appropriate share of consumption and responsibly contribute an appropriate amount of work.

But how does anyone know what is appropriate to consume or to produce? And, more subtly, how does the economy determine what is appropriate?

It turns out that in practice the norm “work to ability and consume to need” becomes, for those who advocate it, work and consume in accord with the social averages unless you have a good reason not to. Advocates of the norm believe people will

responsibly go over and under social averages only when it is warranted.

But when is deviating from the average warranted? Won't one person think it is okay for so and so reason, and another person think it isn't? How does anyone even know what the social averages are? If we are all just working to the extent we choose and taking content to the extent we choose, what way is there to measure either? How does the economy decide how much of anything to produce? How does anyone know the relative values of outputs to needs if we have no measure of the value of the labor - or other inputs involved in their production - or of the extent to which anyone wants the outputs? How do we know if labor - or other assets - are apportioned sensibly? Do we need innovations to increase output of some items or should we diminish output of others? How do we know where to invest to improve work conditions or to generate much desired output rather than other stuff that is consumed, but not much appreciated?

Whether one believes that remuneration for need and working to one's ability is a higher moral norm than remuneration for effort and sacrifice - and this is an open question that reasonable people can certainly differ about - the former is not practical unless there is a way to measure need and ability, plus a way to value different labor types, plus a way for people to determine what is warranted behavior, plus an expectation that we will all only do what is warranted.

All these qualifying requirements are precisely what remunerating effort and sacrifice instead of need makes real, even as it also enables people to work and consume more or less as they choose, and permits everyone to judge relative values in tune with true social costs and benefits. In other words, the idea behind the desire to remunerate only need and to work up to ability are fulfilled most desirably and fully by remunerating for the duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially valued labor.

So, our third economic value is a controversial one, even among anti-capitalists. We want a good economy to remunerate duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially valuable labor, and, when people can't work, to provide income and health care based

on need. Of course as with solidarity and diversity, we have to see if we can conceive institutions to deliver these values without incurring mitigating losses.

Self Management

*"Never send to know for whom the
bell tolls; it tolls for thee."
- John Donne*

Our fourth value to translate to the economy has to do with decisions.

In capitalism, owners have tremendous say. Managers and high-level lawyers, engineers, financial officers, and doctors - each of whom monopolize empowering work and daily decision-making positions - are part of what we have called the coordinator class and have substantial say. However, people doing rote and obedient labor rarely even know what decisions are being made, much less influence them.

In contrast, we want a good economy to be a richly democratic economy where people have control over their own lives consistent with others doing likewise. Each person should have a level of influence that won't impinge on other people's rights to have the same level of influence. We each affect decisions in proportion to how we are affected by them. This is called self management.

Imagine that a worker wants to place a picture of his daughter on the wall in his work area. Who should make that decision? Should some owner decide? Should a manager decide? Should all the workers decide? Obviously none of that makes much sense. The worker whose child it is should decide, alone, with full authority. He should be a dictator in this particular case. It is the wall of my office or work area so I should decide. Sometimes making decisions unilaterally makes sense.

Now suppose instead that a worker wants to put a radio on her desk to play loud, raucous, rock and roll all day long. Who should decide? My office, my desk, my ears, I decide? No, obviously not, because it isn't only my ears that will hear it. We all intuitively know that the answer is that all those who will hear the radio should have a say, and that those who will be more bothered -or

more benefited - should have more say. The worker no longer gets to be a dictator, nor does anyone else.

At this point, we have implicitly arrived at a decision making value. We easily realize that we don't want a majority to decide everything all the time. We do not always want one person one vote with some other percentage deciding. We do not always want one person to decide authoritatively, as a dictator. Nor do we always want consensus, or any other single approach to discussing issues, expressing preferences, and tallying votes. All the possible methods of making decisions make sense in some cases, but are horribly unfair, intrusive, or authoritarian in other cases because different decisions require different approaches.

What we hope to accomplish when we choose from among all possible institutional means of discussing issues, setting agendas, sharing information, and, finally, making decisions, is that each person influences decisions in proportion to the degree he or she is affected by them. And that is our fourth participatory economic value, economic self management.

Problems with Our Values?

"If you want to know what God thinks of money, just look at the people he gave it to."

- Dorothy Parker

Before moving on to try to implement our values via institutions, we should consider whether they have any problems. Let's take each in turn, even if only briefly.

Is there any problem with an economy generating solidarity among its actors. Well, someone could say it will make us uncritical, so that we interact with one another only with praise, only with flattery, and so on. But, of course, that isn't solidarity - which is, instead, premised on honesty, concern, empathy, mutual aid, and, in particular, at rock bottom, shared interests.

Diversity? Well, someone might say if you emphasize diversity you might add options ad infinitum crowding out the excellent with the mediocre. True enough. Sort of like objecting to

saying Vitamin C is good for you by noting that if you have a pound of it a day you won't last long.

Equity is another issue. Here reasonable people are going to very quickly have severe doubts. The argument goes like this. If you remunerate for duration, intensity, and onerousness, why would I become a surgeon? I can make as much - in fact I can make more - working in a coal mine. So I will opt for that, or for something like that. And so will everyone who would have been a surgeon in a capitalist economy. And as a result we will all die for want of medical care. If this reaction is accurate, our value is suicidal. The critic says parecon's equity value generates insufficient incentives to produce what society needs.

The rest of the logic, when pursued a bit deeper, says becoming a surgeon takes so long and is so difficult, I won't do it unless I get rewarded appropriately. When speaking to all kinds of audiences, all over the world, this objection always comes up, always in virtually the exact same form, and always offered with absolute confidence. One response is to do a little thought experiment with folks, to test the logic of their claim.

Point to two folks in the audience and say, okay, you (the first one) are just getting out of high school and going to work in a coal mine, or something comparable, for, let's say, \$50,000 a year.

You (the second one) are also just getting out of high school but are going to go to college, then medical school, and then be an intern for a couple of years, and then be a surgeon - earning \$500,000 a year.

What the critics of parecon's remuneration are telling us is that going to college is so much worse than being in the coal mine for those four years, and then going to medical school is so much worse than being in the coal mine, and then being an intern is so much worse (and here there is at least some minuscule possibility of it being at least plausible), that after those years, for the next forty, the doctor needs to earn ten times what the coal miner earns. An advocate of our equity value says that is total malarky. We say the doctor earns more only because he or she can take more. We say the doctor doesn't need it as an incentive, or wouldn't, if things were arranged differently. So let's test which is the case.

Then you could say say to person two, suppose we drop your income as a surgeon to \$400,000. Will you forego college, medical school, and being an intern, as well as then being a surgeon, to instead go into the mine, or work on an assembly line, or cook burgers, or whatever? No?

Okay, how about \$300,000, \$200,000...\$50,000, \$40,000 - and with every audience, not most, but every single one, you will get the same result. The person will ask you, what's the minimum I can survive on. I am going to be a surgeon, or lawyer, or engineer, or whatever - not a coal miner, or a short order cook, etc., down to whatever pay level I can manage to survive on.

The truth is, what we need an incentive for is to do that which is more oppressive to us - so, we need an incentive to work longer, harder, or at worse conditions. And then some holdout critic says, what about medical school? And you might answer that you will get income according to effort and sacrifice while in school, of course. But, please, don't make believe that going to medical school would be harder than digging coal.

You might also point out, just to round out this thought experiment, that being an intern in a hospital has almost zero to do with good health care. Being up for thirty hours and handling emergencies is not good health care and, instead, has to do with socializing the new doctor into the community of doctors by instilling a willingness to pursue profit for the hospital and riches for oneself even at the cost of health care. Indeed, being an intern is like fraternity hazing, or, more aptly, boot camp in the army that gets soldiers ready to kill without remorse. It generally takes only minutes to achieve consensus with any audience, even pre med students, on what being an intern is about - or lawyers, who go through a similar hazing/socializing process - which reveals the extent to which everyone knows that everything is perversely organized on behalf of elite benefit no matter the cost to others.

Other problems with equitable remuneration are more practical and can only be addressed once we discuss participatory economic institutions.

So what about problems with the fourth value? Self management? Here, too, there is an almost universal objection. If

all people - save, presumably, those in a coma or literally unable to cognitively function - have a say in proportion as they are affected, we will get horrible decisions, says the critic. His or her logic is that decisions involve serious thinking and some people are much better at making decisions than others. If we are all making decision we will get bad decisions compared to if we have the experts decide.

In response, first, while the critic may think they are just rejecting self management, in fact it is instructive to point out that their complaint also rejects democracy, and even, arguably, makes a case for dictatorship. Thus, if Joe Stalin happened to be the best decision maker in society, then, by the critic's logic, why shouldn't Joe Stalin decide everything? The point of this observation is to convey that while the quality of a decision is important, so is participation, for many reasons. We don't argue against having a dictator solely on the grounds that Stalin isn't omniscient and/or is malevolent.

We might also say to the critic that we agree that expertise is very important to good decisions. And then we ask the critic, "who is the world's foremost expert regarding what your preferences are?" The critic invariably replies that he or she is. And we then point out that by the stated logic, that means that when it is time to consult people's preferences and to tally those preferences into a decision, each of us is the person to consult as the best expert in our preferences.

Next, since this isn't enough to seal the case, we tend to give some examples of a simple decision. For example, imagine we are a workplace. We are going to paint the walls and we need to decide the paint to use. There are three cans, one of them is lead based. That, however, happens to be the one that most people like the look of. We agree that the impact of the paint on the wall on each is such that in this case majority rule makes sense. We are all very comparably affected. So we vote and the lead paint wins. In fact, only the expert chemist who knows about lead in paint - this is fifty years ago - votes against using that can. So we screw ourselves. What's the lesson?

And everyone says, well, we should have found out the expert's knowledge and taken it into account. And we say, of course. We don't let the chemist decide for us. But we do consult the chemist. We don't let experts decide everything, but we do consult experts, and then they, and we, self manage our circumstances.

When people ask, what do you want for the economy?, at this point in our discussion we can reasonably say we want solidarity, diversity, equity, and self management, but we need to be aware this doesn't fully answer their question. If we advocate institutions whose logic leads to outcomes contrary to those values - such as markets, corporate organization, and private ownership - what good is our rhetorical attachment to the fine values? Bill Clinton and Bill Gates would probably say they too like solidarity, diversity, equity, and maybe even self management, but would add that reality requires some minor compromises - which, however, lead to wars, starvation, indignity, etc., for the rest of us, plus their personal enrichment and empowerment. So we need to advocate worthy values, yes, but we also need to advocate a set of institutions that can make our worthy values real without compromising economic success.

Workers and Consumers Councils

*"The dream is real, my friends.
The failure to make it work is the unreality."
- Toni Cade Bambara*

Workers and consumers need a place to express their preferences if they are to self manage their economic actions as our values advocate. Historically, when workers and consumers have attempted to seize control of their own lives, they have invariably created workers and consumers councils. This is true in a participatory economy, as well, except that in the parecon case workers and consumers councils include an additional explicit commitment to self management. Parecon's councils use decision-making procedures and modes of communication that give each

member a degree of say in each decision proportionate to the degree he or she is affected.

Council decisions could sometimes be resolved by majority vote, three-quarters, two-thirds, consensus, or other possibilities. Different procedures could be used for different decisions, including involving fewer or more participants and using different information dispersal and discussion procedures or different voting and tallying methods.

Consider, as an example, a publishing house. It could have teams addressing different functions such as promotion, book production, editing, etc. Each team might make its own workday decisions in the context of broader policies decided by the whole workers council. Decisions to publish a book might involve teams in related areas, and might require a two-thirds or three-quarters positive vote, including considerable time for appraisals and re-appraisals. Many other decisions in the workplace could be one-person one-vote by the workers affected, or could require slightly different vote counts or methods of challenging outcomes. Hiring might require consensus in the workgroup that the new person would join, because a new worker can have a tremendous effect on each person in a group that he or she is constantly working with.

The point is, workers decide in groups of councils and teams both broad and narrower workplace decisions, including both the norms and the methods for decision making, and then also the day to day and more policy-oriented choices.

Those who consume the workplace's books, bicycles, or band-aids are affected and must, in turn, have some say. Even those who are unable to get some other product because energy, time, and assets went to the books, bicycles, or band-aids and not to produce what they wanted, are affected and so must be able to influence the choice. And even those tangentially affected such as by derivative pollution, also have to have influence, and sometimes collectively a lot of influence. But accommodating the will of the workers with the will of other actors in an appropriate balance is a matter of allocation, not of workplace organization, so these matters will be addressed a bit later.

Remuneration for Effort and Sacrifice

*"I'd like to live as a poor man with lots of money."
- Pablo Picasso*

Parecon's next institutional commitment is to remunerate for effort and sacrifice, not for property, power, or even output. But who decides how hard we have worked? Clearly our workers councils decide - our fellow workers - including respecting the broad economic norms established by all the economy's institutions.

If you work longer, and you do it effectively, you are entitled to more of the social product. If you work more intensely, to socially useful ends, again you are entitled to more income. If you work at more onerous, dangerous, or boring - but still socially warranted tasks - you are entitled to more.

But you aren't entitled to more income by virtue of owning productive property, because no one will own productive property in a parecon. And you won't be entitled to more income because you work with better tools, or produce something more valued, or even have personal traits that make you more productive, because these attributes don't involve effort or sacrifice but instead luck and endowment. Your work certainly has to be socially useful to be rewarded, but the reward is not proportional to how useful it is. Effort, duration, and sacrifice expended producing outputs that aren't desired is not remunerable labor.

Greater output with less waste is appreciated, of course, and it is important that the means of accomplishing it are utilized, but there is no extra pay for greater output. Yes, my working longer or harder yields more output, and greater output can even be a revealing indicator of my greater effort. But while output is often relevant as an indicator, the absolute level of output is beside the point as a means of establishing the level of remuneration, other than perhaps helping indicate how long I worked or how hard, and whether my work was socially useful.

Rewarding output is not only morally unwarranted, it is far from the best way of providing people with an incentive to

increase output, since output depends on tools, genetic endowment, colleagues, and other factors we have no individual control over.

If one is concerned with increasing each worker's output by offering incentives, one should remunerate effort expended in producing socially valued labor. Effort is the variable the worker controls that impacts output. It's as simple as that.

Some on the Left, however, continue to reject remuneration for effort and sacrifice on the ground that this is what we have now with capitalism. Workers rent themselves out to capitalists and are rewarded more supposedly for working harder and longer. When they hear parecon advocates proposing effort and sacrifice as a fair criteria for remuneration they feel that we have missed the point and will not transcend the rat race generated by the dynamics of capitalist economics.

This view is, however, a result of an analytical error. In fact, capitalism does not remunerate for how hard or how long we work - although it can seem that way when we think in terms of hourly rates. Rather, capitalism remunerates for private ownership and for bargaining power. If you are a worker, your hourly rate will be determined by your bargaining power which, in turn, derives from your job description, type of workplace organization, monopoly over skills or knowledge, etc. So, for example, doctors have more bargaining power than nurses due to having a monopoly on valuable knowledge and skills, and, as a result, get vastly better pay.

This may seem like remuneration for how hard and how long one works, but it isn't. The rat race that Leftists rightly want to transcend is a product of the class system which is tied up with private ownership and the corporate division of labor - and particularly market competition - all of which are addressed by parecon.

But what about the workplace as a whole? The way it works is pretty straightforward. The workplace has certain assets - building, equipment, workforce, inputs in the form of resources or intermediate goods, etc. For the work that is done in the workplace to be considered socially useful, those assets have to be wisely used. Suppose my workplace has assets such that with an average

duration and intensity of work its output level should be X. Suppose instead its output level is 90% of X. We can't claim average income, but only 90% of average income. How we divide that up internally depends on how long you worked, how long I worked, how intensely, etc. But the total amount we have for the workforce depends on the workplace using its assets well. The need for work to be socially valuable to be remunerated is what provides the whole workplace an incentive to use good equipment well, to organize and operate wisely, etc. The remuneration for effort and sacrifice for each person provides incentive for needed labor. The whole calculus follows our values. It is equitable, yet also elicits desirable behavior that makes effective use of equipment, the talents of workers, etc.

Both morally and in terms of incentives, parecon does what makes sense. We get extra pay, when we deserve it, for our sacrifice at work. The economy elicits the appropriate use of productive capacities by providing incentives to the whole workplace to properly utilize technology, organization, resources, energy, and skills, so that the work that is done is all socially useful.

Balanced Job Complexes

"I am somehow less interested in the weight and convolutions of Einstein's brain than in the near certainty that people of equal talent have lived and died in cotton fields and sweatshops."

- Stephen Jay Gould

Suppose that, as proposed, we have workers and consumers councils. Suppose we also believe in participation and self management. And we have equitable remuneration. Now also suppose that our workplace has a typical corporate division of labor as our institutional way of apportioning tasks. What will the roles associated with a corporate division of labor do to our other aspirations for our workplace?

There will be, roughly, 20% at the top of the corporate division of labor who will monopolize daily decision-making positions and the knowledge essential to comprehending what is

going on and what options exist. These folks - who we chose to call the coordinator class - will set agendas. The decisions these managers, engineers, lawyers, doctors, and other empowered actors make will be authoritative. Even if workers lower in the hierarchy have formal voting rights and the whole population is, in principle, sincerely committed to self management, still, rote workers' participation is only to vote on plans and options put forth by the coordinator class. The will of this coordinator class will decide outcomes and in time this empowered group will also decide that it deserves more pay to nurture its great wisdom. It will separate itself not only in power but in income and status.

When giving public talks an instructive exercise is to divide the room up into four-fifths workers and one-fifth coordinators in a hypothetical workplace we are creating. Then ask the groups how they will act - what they will feel and do. The answers are essentially identical not only in thought experiments but in actual cases as well, including communes, collectives, worker run factories, and so on. The groups acknowledge the gap between them, and the trend toward the rule of the one over the other. It isn't enough to have workers and consumers councils that seek to implement self management and remuneration on the basis of effort and sacrifice if, on top of those features, we have a division of labor which sabotages the enlightened efforts and imposes a coordinator class of empowered employees above a working class of disempowered employees. In that case, even with the councils and commitments, our greatest hopes will be dashed against the structural implications of our job design.

As Adam Smith harshly argued:

"the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments, the man whose life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding...and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to be."

Even if sometimes the effects are less disastrous than Smith predicts, surely the person repeatedly doing "a few simple operations" will not be an equal arbiter of economic outcomes as

those whose work daily inspires, informs, enlightens, and empowers. It is important to realize that while this picture horrifies a caring human being, it is quite congenial to an owner or coordinator class manager who wants obedience and passivity from the workforce.

So what is parecon's alternative to familiar corporate divisions of labor? We seek to extend the insights of William Morris, the noted nineteenth century artist and wordsmith, who noted that in a better future we would not be able to have the same division of labor as now. We would get rid of "servanting and sewer emptying, butchering and letter carrying, boot-blackening and hair dressing, as jobs unto themselves." He felt we would apply ourselves to production not so as to sell things, but so as to make things prettier and to amuse ourselves and others.

Parecon concurs with Smith's perception of the debilitating effect of corporate divisions of labor and with Morris's aspirations for future work. That is why participatory economics utilizes what it calls balanced job complexes.

So what do we do to have a better situation? When a parecon advocate asks audiences that question, there is generally a lot of silence, and then maybe someone says how about we rotate jobs. We all do everything. The advocate may then reply, if you live in a run down ghetto and I live in a glorious suburb, rotating every so often won't fundamentally change much. And we can't all do everything, either. Large workplaces have thousands of tasks - each person doing a little of all of them is not just silly, but impossible. Blank faces typically result.

Then the advocate says, imagine another planet you are visiting. You go to a few workplaces and you see the same thing in each. One in every five workers has way better conditions and income, and dominate all decisions. You also notice that before each workday the one-fifth who dominate eat a chocolate bar, and the others don't. You assume that is just another privilege they have, but then you investigate and discover that on this planet eating chocolate gives one knowledge, skills, information, confidence, etc. In fact, the one in five dominate precisely because they eat the chocolate and the rest do not. The chocolate empowers

them. And then the parecon advocate asks, what do we need to do in the workplaces on this planet to avoid a fifth of the participants dominating four-fifths? And, of course, everyone says, share the chocolate. It is not rocket science.

Well, the same thing applies to dealing with the corporate division of labor. At this point, everyone gets it. Instead of combining tasks so that some jobs are highly empowering and other jobs are horrible, so that some jobs convey knowledge and authority while other jobs convey only stultification and obedience, and so that those doing some jobs rule as a coordinator class accruing to themselves more income and influence while those doing more menial work obey as a traditional working class subordinate in influence and income - parecon says let's make each job comparable to all others in its quality of life and even more importantly in its empowerment effects. We don't have to share chocolate, we have to share empowering tasks and in doing so we move from suffering a corporate division of labor that enshrines a coordinator class above workers to enjoying a classless division of labor that elevates all workers to their fullest potentials.

In a parecon with balanced job complexes, each person has a job. Each job involves many tasks. Each job should be suited to the talents, capacities, and energies of the person doing it. However, in a parecon each job must also contain a mix of tasks and responsibilities such that the overall empowerment effects of work are comparable for all.

In a parecon there won't be someone doing only surgery and someone else only cleaning bed pans. Instead people who do surgery will also help clean the hospital and perform other tasks so that the sum of all that they do incorporates a fair mix of conditions and responsibilities, and likewise for the person who used to only clean rooms.

A parecon doesn't have some people in a factory who only manage production relations and other people in the factory who do only rote tasks. Instead people throughout factories do a balanced mix of empowering and rote tasks.

A parecon doesn't have lawyers and short order cooks or engineers and assembly line workers, as we now know them. All

the tasks associated with these jobs get done, as needed, of course, but in a parecon the tasks are mixed and matched very differently than they are in capitalist workplaces.

Parecon has a new division of labor. Each parecon worker does a mix of tasks that accords with his or her abilities but that also conveys a fair share of rote and tedious but also interesting and empowering conditions and responsibilities.

Our work doesn't prepare a few of us to rule and the rest of us to obey. Instead, our work comparably prepares all of us to participate in collectively self-managing production, consumption, and allocation. Our work comparably prepares all of us to engage sensibly in self managing our lives and institutions.

When balanced job complexes are offered as an idea to diverse audiences three objections always arise. After the chocolate example and some moving descriptions of experiences of hearing workers who have occupied factories report on the devolution of good feelings and equitable and democratic relations due to the people who monopolize empowering work becoming a new boss in place of the old boss, audiences accept that to eliminate rule by coordinators over workers this type step is required. However, they wonder if related debits will outweigh the benefits.

The logic always follows the same path: someone spontaneously yells out (or a presenter provokes someone to do so by asking if there are any medical students in the house who want to contest the desirability of balanced job complexes) that such an approach would be a calamity. If surgeons have to clean bed pans, we will have way less surgery done. While we will have eliminated class division and the obstacle that class division poses for self management and equity, we will have done so at the cost of losing essential output - in this case surgeries and in other fields, poems, calculations, research, legal work, and so on.

A parecon advocate can answer that in one respect the complaint is exactly right. To make it simple, suppose current surgeons work a forty-hour week doing nothing but surgeries. And suppose it wound up that in a parecon the work week got shorter (which it quite predictably would) and after balancing off surgery with other less empowering tasks, the 40 hour a week surgeon in

the old economy was only doing 15 hours a week of surgery in the new one. Well, that is a dead loss, looking at that one person, of 25 hours or five-eighths of all the surgery by that person. And it would be true for all surgeons, so the previous surgeons would only be doing three-eighths as much as they were doing before. We would all be screwed if that was the end of the story, especially given that it would also be true for engineers, scientists, artists, managers, accountants, and so on. However, the reaction overlooks a very important point. We don't settle for the drop in empowered work. Instead, those who previously were doing no empowered work now do their share and make up the deficit. Audiences, depending on the venue, tend to go berserk. Impossible, they say. Why?, a parecon advocate might ask. Because nurses and custodians can't do surgery, law clerks and typists can't be lawyers, and so on, comes the reply.

To answer, one might offer the following thought experiment. Imagine it is fifty years ago. You take all the surgeons in the U.S. and put them in a stadium, a big one. What do you see that is striking?

Someone quickly says, they are all men. Yes, and every one of those male surgeons would have said that women aren't here in the stadium with us because women can't do surgery. We, of course, recognize that as gross sexism, not least because we are sensible, but also because medical schools in the U.S. are currently, for example, a bit over fifty percent women.

The advocate of balanced job complexes can then explain that what makes people think those in the working class - people not doing any empowering tasks - cannot do any empowering tasks is classism, quite analogous to sexism. Instead of realizing that the reason people are unable to do certain things is that they are not only denied the training, but, even more, are forcefully robbed of initiative, confidence, and access, we attribute the failing to their inadequate capacity. This is precisely analogous to the sexist explanation of the absence of women surgeons decades ago.

Of course it takes time and training, but a random set of twenty people chosen from workers, and a random set of twenty chosen from the coordinator class, have pretty much exactly the

same general capacity to do empowering work of one kind or another, a claim we have come to understand about women as compared to men, and about various racial and cultural communities as compared to others, and now we need to come to understand about working people, as well.

But wouldn't it be inefficient to have to train so many more doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc., rejoins the critic? A parecon advocate can answer, no, not at all. In fact, on the contrary, getting all we can from everyone is the opposite of inefficient. To have a tool lie fallow is inefficient. The same holds for a person. We should also point out that even if total output would drop - though, in fact, on the contrary it would climb dramatically due to new contributions from more people, not to mention the gains that accrue from not having an elite defending its privileges and those below being recalcitrant about cooperating - we should favor the changes.

Our values said nothing about maximizing output. Rather, the aim was to conduct economic life to meet needs and develop potentials while advancing solidarity, diversity, equity, and self management. And balanced job complexes would do all that plentifully, even if they were not more productive of desirable final goods and services - which they would be.

There is more to say, of course, as with every other issue we have raised. As forewarned in the introduction, what we have here is a failure to communicate enough - but the good news is that there are plenty of avenues to explore further, if the appetite is aroused.

Now, however, what happens if we have a new economy that has workers and consumers councils, self-managed decision-making, remuneration for duration, intensity, and onerousness of productive labor, plus balanced job complexes - but we combine all that with markets or central planning for allocation. Would the sum of all those components constitute a good economy?

Allocation: Markets and Central Planning

"Upon entering Paris which I had come to visit, I said to myself, here are a million human beings who would all die in a short time if provisions of

every sort ceased to go towards this great metropolis. Imagination is baffled when it tries to appreciate the multiplicity of commodities which must enter tomorrow through the barriers in order to preserve the inhabitants from falling prey to all the convulsions of famine, rebellion, and pillage."

Frederic Bastiat

Suppose we hook up our fledgling firms with each other via market competition. First, markets would immediately destroy the remuneration scheme. Markets reward output and bargaining power instead of effort and sacrifice.

Second, markets would also force buyers and sellers to try to buy cheap and sell dear, each fleecing the other as much as possible in the name of private advance and market survival. Markets, in other words, generate anti-sociality not solidarity. We get ahead at the expense of others, not cooperatively with them.

Third, markets would explicitly produce dissatisfaction because it is only the dissatisfied who buy again and again. As the general director of General Motors' Research Labs, Charles Kettering introduced annual model changes for GM cars put it: business needs to create a "dissatisfied consumer"; its mission is "the organized creation of dissatisfaction." The idea was that planned obsolescence would make the consumer dissatisfied with the car he or she already had.

Fourth, prices in a market system don't reflect all social costs and benefits. Market prices take into account only the impact of work and consumption on the immediate buyers and sellers (mediated by their power) but not on those peripherally affected, including those affected by pollution or, for that matter, by positive side effects. This means markets routinely violate ecological balance and sustainability, much less stewardship. They subject all but the wealthiest communities to a collective debit in water, air, sound, and public availabilities.

Fifth, markets also produce decision making hierarchy, not self management. This occurs not only due to market-generated disparities in wealth translating into disparate power, but because market competition compels even council-based workplaces to cut costs and seek market share regardless of the ensuing implications.

To compete, even workplaces with self managing councils, equitable remuneration, and balanced job complexes have no choice but to insulate some employees from the discomfort that cost-cutting imposes - that those people can then figure out what costs to cut and how to generate more output at the expense of worker (and even consumer) fulfillment, but not their own.

In other words, to cut costs - and otherwise impose market discipline - there would emerge due to market logic, even with councils and balanced job complexes (at first), a coordinator class located above workers and violating our preferred norms of remuneration as well as accruing power to themselves and obliterating self-management and equity.

That is, under the pressure of market competition, any firm I work for must try to maximize its revenues to keep up with competing firms. If my firm doesn't do that, then we lose our jobs. So we must try to dump our costs on others. We must seek as much revenue as possible - even via inducing excessive consumption. We must cut our costs of production - including reducing comforts for workers and unduly intensifying labor - to win market share regardless of costs to others.

To relentlessly pursue all these paths to market success, however, requires freedom for the managers from suffering the pains their choices induce. So even in a firm that is committed to self management and balanced job complexes, if we must operate in a market context our roles will over time impose on us a necessity to hire folks with appropriately callous and calculating minds such as those that business schools produce. We will then have to give these new callous employees air conditioned offices and comfortable surroundings. We will have to say to them, okay, cut our costs to ensure our livelihood in the marketplace.

In other words, we will have to impose on ourselves a coordinator class, not due to natural law, and not due to some internal psychological drive, but because markets will force us to subordinate ourselves to a coordinator elite we accept and welcome, lest our workplace lose market share and revenues, and eventually go out of business.

There are those who will claim that all these market failings are not a product of markets per se, but of imperfect markets that haven't attained a condition of perfect competition. This is a bit like saying that the ills associated with ingesting arsenic occur because we never get pure arsenic, but we only get arsenic tainted with other ingredients.

On the one hand, calling for perfect markets ignores that in a real society there is literally no such thing as frictionless competition, so of course we will always get imperfect markets. But even more important, it also ignores that the harmful effects of markets we have highlighted do not diminish when competition is made more perfect - they intensify. And all this is not just true in our thought experiment, but also in past practice.

Historically, the closer economies have come to a pure market system - without state intervention and with as few sectors as possible dominated by single firms or groups of firms, or with as few unions as possible - the worse the social implications have been. For example, there have rarely, if ever, been markets as competitive as those of Britain in the early nineteenth century, yet, under the sway of those nearly perfect markets, young children routinely suffered early death in the pits and mills of the time. The point is, well-functioning markets get various economic tasks done but otherwise do not promote excellence in any form. They do not resist - and they even facilitate - cultural and moral depravity. As a result, seeking an economy fulfilling our values means rejecting markets as a tool of allocation.

Moreover, the same broad result of market allocation destroying the benefits sought via councils, including destroying equitable remuneration and balanced job complexes, has historically held for central planning allocation as well, though for different reasons. Central planning elevates central planners and their managerial agents in each workplace, and then, for legitimacy and consistency, it also elevates all those actors in the economy who share the same type of credentials.

In other words, the central planners need local agents who will hold workers to norms the central planners decide. These local agents must be locally authoritative. Their credentials must

legitimate them and must reduce other actors to relative obedience. Central planning thus, like markets, also imposes a coordinator class to rule over workers, with the workers, in turn, made subordinate - not only nationally, but in each workplace.

The allocation problem that we face in trying to conceive a good economy is therefore that (as could be seen in the old Yugoslavia and Soviet Union) even without private ownership of means of production, markets and central planning subvert the values and structures we have deemed worthy. They obliterate equitable remuneration, annihilate self management, horribly mis-value products, impose narrow and antisocial motivations, and impose class division and class rule.

This is precisely the kind of thing our overarching theory attunes us to. It is a case of particular institutions - markets and central planning - having role attributes that violate our aims. The same held for the corporate division of labor, discussed earlier, and for private ownership of productive assets. The associated roles of those institutions obstruct, and actually obliterate, the values we favor. That is why we had to transcend them. And now we see the same implication for markets and central planning.

Allocation is the nervous system of economic life. It is both intricate and essential. To round out a new economic vision we must conceive a mechanism that can properly and efficiently determine and communicate accurate information about the true social costs and benefits of economic options, while giving to workers and consumers influence over choices proportional to the degree they are affected.

“True social costs and benefits.” What is that? Well, suppose we make a car. What does it cost? What are the benefits? If we don’t know, how can we decide it is a good idea to make the car, instead of something else? If we don’t know, how can we decide if we need more cars, or fewer? The costs we take into account go beyond those that the current capitalist owners of automobile plants consider. They want to maximize profits while retaining the rights to accrue those profits themselves. We want to advance our values while meeting needs and developing potentials of those involved. Very different.

They take into account the amount they have to pay for resources, intermediate goods, technologies employed, rent, electricity, and the wages they have to pay - as well as if there are any significant effects on their balance of power, and their ability to keeping taking their preferred giant share of revenues. We take into account the costs of producing, transporting, and consuming cars including the impact on the environment, workers, consumers, bystanders, and communities, etc. We also take into account the benefits for those same affected constituencies - both individual and collective. So true social costs and benefits is an accurate measure of the gains and losses associated with the production and consumption of the car: in social relations, in the material, moral and psychological condition of workers, communities, and consumers, and the environmental impact.

Desirable means of allocation must allocate resources, labor, and the products of labor in a flexible manner that is able to realign in case of unexpected crises or shocks. It must not homogenize tastes but instead abide diverse preferences, preserve privacy and individuality, engender sociality and solidarity, and meet the needs and capacities of all workers and consumers. Desirable allocation must operate without class division and class rule but instead with equity and classlessness, and it must operate without authoritarianism and disproportionate influence for a few people but instead with self management for all. Finally, in deciding what to do with any particular asset - whether people's labor or a resource like oil or copper, or some technology - it needs to take into account the true and full material and etherial social and environmental affects of the contending options.

Self management of allocation is clearly no little ambition given that virtually everyone is, to at least some degree, affected by each decision made in an economy so that in any institution - whether a factory, university, health center, or whatever - many interests ought to be represented in decision-making. There is the workforce itself, obviously affected by their actions each day. There is the community in which the workplace is located - polluted, for example, or uplifted. And there are the users of its products or services, presumably benefitting by their consumption,

or losing because they were not put to a different use that they would have preferred. If society is making cars instead of public transport, I may gain from having a car, but I will also lose due to the lack of public transport. To have self management, entails that there are structures that displace and eliminate any influence for private owners of the means of production and resources, by ensuring that that type ownership no longer exists - but that also consult all affected parties appropriately in determining outcomes.

In other words while private ownership is disastrous in its effects on economic outcomes, as critics of capitalism have always claimed, the deeper and arguably even deadlier villains, as we have all too briefly indicated above, are markets and central planning. We not only need "directly democratic" workers and consumers councils, but we also need allocation connections between workers and consumers that preserve and enhance informed, insightful, self managed decisions.

Participatory Planning

"Money is better than poverty, if only for financial reasons."
- Woody Allen

Suppose in place of top-down allocation via centrally planned choices, and in place of competitive market allocation by atomized buyers and sellers, we instead opt for informed, self-managed, cooperative negotiation of inputs and outputs by socially entwined actors who:

- each have a say in proportion as choices affect them
- who each have accurate information to assess, and
- who each have appropriate training, confidence, conditions, and motivation to develop, communicate, and express their preferences.

This choice of allocation attributes - if we could conceive institutions able to make it real - would, as we seek, compatibly advance council-centered participatory self-management, remuneration for effort and sacrifice, and balanced job complexes.

It would also provide proper valuations of personal, social, and ecological impacts and promote classlessness.

Participatory planning is conceived to accomplish all this. In participatory planning, worker and consumer councils propose their work activities and their consumption preferences in light of continually updated knowledge of the personal, local, and national implications of the full social benefits and costs of their choices.

What does it look like?

Workers and consumers cooperatively negotiate workplace and consumer inputs and outputs. They employ a back and forth communication of mutually informed preferences using what are called indicative prices, facilitation boards, rounds of accommodation to new information, and other participatory planning features which permit people to express and refine their desires in light of feedback about other people's desires.

Workers and consumers indicate in their councils their personal and group preferences. I say I want such and such. My workplace settles on a proposal that we wish to produce. We learn what preferences others have indicated as they learn ours. They, and we, alter and resubmit our preferences - keeping in mind the need to balance a personally fulfilling pattern of work and consumption with the requirements of a viable overall plan. Each participant - as a worker and as a consumer - seeks personal and collective group well being and development. However, each can improve his or her situation only by acting in accord with more general social benefit. New information leads to new submissions in a sequence of cooperatively negotiated refinements, until settling on a plan.

As in any economy, consumers deciding on what they want for their share of the social product, take into account their income (from the duration, intensity, and onerousness of their socially valued labor) and the relative costs of available products that they desire. This occurs not only for individuals deciding personal consumption, but also for households, communes, neighborhoods, and regions, all through consumer councils, up to the cumulative demand put forth by all of society. Workers in their workers councils similarly indicate how much work they wish to do in light

of requests for their product as well as their own labor/leisure preferences. While workplace proposals are collective - for the whole workplace - they are arrived at with input from each individual in the workplace.

In a participatory economy no one has any interest in selling products at inflated prices or in selling more items than consumers actually need - because imposing high prices and inducing purchases beyond what will fulfill people are not how income is earned.

Even if I could set some false, inflated price for what I was selling, my income would not climb as it doesn't depend on the overall sales revenue. And the same goes for somehow getting people to buy what they don't really need. In fact, why would I want to produce anything - taking my time and energy - that wasn't actually going to benefit folks? I wouldn't, not in a participatory economic institutional setting.

Nor is there any need to compete for market share. Individuals and units do not advance by way of beating others in any manner. Rather, motives are simply to meet needs and to develop potentials at whatever level turns out to be preferred without wasting assets. We seek to produce what is socially acceptable and useful while compatibly and cooperatively fulfilling our own as well as the rest of society's preferences. This is true not because people are suddenly saints. It is because cooperation is lucrative for all. Merciless fleecing simply has no place in a parecon because there is neither means to do it, nor gains to be had from doing it.

Preferences for desired production and consumption are communicated by means of special mechanisms developed for the purpose. Negotiations occur in a series of planning rounds. Every participant has an interest in most effectively utilizing productive potentials to meet needs, because everyone gets an equitable share of output that grows as overall social output for all grows.

Each person also favors workplaces - and all of society - making investments that reduce drudge work and that improve the quality of the average balanced job complex, because this is the job quality that everyone, on average, enjoys.

Plans for the economy are continually updated and refined. It isn't that there are no errors or imperfections in the day-to-day and year-to-year operations of a participatory economy. It is that such deviations from ideal choices as occur arise from ignorance or mistakes and not the system, by its logic, causing such deviations. So in no way can one sector systematically benefit above others. Mistaken choices and deviations don't snowball or multiply in a manner that continually benefits some (in a ruling class, for example) to the detriment of others.

To choose what role and position to occupy in a participatory workplace, each person consults his or her own personal tastes and talents. Of course, each person will be better suited and more likely to be happy at some pursuits than others. However, each person's job search is solely about meeting personal preferences equitably. There is no choice that one can individually make - or that a group can collectively make - that would accrue what other members of society would deem unjust power, wealth, or circumstance.

Summing Up

*"It's a poor sort of memory
which only works backward."
- Lewis Carroll*

Participatory economics generates social solidarity. In a parecon I can get better work conditions if the average job complex improves. I can get higher income if I work harder or longer, with my workmates' consent, or if the average income throughout society increases. I not only advance in solidarity with others, I also influence all economic decisions in my workplace - and even throughout the rest of the economy - at a level proportionate to the impact those decisions have on me.

Parecon not only eliminates inequitable disparities in wealth and income, it attains just distribution. Parecon doesn't force people to undervalue or violate other people's lives, but produces solidarity. Parecon doesn't homogenize outcomes and even underlying preferences, but generates diversity. Parecon doesn't give a small ruling class tremendous power while burdening the

bulk of the population with powerlessness, but produces appropriate self-managing influence for all.

Debating Anarchists in the Persona of the Young Chomsky

*"I can't understand why people are frightened of new ideas. I'm frightened
of the old ones."
- John Cage*

It is tempting to move on from remuneration at this point, letting the above discussion stand. However, the authors know that there are many anarchists who we believe ought to find parecon to their liking, who still won't agree that the argument is sound. Perhaps the best way to address their concerns is to very closely address the views on this topic of the strongest and most astute advocates of anarchist aims over recent years.

In 1976, Noam Chomsky gave Peter Jay what may be his most extensive interview regarding what a desirable society might look like. The views Chomsky offered are still dear to him 45 years later, as well as to many other anarchists. They are dear to us, as well, and have influenced our own commitments, albeit with some changes.

Chomsky offered his observations as part of the heritage of "libertarian socialist or anarcho-syndicalist or communist anarchist views." He was following "in the tradition of Bakunin and Kropotkin and Anton Pannekoek," who favored "a society organized on the basis of organic units, organic communities." And in his views we find the basis for anarchist doubts about parecon.

Chomsky argued:

"that the workplace and the neighborhood, are central," and that "from those two basic units there could derive through federal arrangements a highly integrated kind of social organization which might be national or even international in scope."

He continued: "Decisions could be made over a substantial range...by delegates who are always part of the organic community from which they come, to which they return, and in which, in fact,

they live.” While some anarchists entirely reject the idea of representation, clearly Chomsky didn’t, nor would we.

Chomsky also clarified that:

“representative democracy, as in, say, the United States or Great Britain, would be criticized by an anarchist of this school on two grounds. First ... because there is a monopoly of power centralized in the state, and second... because the representative democracy is limited to the political sphere and in no serious way encroaches on the economic sphere.”

Thus Chomsky’s, Kropotkin’s, Bakunin’s, and Pannekoek’s liberated society doesn’t reject institutions such as workplaces or even polity. It does, however, reject political or economic entities that are divorced from and rule over the population.

Chomsky added, that “anarchists of this tradition have always held that democratic control of one’s productive life is at the core of any serious human liberation, or, for that matter, of any significant democratic practice.” He continued:

“as long as individuals are compelled to rent themselves on the market to those who are willing to hire them, as long as their role in production is simply that of ancillary tools, then there are striking elements of coercion and oppression that make talk of democracy very limited, if even meaningful.”

We think pretty much all anarchists - and indeed anti capitalists of all types - would agree. However a question arises. How does one organize an economy in accord with the need for “self-management, direct worker control, ... personal participation in self-management?”

Asked for an example, back in 1976, Chomsky replied, “A good example of a really large-scale anarchist revolution... is the Spanish revolution of 1936....” which was “in many ways a very inspiring testimony to the ability of poor working people to organize and manage their own affairs, extremely successfully, without coercion and control,” though, “how relevant the Spanish experience is to an advanced industrial society one might question in detail.”

For himself, Chomsky thought and still thinks that:

self-management ... is precisely the rational mode for an advanced and complex industrial society, one in which workers can very well become masters of their own immediate affairs, that is, in direction and control of the shop, but also can be in a position to make the major, substantive decisions concerning the structure of the economy, concerning social institutions, concerning planning, regionally and beyond."

But he added that, "at present, institutions do not permit workers to have control over the requisite information and the relevant training to understand these matters."

And so again an obvious question surfaces: How does one structure an economy so it conveys the "requisite information" and "relevant training"?

Asked to switch to fill out his vision of anarchism, Chomsky replies:

"Let me sketch what I think would be a rough consensus, and one that I think is essentially correct. Beginning with the two modes of organization and control, namely organization and control in the workplace and in the community, one could imagine a network of workers' councils, and at a higher level, representation across the factories, or across branches of industry, or across crafts, and on to general assemblies of workers' councils that can be regional and national and international in charter. And from another point of view, one can project a system of government that involves local assemblies -- again, federated regionally, dealing with regional issues, crossing crafts, industry, trades, and so on, and again at the level of the nation or beyond."

We agree with Chomsky that this is likely a rough consensus among anarchists, and rightly so, in our view, and we will get more deeply into the political dimension, next chapter, when we address participatory polity.

Chomsky continued, an...

"idea of anarchism is that delegation of authority is rather minimal and that its participants at any one of these levels of government should be directly responsive to the organic community in which they live. In fact, the optimal situation would be that participation in one of these levels of government should be temporary, and even during

the period when it's taking place should be only partial; that is, the members of a workers' council who are for some period actually functioning to make decisions that other people don't have the time to make, should also continue to do their work as part of the workplace or neighborhood community in which they belong.”

Again, this is unobjectionable.

Then, however, comes a point of possible concern. Chomsky says:

“As for political parties, my feeling is that an anarchist society would not forcefully prevent political parties from arising. In fact, anarchism has always been based on the idea that any sort of Procrustean bed, any system of norms that is imposed on social life will constrain and very much underestimate its energy and vitality and that all sorts of new possibilities of voluntary organization may develop at that higher level of material and intellectual culture.”

So far so good, though the minimal not “forcefully prevent” formulation foreshadows what follows when he adds, “but I think it is fair to say that insofar as political parties are felt to be necessary, anarchist organization of society will have failed.”

Why would people forming a political party be a sign of failure?

Chomsky explained:

“It should be the case, I would think, that where there is direct participation in self-management, in economic and social affairs, then factions, conflicts, differences of interests and ideas and opinion, which should be welcomed and cultivated, will be expressed at every one of these levels.”

Agreed. But then Chomsky adds:

“Why they should fall into two, three or n political parties, I don't quite see. I think that the complexity of human interest and life does not fall in that fashion. Parties represent basically class interests, and classes would have been eliminated or transcended in such a society.”

Of course we agree to the elimination of parties as agents of class interests. But does that imply that the existence of parties would indicate failure? Chomsky is saying he thinks human

preferences are so diverse and varied that the only reason a considerable number of folks would share a set of views consistently contrary to those that other sets of people hold would be if the folks were in a different class due to occupying a structurally different economic position, thus having opposed economic interests. We don't think so.

Imagine a party forming around some new values that the participants are seeking to advocate and introduce into social life. Perhaps it is animal rights, as but one possible example. Or perhaps a new economic value - to equalize pleasure, say. Or maybe the issue is abortion, or something about space flight, or something to do with the rights of future generations compared to present populations. People form a party because they agree on some views and think other folks are wrong in not agreeing on those views, and because they want to make their case in concert with one another. Why must such a constituency be a class, or even any group within some hierarchy of power? Why can't it be that it is simply a group with a view that they deem very important but that others differ from?

However, as long as he says factions are welcome, we think the values underlying what Chomsky is saying and what we are amending it with are in accord, as we will see further next chapter. What we are calling a party is just a large faction that crosses neighborhoods and workplaces and which, for some purposes, wants to coordinate their collective efforts on behalf of ideas they share. So, if that is welcome, there is no real dispute, we think.

Chomsky also indicated that he is:

“unpersuaded that participation in governance is a full-time job. It may be in an irrational society, where all sorts of problems arise because of the irrational nature of institutions. But in a properly functioning advanced industrial society organized along libertarian lines, I would think that executing decisions taken by representative bodies is a part-time job which should be rotated through the community and, furthermore, should be undertaken by people who at all times continue to be participants in their own direct activity.”

As to how much time will have to go to adjudicating disputes, dealing with anti social actions, determining legislation for steadily

altering circumstances, and implementing collective projects, we don't know, but we suspect it will be whole lot more than Chomsky seems to suggest. He was certainly right, however, that much and likely most of what current governments do will no longer be needed. He was also right that all people in all political functions, like for all other functions, must be well prepared to do their tasks well, and must be engaged in those tasks in ways and with responsibilities that do not elevate their power or wealth or their capacity to amass privilege either for themselves or for others, or to have say over outcomes beyond what is appropriate for all actors. Of course, how to accomplish all this is the meat and potatoes of the assertion that it must be so.

Chomsky pinpointed a broad underlying insight in his interview, we think, when he said:

“it seems to me the natural suggestion is that governance should be organized industrially, as simply one of the branches of industry, with their own workers' councils and their own self-governance and their own participation in broader assemblies.”

Again, this is unobjectionable as long as we keep in mind that an airplane pilot, a steel worker, a doctor, or a governance worker, all need to have appropriate skills and knowledge, on the one hand, but also roles that give them no more overall power or privilege than any other citizen, on the other hand.

To put the problem another way: consider two industries: widget making and governance. Workers councils in both these industries would exist, and both would not have complete autonomy but instead be subject to a broader social plan they, however, contribute to, because their acts affect other people as well as other people's acts affect them. Nevertheless, the external constraints on widget making are likely to be far less intrusive to how widget workers operate each day than the external constraints on governance. For widget-makers, society's interest is the number of widgets produced and the amount of resources to be used in their production (two simple numbers) - as well as that the workplace is classless - and beyond that (considering working conditions, etc.) the workers' interests are totally sovereign. But when you take a job like police officer, as one example of a job in

the political/governmental sphere - society's interests are not just to "enforce the law" (which is far more complicated than to "produce 45 million widgets using this amount of inputs"), but to do so in a way that protects and respects everyone's rights and doesn't give too much discretion (i.e. power) to police officers to rule over us - thus imposing further constraints on how they operate. But even this is a matter of degree. Thinking about airplane pilots or doctors reveals the need for similar types of socially determined guidelines and constraints as exist for governance, though unique to each case, including widget making.

At any rate, in a question his interviewer then asked, Chomsky is quoted as saying, "in a decent society, everyone would have the opportunity to find interesting work and each person would be permitted the fullest possible scope for his talents." And then, as himself asking: "What more would be required in particular, extrinsic reward in the form of wealth and power," to elicit such work? Chomsky answers his own query, nothing more, unless "we assume that applying one's talents in interesting and socially useful work is not rewarding in itself."

This is where problems bearing on participatory economics start to surface. The above assertion is false for three reasons. The first has to do with the need to correlate work and consumption, including having information and indicators which permit sensible choices by all concerned. The second is that a central reason for remuneration is not only to provide incentives, but to have just outcomes regarding both production and consumption. And, finally, the third problem bears on the incentive issue itself, the only aspect that Chomsky directly spoke to. But someone saying he or she likes to work, as Chomsky feels all would say in a desirable society - with which we would agree - is not the same as that person saying work is the only thing he or she likes. And this obvious and seemingly nit picky distinction actually matters quite a lot.

First, by work we mean labor undertaken (a) within the economic institutions of society, and (b) to produce contributions to the social product which other people, not the producer or his or her family and friends, will enjoy.

Second, Chomsky is of course right that there are intrinsic reasons to do work for the social good including self expression and to benefit others. But what is missing is the obvious parallel truth that there are intrinsic reasons to want to have leisure too - and not just in order to rest, but also to play, to relate to family and friends, to do things that we like but that we are not good enough at to be making a contribution to society doing, and so on.

As a result, if we are free to individually choose the ratio of productive work in the economy we do and the leisure we enjoy while not working, and if making a choice for less work and more output has zero bearing on our claims on social output as a consumer, then we may well choose to work less than society needs, or than equity and justice warrant.

To explain his contrary view, Chomsky says,

“there's a certain amount of work that just has to be done if we are to maintain [a worthy] standard of living. It's an open question how onerous that work has to be.”

That is certainly correct, though it is important to realize that what a “worthy standard of living from outputs of production is” depends precisely on an active choice by people as to their relative desire for more outputs, or for more free time. And it is also important to realize that quite a lot of that work, for a very long time to come, will have to be demanding, and often even boring and tedious, and sometimes dangerous. And that even more of it, however positive it may be to do, will not be intrinsically more rewarding than spending the same time, instead, pursuing hobbies, or personal relations, or playing, and so on.

When Chomsky adds, “let's recall that science and technology and intellect have not been devoted to ... overcoming the onerous and self-destructive character of the necessary work of society,” he is of course correct. When he adds that “the reason is that it has always been assumed that there is a substantial body of wage slaves who will do it simply because otherwise they'll starve,” he is again correct. And he is also correct when he says, “if human intelligence is turned to the question of how to make the necessary work of the society itself meaningful, we don't know what the

answer will be.” All true, but it isn’t going to happen in a week, month, or decade. And there will be limits, not least environmental, on how much onerous work can be replaced by more uplifting work. But, in any event, this raises another issue for a good economy, which is that it must facilitate sensible and warranted attention to matters bearing on improving the quality of work life, as well as on the pleasure and potentials unleashed by the products of work life.

Chomsky continues, “My guess is that a fair amount of [work] can be made entirely tolerable.” I would agree, but I would also say that there is a large gap between “entirely tolerable,” on the one hand, and as engaging and interesting as what we typically choose to do with leisure time, on the other hand. And “fair amount” is, as well, far short of all.

Chomsky says, “It’s a mistake to think that even back-breaking physical labor is necessarily onerous. Many people, myself included, do it for relaxation.” Sure, but does anyone really do back breaking physical labor day in and day out for relaxation? Not many, I would wager.

Chomsky goes on:

“Recently, for example, I got it into my head to plant thirty-four trees in a meadow behind the house, on the State Conservation Commission, which means I had to dig thirty-four holes in the sand. You know, for me, and what I do with my time mostly, that’s pretty hard work, but I have to admit I enjoyed it. I wouldn’t have enjoyed it if I’d had work norms, if I’d had an overseer, and if I’d been ordered to do it at a certain moment, and so on.”

Our guess is that he also wouldn’t have enjoyed it if it was his job, day in and day out. Chomsky might have enjoyed it somewhat less, also, if it wasn’t in his own backyard, and if, because he was working with a team, he had to abide a schedule. And, mainly, whether he enjoyed it or not, the amount of time he would give it - simply to have the pleasure of the involvement, could easily be way less than the amount needed, or the amount others might give to it, etc. What if someone wanted to do back breaking labor once every twenty or thirty years, and the rest of the time he wanted to

do highly empowered conceptual labor of a creative sort? Who then plants trees?"

When Chomsky says, "On the other hand, if it's a task taken on just out of interest, fine, that can be done," he means that it will be enjoyable, as it was for him. True enough. But the implication is that we can all just do what we find enjoyable and desire to do - and somehow what we choose on grounds of just our pleasure at work will match up, regarding output, with what people want to consume.

The questioner says,

"I put it to you that there may be a danger that this view of things is a rather romantic delusion, entertained only by a small elite of people who happen, like elite professors, perhaps journalists, and so on, to be in the very privileged situation of being paid to do what anyway they like to do."

This is a fair question - but it does miss additional points. What is just? What is needed to convey necessary information?

Chomsky answers:

"That's why I began with a big 'If'. I said we first have to ask to what extent the necessary work of the society -- namely that work which is required to maintain the standard of living that we want -- needs to be onerous or undesirable. I think that the answer is: much less than it is today. But let's assume there is some extent to which it remains onerous. Well, in that case, the answer's quite simple: that work has to be equally shared among people capable of doing it."

Coal mining will remain onerous. So will many kinds of cleaning, among a great many other rote tasks (and, in truth, for example, even the finest most creative chef on the planet is unlikely to want to cook other peoples' meals for people he doesn't know, for more hours than needed to justify his own level of consumption). Do we each do an equal share of coal mining, cleaning, cooking and every other onerous aspect of work? Of course not. So the point is that we would each, in Chomsky's formulation, share a fair amount of such onerous tasks along with our other more intrinsically fulfilling tasks, balancing our jobs for onerousness. And we would agree that equilibrating each person's job for quality of life implications would by definition eliminate

the issue of unequal onerousness from economic calculus. In that case, paying attention to onerousness as a factor in determining income becomes irrelevant to just outcomes.

But equilibrating onerousness of work does not address the full issue of incentives, indicators, or fairness. Incentives means providing a reason for people to work in a manner and for a duration that yields social output in accord with popular desires - where those desires are in turn also mediated by knowledge of the implications of the chosen output level for work. Indicators means providing information able to guide people in sensibly and responsibly deciding what to consume and what to produce, and also regarding where it makes sense to invest to improve work further, to generate new output, etc. And fairness means ensuring that the distribution of benefits and costs associated with economic life - both with production and consumption with what we do and what we receive - is fair, whatever we decide we mean by that term.

Chomsky says:

“as I watch people work, ... automobile mechanics for example, I think one often finds a good deal of pride in work. I think that that kind of pride in ... complicated work well done, because it takes thought and intelligence to do it, especially when one is also involved in management of the enterprise, determination of how the work will be organized, what it is for, what the purposes of the work are, what'll happen to it, and so on - I think all of this can be satisfying and rewarding activity which in fact requires skills, the kind of skills people will enjoy exercising.”

We agree that much of work, but far from all of it, has such attributes. But it is important to be clear that the fact that I am involved in determining what the purposes and composition and timing of the work I do is not the same as saying I alone determine the purposes, composition, and timing. Instead, I'm part of a discussion on what I and others I work with do, but I might be on the losing end of a vote. Like a good citizen, I will still feel socially responsible to do the tasks, but my internal incentives are likely to be lower than if the decision had gone my way. In any event, even regarding more engaging and intrinsically rewarding

work, people will also want to spend time with their kids, enjoying hobbies, celebrating, contemplating, or whatever.

Chomsky adds, talking only about the onerous work aspect:

“suppose it turns out there is some residue of work which really no one wants to do, whatever that may be -- okay, then I say that the residue of work must be equally shared, and beyond that, people will be free to exercise their talents as they see fit.”

This is not thought through. First, everyone will not want to do work that is tedious and boring if not doing it would have no known adverse effects on oneself and others. Second, suppose after we agree on equilibrating jobs for quality of life implications, that in the fulfilling part of my job I am free to use my talents as I see fit, as Chomsky suggests. Well, suppose you were once a fairly good tennis player - nothing to write home about, but you loved playing. So suppose you decided, okay, that's the talent you want to exercise, choosing as you see fit, in the hours left after you do your share of onerous work. The problem is, your playing tennis would contribute nothing valuable to society's social product. You are simply not good enough to be worth watching or taking lessons from.

Chomsky may say no one will opt to do something that is not socially valuable to others, but how does anyone know what is and what isn't? How does anyone know that their effort isn't up to snuff? Perhaps his answer would be that the tennis industry has to hire new players or teachers - and wouldn't hire you - but in that case, you are not free to exercise your talents as you see fit. You can only do that within certain norms and social relations that prevent useless endeavors, including preventing you from being an incompetent tennis player, or an incompetent surgeon, and so on.

But what are these norms and relations which yield good economic outcomes, and which are also consistent with eliminating class division and with people exercising self managing say? These are the questions that one must address to give substance to the values of those favoring self management.

Pushed further by his questioner, Peter Jay, who doubted that the amount of tasks that would be deemed intrinsically negative would be low, Chomsky replied,

“whatever it is, notice that we have two alternatives. One alternative is to have it equally shared, the other is to design social institutions so that some group of people will be simply compelled to do the work, on pain of starvation. Those are the two alternatives.”

That observation is false. Rather, one could also go a long way toward improving the quality of life effect of work - within ecological limits, time limits, allocation limits, etc. But then, one could refuse to compel a minority to do all that was left. And one could reject sharing it all equally, as well. Instead, one could, as a third alternative, remunerate to offset the negative impact of the more onerous tasks.

Chomsky replies to the questioner raising roughly the same point, by saying, “I’m assuming everyone essentially gets equal remuneration.” But then one wonders, why we should assume that - or even what the word “essentially” means? This is the core of the justice and incentives side of the issue. What if I am happy with less income - which means I am happy with less claim on social product - supposing that working fewer hours to get less income means that I can have more leisure? Am I free to take less income as a basis for working less hours? If I am not, can I just work fewer hours for the same income? The first option seems socially responsible. The second option does not, at least to us. The first is also economically viable. The second is not.

A basic anarchist principle is that wherever possible and when it doesn't conflict with the social good, we should enable people to pursue their own personal visions of a good life. Having a single income level and a single work-time-requirement for everyone is an instance of an unnecessary and coercive requirement. There is no social or economic reason why people should not be able to trade off income for leisure time or vice versa (while there is a social and economic reason why people should not be able to lower their work time without lowering their income, or raise their income without increasing their time working).

Chomsky said:

“Let's imagine three kinds of society: one, the current one, in which the undesired work is given to wage-slaves. Let's imagine a second system in which the undesired work, after the best efforts to make it meaningful, is shared. And let's imagine a third system where the undesired work receives high extra pay, so that individuals voluntarily choose to do it. Well, it seems to me that either of the two latter systems is consistent with -- vaguely speaking -- anarchist principles. I would argue myself for the second rather than the third, but either of the two is quite remote from any present social organization or any tendency in contemporary social organization.”

We are not sure why Chomsky would argue for the second rather than the third. Saying that everyone must get the same income seems to me, as noted above, to be more of a constraint on personal choice - and an unnecessary one - than does permitting or acknowledging some differences in quality of life implications in people's jobs but remunerating accordingly.

However, in any case, Chomsky's conclusion on this specific matter is unobjectionable. Both his options two and three do exist and each is compatible with classlessness and with self management, and also with anarchist fairness as Chomsky is outlining it in his interview. But even after that considerable agreement, we are still not getting to the issue of hours worked matching up with output desired, nor to the issue of indicators to inform intelligent decision making - that is, to providing the information Chomsky rightly spoke of earlier that people need if they are to engage responsibly in economic life, nor have we seriously broached the subject of consumption rights.

The questioner at this point asked:

“It seems to me that there is a fundamental choice, however one disguises it, between whether you organize work for the satisfaction it gives to the people who do it, or whether you organize it on the basis of the value of what is produced for the people who are going to use or consume what is produced.”

This polarized formulation misses that you can and must, if there is to be real self management, accomplish both these priorities at once - as in, considering both the impact on workers

and the impact on consumers in making decisions whether to produce and distribute items.

Still, the questioner continued:

“And that a society that is organized on the basis of giving everybody the maximum opportunity to fulfill their hobbies, which is essentially the work-for-work's-sake view, finds its logical culmination in a monastery, where the kind of work which is done, namely prayer, is work for the self-enrichment of the worker and where nothing is produced which is of any use to anybody and you live either at a low standard of living, or you actually starve.”

This went too far - but the underlying point was real. What will connect work that is done purely because it is fulfilling to the level of outputs that are desired? What will connect needs and desires for outputs to needs and desires of workers producing those outputs?

Chomsky replies,

“My feeling is that part of what makes work meaningful is that ... its products do have use. The work of the craftsman is in part meaningful to that craftsman because of the intelligence and skill that he puts into it, but also in part because the work is useful... The fact that the kind of work you do may lead to something else ... that's very important quite apart from the elegance and beauty of what you may achieve. And I think that covers every field of human endeavor.”

Of course the above is true, but it is also not addressing the issue raised, because even though the observation is true, the issues remain operative unless one wants to claim that the pleasure of doing self managed labor that contributes to social output is so great that everyone will automatically want to do more than an amount, in sum, consistent with what people want to consume, and unless one wants to claim that people will know appropriate amounts, also automatically.

Chomsky adds:

“Furthermore, I think if we look at a good part of human history, we'll find that people to a substantial extent did get some degree of satisfaction -- often a lot of satisfaction -- from the productive and creative work that they were doing.”

Also true. But also not addressing the issue raised.

Chomsky says, "I think work freely undertaken can be useful, meaningful work done well." Of course it can. But it can also produce stuff that no one wants, or that is too much of a good thing, or that is too little. It can be fun to do, but not of sufficient quality to be contributing. How does one know? And more, just because it can be meaningful and well done - especially if we create institutions that ensure that - this still doesn't mean we all, or perhaps even any of us, automatically want to do as much of it as our desires for outputs requires.

Chomsky says:

"Also, you pose a dilemma that many people pose, between desire for satisfaction in work and a desire to create things of value to the community. But it's not so obvious that there is any dilemma, any contradiction."

If we police ourselves - which means if we have information that permits us to police ourselves - perhaps Chomsky is right. But in the absence of that information, why can't you play tennis, or be a surgeon, as your work, even if you are not very good at those pursuits?

Chomsky emphasized a particular point about work having intrinsic rewards - and regarding that point, at least among anarchists and serious leftists of all types, we believe he is pushing on an open door. He said:

"Recall that a person has an occupation, and it seems to me that most of the occupations that exist -- especially the ones that involve what are called services, that is, relations to human beings -- have an intrinsic satisfaction and rewards associated with them, namely in the dealings with the human beings that are involved. That's true of teaching, and it's true of ice cream vending. I agree that ice cream vending doesn't require the commitment or intelligence that teaching does, and maybe for that reason it will be a less desired occupation. But if so, it will have to be shared."

So what we have now emerging is a list of less desired tasks - and those will have to be shared, as people also do desired things they want to do, intrinsically to fulfill themselves for enough

duration to fill out a responsible job. Or course we also need some way to ensure that people aren't doing things they want to do but are not good enough at to produce a worthwhile output.

Here is the crux of it, though. Chomsky says:

“what I'm saying is that our characteristic assumption that pleasure in work, pride in work, is either unrelated to or negatively related to the value of the output is related to a particular stage of social history, namely capitalism, in which human beings are tools of production. It is by no means necessarily true. For example, if you look at the many interviews with workers on assembly lines, for example, that have been done by industrial psychologists, you find that one of the things they complain about over and over again is the fact that their work simply can't be done well; the fact that the assembly line goes through so fast that they can't do their work properly.”

That producing vehicles in a self managed workplace will be vastly better than in a capitalist one is true. That one will not want to do it to the complete exclusion of leisure, however, is also true. And the idea that all work, because it benefits society, and because it is self managed, will be intrinsically fulfilling to the same degree as all other work, is obviously false. So such differences may matter. And duration will certainly matter.

Then Chomsky says something quite important, in our view, and a bit different.

“But let's imagine still that at some level it does harm. Well, okay, at that point, the society, the community, has to decide how to make compromises. Each individual is both a producer and a consumer, after all, and that means that each individual has to join in these socially determined compromises -- if in fact there are compromises.”

Exactly. But this means that there must be institutions that facilitate such decisions, and that we have to have some kind of norms, as well, to know what is fair, what is just, and what is consistent with preserving classlessness in our future economy.

Chomsky of course knows all this:

“it seems to me that anarchist, or, for that matter, left-Marxist structures, based on systems of workers' councils and federations, provide exactly the set of levels of decision-making at which

decisions can be made about a national plan. Similarly, state socialist societies also provide a level of decision-making -- let's say the nation -- in which national plans can be produced. There's no difference in that respect. The difference has to do with participation in those decisions and control over those decisions."

In the case of central planning and authoritarian states - the decisions are top down. In the anarchist alternative, they are self managing - which, I think, if it means anything coherent - means that we strive to have people involved in them to the extent they are affected by them. But then we need institutions and associated information flow that permits, facilitates, and even makes that the inevitable case.

As Chomsky said:

"In the view of anarchists and left-Marxists ... those decisions are made by the informed working class through their assemblies and their direct representatives, who live among them and work among them."

Fine, this is unobjectionable, but it leaves the question, how is it that the workers - and as mentioned earlier, also the consumers - are informed? From where do they get the information essential to the decisions? And, as well, by what methods do they tally their preferences into decisions that all then abide by?

This is not asking for a blueprint, it is asking for a minimal structural description that can give real substance, and believability, to the possibility of self management.

Chomsky continued:

"certainly in any complex industrial society there should be a group of technicians whose task it is to produce plans, and to lay out the consequences of decisions, to explain to the people who have to make the decisions that if you decide this, you're likely to get this consequence, because that's what your programming model shows, and so on. But the point is that those planning systems are themselves industries, and they will have their workers' councils and they will be part of the whole council system, and the distinction is that these planning systems do not make decisions. They produce plans in exactly the same way that automakers produce autos. The plans are

then available for the workers' councils and council assemblies, in the same way that autos are available to ride in."

This too raises important questions. What keeps these planners, and other experts, from dominating outcomes? It is one thing to provide expertise in assembling information. It is another thing to have power over outcomes. How do we get the former but without having the latter? Likewise, on what basis do workers determine what to favor? Where is the opinion and influence of consumers in this process? Why does anyone abide by emergent plans - where abiding would of course entail working specific numbers of hours and at times and in ways one may not optimally prefer?

There is a very real sense in which the economic vision called participatory economics that we earlier summarized in this chapter, was conceived precisely to answer all the questions raised above. The interview with the young Chomsky was in 1976, and the conception and formulation of parecon began in earnest not long thereafter. How do we give legs to an anarchist or libertarian and certainly classless and self managing vision for economy? The answers that emerged from that concern bear directly upon all the points raised above, and some very important additional ones.

First, parecon, moved by the call for self management, to reiterate, settled on workers and consumers councils as the venues of decision making power. This is where people get together, air views, discuss options, manifest preferences, settle on decisions. This was also just borrowing from past practice. The norm guiding the councils in parecon, however, was conceived so as to conduct discussions, debates and explorations, and then tally preferences, all such as to convey to each actor a say in decision-making in proportion as they are affected - at least to the extent possible and without being overly anal about it. This refined past practice, somewhat.

Second, there arose a concern about the distribution of tasks - work - among all those able to do work. How should tasks be combined into jobs? While the issue of more or less onerous, or more or less fulfilling tasks arose, in accord with Chomsky's observation of the need for workers to be prepared to participate in

and make decisions, we realized that some kinds of work are empowering for those doing it - and other kinds are disempowering for those doing it. The empowering tasks produce not only goods and services, but creates in the workers involved: increasing confidence, advancing skills, evolving socially enriched connections, steadily growing awareness of critical information, and steadily enhanced experience of daily decision making. The disempowering tasks produce not only goods and services, but creates in the workers involved: declining confidence, diminishing skills, fragmentation, declining awareness of critical information, and enforced divorce from daily decision making.

Combining overwhelmingly empowering tasks into roughly 20% of all jobs, and combining overwhelmingly disempowering tasks into roughly 80% of all jobs, guarantees that the 20% who are empowered, who we call the coordinator class, will rule over the 80% who are disempowered, the working class.

Thus we saw the need to replace that corporate division of labor with a new approach, which we called balanced job complexes. The idea is simple: balance the jobs people do for empowerment effect. We all do a job with a mix of tasks and responsibilities which, on average, over time, has the same empowerment impact as each other job in the economy. Of course balancing for empowerment also largely balances for onerousness and intrinsic desirability of jobs, too, but not entirely. And to our thinking this empowerment balance was by far the more important step to take to avoid class division and all the ugly derivative effects it entails. Slight differences in onerousness could easily be addressed by differential income allotments to offset the debits thereby incurred, as per the suggestion from Chomsky, above.

So what about remuneration and consumption? Well, here comes a key point of disagreement with the formulations in Chomsky's interview. The first problem to address is the need for fairness. The second problem is the need for people to have incentives to do that which they should do but would, assessing only their own condition, prefer not to do. The third problem is the need to have signals that communicate needed information for wise and ethically sound decision making about what to produce

and consume. The fourth problem is the need to correlate the population's desires for social product to the population's desires for work and to also enjoy leisure.

A frequent anarchist answer is, okay, let's have work from each able bodied person in accord with their abilities, and let's have consumption by each person in accord with their needs. The trouble is, no one who says this literally means it. That is, no one means that they favor that each person decides, independently of all other people, and consulting only their own preferences, how much to take from the social product for their own consumption, and how long to work and what to work at. Taken literally, the "from each to each" norm is remarkably anti social, so it is not intended literally.

If I have only my own tastes to consult, I will want a whole lot of stuff. Why not take it, assuming there is no injustice involved, and no loss to others. And I will also only want to work up to the point at which the pleasures of working are outweighed by the pleasures to be had from leisure. In other words, I will want too much - actually, way too much. And, despite Chomsky's correct insights into the intrinsic values of work, I will also very likely want to work far fewer hours than would be required to fulfill everyone expressing consumption needs like mine. So, there is a problem - the mesh between work and consumption - not to mention taking into account the full social and environmental costs of both production and consumption.

The anarchist task is to solve these matters without defaming or degrading work or leisure, without violating self management, and without imposing class division. It can be done, I believe, by combining the self managed network of councils and balanced job complexes with two additional structures - remuneration for duration, intensity, and onerousness of the socially valued work we do, called equitable remuneration, and cooperative negotiation of production and consumption by those same councils using procedures that account for full social costs and benefits and that convey to each actor a self managing say, via an allocation methodology called participatory planning.

The remunerative scheme is fair. If we all do socially valued labor - which, in time, has had the onerous components minimized, but even until then - and we all do it for the same duration, and all working equally hard, and all having an equal share of fulfilling and onerous tasks - then we should all earn an average income. You can get more income, however, by working longer, harder, or at more onerous tasks, all in agreement with your workmates, and all in a socially productive manner. Alternatively, you might value leisure more and might opt for less consumption and thus also for less hours spent at socially valued labor. Both choices are fair, in the parecon view. And the system is not only fair, but also provides precisely the incentives needed to coordinate work with desires for the output of work, as well as providing precisely the information needed for people to sensibly determine investment patterns, volumes of production, etc.

The participatory planning allocation procedures are also desirable. They are consistent with self management, classlessness, and equity. They elevate human need and well being - both in work and in leisure - to the guide for economic decisions. They make it part and parcel of personal fulfillment for people to take into account all social and environmental effects.

Finally, we have here addressed the young Chomsky's interview for two reasons.

- One, we wanted to bring it to light for people who have likely never seen it.
- Two, we wanted to demonstrate that while the motives and values guiding Chomsky's formulations are in tune with all our finest aspirations, a few of the extrapolations to judgements about institutions are not. And three, we wanted to make a case that participatory economics is in tune with anarchist aspirations, but also accurately addresses the actual complexities of economic life.

Our hope is that the next discussion with an anarchist who has doubts about parecon akin to those that arise from the young Chomsky's views, might go something like this:

Anarchist: Liking much about parecon, there is still a key point that worries me. How do pareconists see work?

Pareconist: By work pareconists mean activity undertaken in the economy to produce goods or services that others, not the person doing the work, will enjoy.

Anarchist: But in a parecon this is self managed, yes?

Pareconist: Exactly.

Anarchist: So isn't work, in that case, one of the cornerstone ways a person expresses and fulfills him or herself?

Pareconist: Yes, as long as it is self managed, without class rule, and without impositions perverting it, of course.

Anarchist: Then why give an income for doing self managed socially valued labor? Doesn't remunerating work assume that without pay, people would rather vegetate than work? Why not get from each according to ability, and give to each according to need?

Pareconist: For one thing, while work that is freely undertaken to create worthy outputs is indeed part of a fulfilling life, nonetheless certain aspects of work are boring or burdensome, causing us to want to do less. But, so is taking care of kids part of a fulfilling life, or resting, playing games, reading, going to a concert or movie, taking a walk, or seeing something new. Other activity that is not about producing something which others benefit from via the economic allocation system is also fulfilling, so we each have a trade off, if you will, between work for the social output, and leisure that we put to other desirable ends, not vegetating.

Anarchist: Why can't we each decide how much leisure and work we want? Why do you assume that we will work too little, or consume too much?

Pareconist: We should each decide, I agree, but not in isolation from the implications for people who produce what we consume, or who consume what we produce, and for the environment, as well. The implication of opting for less work and more leisure, is generating less social output.

Anarchist: So, if I want to work less, I should take correspondingly less, and I will.

Pareconist: But how do you know how much it is just and fair to take, or to work? The assumption of your norm, "from each to each," is that people will be responsible. There will be many more things you would like to have than you will take, but you will responsibly restrain yourself. There will be times you would rather not work, but you will anyhow, to be responsible. Let's just assume, which most would doubt, that all people will automatically want to act thusly. The question nonetheless arises, how will such people be responsible? According to what shared value system? With what indicators to guide their choices?

Anarchist: So you need remuneration for duration, intensity, and onerousness to get fair results - not mainly as an incentive?

Pareconist: Yes, but there is another issue, too. By having income as we do in parecon, the allocation system is not only able to be fair, but is also able to unearth desires for leisure versus desires for output, as well as for different types of work that people prefer or dislike, as well as revealing the relative desires for and costs of different types of production, so that we can alter current plans and investments accordingly. People restraining themselves is actually not so helpful. It is better for an economy if people reveal their actual true and full desires, since this can usefully inform investment choices regarding where to aim in the future, even if for now people will wind up having to settle for less.

Anarchist: I still feel like I would rather not besmirch what labor is, and what we think are people's motives, by offering rewards.

Pareconist: I don't see why fair allocation, with self management so that work's character and average duration is mutually agreed, is besmirching it, but since you do feel that way, perhaps another observation might bridge our gap.

Say we establish a parecon. If I am right, it would be disastrous to have no remunerative norm other than that people work and take whatever they independently choose to do and to have. So, as a caution, to avoid risk of destructive outcomes, how about if we start with parecon's norm.

Then, however, over time, as people become more and more social, we experiment with having additional free goods and with more lenient accountings of duration, intensity, and onerousness in

various workplaces or industries. And we see what happens. If you are correct, outcomes won't change, or will even improve. In that case, we continue the experiments. If I am right, outcomes will get seriously messed up, for want of guiding indicators, and many problems will arise. If that happens, we slow or stop the experiments. By this approach, we minimize risks of calamity but we also preserve and explore possibilities to further refine the income norm.

Class and Participatory Economics

"We are all agreed that your theory is crazy. The question which divides us is whether it is crazy enough to have a chance of being correct."

- Niels Bohr

The title of this chapter of Occupy Vision is "Beyond Class Rule is Parecon." Okay then, to close out the chapter, does participatory economics get beyond class rule, and if so, what features are critical to that accomplishment?

To get rid of an owning class above all others, the only recourse is to not have individuals, or even groups, own productive assets - meaning workplaces, resources, equipment and so on. This has been known since there have been anti capitalists, and at no time has anyone remotely made a case it isn't true. It is basically a kind of truism. If owning a workplace is allowed and conveys to the owner control over it and a claim on its revenues - after paying costs - we are doomed to the owning class being a ruling class above workers and even above those we have called coordinators. It isn't that the later have no recourse, no power - it is that the former, insofar as the system persists, are, within the system, dominant. Coordinator class members can use their relative monopoly on empowering work - and, derivatively, information and skills - to attract high, and sometimes extremely high incomes. They can also bargain for outcomes, therefore seriously influencing decisions even beyond those they in fact make by virtue of their positions. Workers can withhold their labor or otherwise act in concert to try to attain at least living and even bearable incomes, and to try to ward off the most egregious

violations of dignity, etc. But, unless the hold on property by a few is eliminated, there will be a ruling class of property owners.

So what does parecon do about owning productive property? Really, the issue isn't "owning" since the word doesn't mean much without being filled out with its rights and privileges. Suppose you own General Motors or Microsoft - the whole of either or both. However, also suppose ownership conveys no rights whatsoever. You get no income by virtue of it. You get no decision making by virtue of it. You get nothing by virtue of it. Then there is no owning, ruling, class. This makes clear what must be done, and what is done, in parecon. It isn't just that no one has a deed that says I own such and such resources, productive tools, or workplaces. It is that no one has any claim over any such property for any reason at all, other than that which derives from the parecon norm for income and for decision making influence.

You could think of it as everyone owns an equal share of everything productive, and it conveys nothing - or society as a whole owns all of it - and, again, the ownership conveys nothing. It doesn't really matter which view of it you have. Parecon eliminates an owning class by eliminating the roles and requisites of ownership of productive property.

Okay, but what about the coordinator class that exists, inside a capitalist economy, between labor and capital and that is defined by its relative monopoly on empowering work that in turn conveys to it skills, information, confidence, and even energy essential to decision making, while other workers doing disempowering tasks are, in contrast, relatively de-skilled, dis-informed, and made passive and exhausted by their activities, all interfering with their being able to or even wanting to participate in decision making. This too creates class division, and in the absence of an owning class, a new class rules, now coordinators over workers - as we have seen in what has been called twentieth century socialism.

Does parecon retain this class hierarchy? Is parecon just a familiar kind of coordinator ruled economy? Or is it truly classless?

The claim is that in the combination of workers and consumers self managed councils, remuneration for duration,

intensity, and onerousness of socially valued labor, balanced job complexes, and participatory planning, there is simply no locus of creation of class difference, much less class rule. These institutions do not treat one sector/class differently than another sector/class such that they have opposed interests and one advances from the decline of the other, much less such that one rules the economy above the other.

The first step in checking this claim is to ask, is there an owning class - and a class that doesn't own. If so the claim will be false. As noted above, parecon passes this first test.

The second step is to ask is there a coordinator class above a working class - the one empowered and high stepping, the other disempowered and low slung?

What we can say is this. The most direct cause of existence of this division is eliminated entirely, root and branch, by incorporating balanced job complexes. This gives each participant comparably empowering circumstances. The next most direct avenue to even this type division - simply affording to one group dominance over another which they then parlay into all kinds of advantages - is eliminated by adopting self managed decision making and equitable remuneration. And finally, most subtly, the only known indirect source of this division - the presence of an institution chosen for entirely other reasons (simply to distribute labor goods and services) that by its role implications subverts self management and equitable remuneration and even enforces the reinstitution of a coordinator/worker division of labor - is also eliminated (in both its market and central planning variants) by adopting participatory planning.

Can we say there is no other danger we have missed. No - not definitively. But we can say, if there is, and if anyone can find it, then a good economy must take it into account and deal with it, and parecon advocates would certainly move to do so.

We have posed the above briefly, and of course one can explore much further into the details, but the essence is as stated.

We want classlessness because with classes, and class rule, our values will be violated. To get classlessness we must reject private ownership of productive property and the corporate division of

labor. If we reject those, but retain markets or central planning, they will overthrow our intentions and reimpose the old structures - certainly the division of labor, and over time, at least with a significant probability (see Soviet and Yugoslav history) private ownership as well. Thus, we must adopt, on top of our other commitments, participatory planning.

That is the logic, and the claims, of participatory economics. What about participatory politics - the next stop on our visionary agenda?

Chapter Three

Self Management Implies Parpolity

"I would like to believe that people have an instinct for freedom, that they really want to control their own affairs. They don't want to be pushed around, ordered, oppressed, etc., and they want a chance to do things that make sense, like constructive work in a way they control, or maybe control together with others. I don't know any way to prove this. It's really a hope about what human beings are like, a hope that if social structures change sufficiently, those aspects of human nature will be realized."
- Noam Chomsky

Current times make a loud argument, by example, that contemporary political structures are decrepit and redundant. Every day hammers home the realization. The U.S., for example, arguably has one of the most democratic political systems now operating. Yet even if there weren't huge concentrations of corporate wealth and power dominating political outcomes, even if media didn't constrain and manipulate information to distort political preferences, even if the two parties weren't two wings of a single corporate party, even if there weren't diverse, idiotic, and at best anachronistic structures like the electoral college, even if elections weren't winner take all affairs in which upwards of half the voting population have their desires ignored (as do most of the other half, but that's another matter), and even if elections weren't easily hijacked by outright fraud, clearly modern electoral and parliamentary democracy would still diverge greatly from a system that maximally facilitates participation, elicits informed opinion, and justly resolves disputes.

So, what do we want instead of current political systems? When activists take to the streets in the Mideast, North Africa, Europe, and America too - protesting governments that range from dictatorships to “democracies,” what, beyond indignation, fuels their tenacity? What do they want? What do we want?

With polity encompassing legislation of shared rules or laws, implementation of shared programs and pursuits, and adjudication of contested claims including violation of rules and laws - our task is to determine our values (adapting those we have already elucidated generally to the political sphere of life) and, more particularly, a set of institutions able to actualize our values.

Positive political vision has not yet, at least in context of the values of Fanfare, been as fully spelled out, explored, and challenged as participatory economics, which was presented last chapter. However, the U.S.-based activist and political scientist Stephen Shalom, among others, has at least begun the process in his preliminary presentation of parpolity (available on the internet via the Participatory Society subsite of ZNet at <http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/topics/parsoc>). In this chapter, we lean heavily on Shalom’s work as his parpolity is a political vision that seeks to further the same values as parecon.

Anarchist Roots

"Such was law; and it has maintained its two-fold character to this day. Its origin is the desire of the ruling class to give permanence to customs imposed by themselves for their own advantage. Its character is the skillful commingling of customs useful to society, customs which have no need of law to insure respect, with other customs useful only to rulers, injurious to the mass of the people, and maintained only by the fear of punishment."
- Peter Kropotkin

The French anarchist Proudhon wrote,

“To be governed is to be watched over, inspected, spied on, directed, legislated, regimented, closed in, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, assessed, evaluated, censored, commanded, all by creatures that have neither the right nor wisdom nor virtue... To be governed means that at every move, operation, or transaction, one is

noted, registered, entered in a census, taxed, stamped, authorized, recommended, admonished, prevented, reformed, set right, corrected. Government means to be subject to tribute, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolized, extorted, pressured, mystified, robbed; all in the name of public utility and the general good. Then at first sign of resistance or word of complaint, one is repressed, fined, despised, vexed, pursued, hustled, beaten up, garroted, imprisoned, shot, machine gunned, judged, sentenced, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed, and to cap it all, ridiculed, mocked, outraged, and dishonored. That is Government. That is its justice and morality!"

The problem that arises for people responding to this outcry, and many other similar anarchist formulations, is that they do not specify how to transcend the regimentation typical of state and government. They don't explain how each citizen and community can organizationally freely determine its own actions. How do we legislate shared norms, implement collective programs, and adjudicate disputes, including dealing with violations of law? How do we prevent humans from being reduced to "atomistic units clashing and jangling," as Barbara Ehrenreich once described, and instead compose a society where the actions of each person collectively benefit all other people?

The anarchist desire for freedom from constraint imposed on the populace by a state operating separate from, and above, the populace is apt and accurate. When this morphs into a claim that any effort to accomplish political functions is doomed to be oppressive - which it sometimes does - that goes way too far. Accomplishing legislation, adjudication, and collective implementation by way of lasting institutions is not, itself, the problem. The problem is doing this in ways divorced from the will and needs of the populace. We must attain an end to states existing above people if we are to attain our values. However, the task of doing so cannot be accomplished at the expense of collectively achieving needed political functions. Thus, we confront the same type of problem as last chapter. What institutions can fulfill the functions of the polity, while also fulfilling our overall social values?

The Need for Political Vision

*"I swear to the Lord I still can't see
Why Democracy means Everybody but me."
- Langston Hughes*

One thug with a club can disrupt even the most humane gathering. Thugs with clubs, in all variants - whether aroused by liquor, jealousy, arrogance, greed, pathology, or some other antisocial attribute - won't disappear from a good society.

Likewise, a dispute that has no means of resolution will often escalate, even in the best of environments, into a struggle that vastly transcends the scope of its causes, whether the escalating dispute occurs between the Hatfields and McCoys, northern and south states, rural and urban areas, France and Germany, or Pakistan and India.

What prevents social degradation from thugs? What prevents escalating disputes? More generally, if we lack agreed social norms, people will have to repeatedly start social projects from scratch. We won't be able to benefit from a set of previously agreed on responsibilities and practices. We will have to repeatedly negotiate to the point of never implementing.

In a good polity will we have known responsibilities we cannot violate, or will everything we do be up for grabs with each new day? In the former case, we might attain civilized existence. In the later case, we would have only chaos. To have social success, in other words, we need political structures. Roles certainly eliminate some options, but they also fantastically facilitate others. When options that are precluded are all harshly harmful, and options that we gain are all desirable, the limitations and facilitations of institutional roles benefit us.

Put differently, it is true that even the most desirable mutually agreed roles and responsibilities will, to some degree, limit our range of options. Laws do restrict what we are permitted to do. So do conventions, norms, and agreements. In fact, for any role, role conflicting behavior disappears, typically, even as an option. However, desirable mutually agreed roles also make the range of all options available to us vastly larger and more attainable by

facilitating their accomplishment. Having red and green lights at intersections constrains our driving options since we must stop at red and go at green, but this also keeps us alive to do all else we might choose, not to mention permitting driving through intersections without crashes and jams halting our motion. More generally, having diverse collectively established rules that we all abide, permits us each to operate far more effectively and diversely than if we had no such rules, even as having rules also narrows our choices in some contexts. If our political institutions limit options agreeably, and if they facilitate options desirably, then the coherence and ease of interactive activity that institutional norms bring will more than outweigh the limitations they impose.

If I violate my previously agreed on roles and responsibilities, it will likely disturb and perhaps completely disrupt other people's expectations, actions, and options. We don't want everyone to be free to kill. We don't want everyone to be free to drive through red lights. Nor do we arrive at our rules every day anew. We establish them. We want the kind and level of freedom whose exercise facilitates further freedom and the means to enjoy it. We do not want the kind and level of freedom whose exercise curtails additional freedom and the means to enjoy it. We want to escape needless restrictions, but we want to do this only consistent with others having the same freedoms we have while also preserving previously agreed role responsibilities.

So we need to establish institutions that let us accomplish political functions in accord with solidarity, diversity, and equity - where this means fairness, or, in the political realm, justice, meaning the appropriate allocation of burdens and benefits including responsibilities and, when need be, restraints, and including rewards to offset harms and when need be punishments to prevent harms - and finally self management. The question for political vision is: what are those institutions?

Failed Political Visions

*"Ring the bells that still can ring
Forget your perfect offering
There is a crack in everything*

That's how the light gets in."
- Leonard Cohen

One failed answer comes from the perspective called Marxism Leninism. As history has verified, the "dictatorship of the proletariat," even when sought for worthy reasons, translates virtually seamlessly into the dictatorship of the party, the politburo, and in the worst case even the beneficent, or worse, the megalomaniacal dictator. That this trajectory could ever have been equated with a desirable form of political life will always be a horrible blemish on the political history of "the Left." Outlawing all but a single "vanguard" party ruled by "democratic centralism" subverts even democracy, much less self management.

Democratic centralism systematically impedes participatory impulses, promotes popular passivity, nurtures fear, and breeds authoritarianism, and it does all this even against the far better aspirations of many Leninists. To routinely outlaw external opposition and suppress or manipulate internal dissent by transferring members who become critical between branches does not engender democracy. However positive specific Leninists' motivations may be, Leninist practice does not lead to a better polity.

Western-style electoral democracy is another answer to the political vision question, and while it is arguably politically better than the Leninist one-party state and dictatorship, it is nonetheless a far cry from participatory democracy. Highly unequal distributions of wealth stack the deck before the political card game even begins. Citizens choose from pre-selected candidates screened for compatibility by society's corporate elites. And even if we remove private ownership of productive assets to overcome money-related problems within a Western style democracy, participatory democracy requires more than infrequently voting for a representative to carry out political activity that is largely alienated from popular will and often contrary to popular interests.

The incorrect claim of some anarchists is that polity per se is oppressive. Anything goes should be the watchword. However, the correct claim of still more anarchists is that a polity which exists

above the populace, imposing on the populace, not reflecting the informed will of the populace, is oppressive, and this is not addressed by current western political structures which, instead, are instances of the problem.

While electing representatives is, for certain situations, a plausible and perhaps even an essential part of a true participatory democracy that promotes deliberation and exploration, frequent and regular referenda on important political propositions and policies at every level of political organization accompanied by a full airing of competing views would presumably be at least an important addition to voting for candidates. The question arises, however, can we conceive mechanisms that would permit and promote engagement, deliberation, and participatory decision making that gives all citizens appropriate say, whether directly or when desirable through representatives, and that preserves essential rights while serving justice.

ParPolity

*"Oh the time will come up
When the winds will stop
And the breeze will cease to be a'breathin'*

*Like the stillness in the wind
Before the hurricane begins
The hour when the ship comes in."
- Bob Dylan*

After admittedly very quickly rejecting Leninism and parliamentary democracy as both violating our values, the first important thing to realize is that political life will not disappear in a desirable society. This might seem utterly obvious to many, but there are others who approach the problem of envisioning a better future who miss this key point. The structure of political life will transform, yes, but its relevance to citizens will intensify rather than diminish.

Politics will no longer be privileged groups perpetuating their domination. Nor will oppressed constituencies battle an unjust status quo whether cynically or as an opposition. But having a

desirable polity doesn't mean having universal agreement about social choices. If we assume universal agreement there is little to discuss, but we will also be operating in an ugly delusion. Homogenized minds is not an apt image upon which to build liberated circumstances.

While the goal of social diversity dictates that competing ideas should be implemented in parallel whenever possible, many times one program will have to be implemented at the expense of others. The problem of public choice will therefore not disappear in a desirable polity. Even more, since a desirable society will kindle our participatory impulses, in a good society debate will sometimes heat up rather than cool down.

Stephen Shalom, in his efforts to envision a parpolity, outlines a sampling of issues that will still inspire debate and dispute:

“Here are just a few issues that will continue to vex us: animal rights (should meat-eating be outlawed?), pornography (is it inherently oppressive to women or is it an expression of individual autonomy?), prostitution (in a society without economic exploitation is it possible for someone to ‘choose’ to be a sexual worker?), deep ecology (to what extent should we treat the environment not just as something to be saved so that it can continue to sustain us in the future, but as something of value independent of all human benefit?), drug legalization, multilingualism, children's rights, allocation of expensive or scarce medical resources like heart transplants or cloning, surrogate motherhood, euthanasia, single-sex schools, and religious freedom when the religions violate other important societal values like gender equity.”

If that list doesn't make the point, Shalom continues:

“On top of this, there are issues that are generally supported by the Left, but not universally so, and about which I can imagine continuing debates in a good society: for example, the extent to which we should recognize abortion rights or preferential policies for members of previously oppressed groups. And then there are issues that would arise from the fact that the whole world may not become ‘a good society’ all at once ... how will we deal with questions of foreign policy, trade, or immigration?”

After which Shalom summarizes,

“In short, even in a society that had solved the problem of economic exploitation and eliminated hierarchies of race, class, and gender, many controversies--many deep controversies--would still remain. Hence, any good society will have to address issues of politics and will need some sort of political system, a polity.”

The broadest goals, if not the structural means of embodying a new polity, are already pretty well understood and enunciated. A truly democratic community insures that the general public has the opportunity for meaningful and constructive participation in the formation of social policy. A society that excludes large areas of crucial decision-making from public control, or a system of governance that merely grants the general public the opportunity to ratify decisions taken by elite groups...hardly merits the term democracy. A central question is, however, what institutional vehicles will best afford and even guarantee the public truly democratic opportunities?

Ultimately, political controversies must be settled by tallying people's preferences. Obviously voting will be better informed the greater access voters have to relevant information. One condition of real democracy, therefore, is that groups with competing opinions can effectively communicate their views. Democratization of political life must include democratization of the flow of information and commentary (see a discussion of such media in chapter ten of the book *Realizing Hope*).

Participatory democracy requires not only democratic access to a transformed media and the possibility for people to form and utilize single-issue political organizations to make their views known, but also, at least in all likelihood, a pluralism of political parties with different social agendas. There is no reason to think, in other words, that having a good economy or kinship or culture or whole society means that people won't disagree about major matters in ideological ways. An absence of class, gender, and racial hierarchy doesn't imply an absence of all difference and dispute.

If we reflect briefly on the history of political life within the left and on the consequences of attempting to ban parties, factions, or any form of political organization that people desire to employ, all in an attempt to attain cohesiveness and, in essence, uniformity,

it should be clear that bans are the stuff of repression and authoritarianism. To have parties which internally create anti solidaritous relations, violate self management, and deny diversity, will not further these values in society as a whole.

But can we offer more by way of political vision than these broad and very general intimations of possible features of a desirable polity?

Values

*From fixtures and forces and friends
Your sorrow does stem
That hype you and type you
Making you feel
That you must be exactly like them
- Bob Dylan*

Following the same path used last chapter for economy, we might start with values, and parecon's economic values not only make good economic sense, but with a little tweaking make good political sense as well.

Surely a polity should produce solidarity and generate diversity. These two economic values transfer easily and directly into politics, though they are rarely implemented. The former means political actors should each advance via the advance of all. The latter means that political institutions should be protecting and celebrating dissent and diversity of views as much as possible - not seeking one right mind or one right path.

For the economy, equity addresses the distribution of rewards. For polity, the analogue of equity is justice, which addresses the distribution of rights and responsibilities, including the need to redress violations of social agreements. This does not mean vengeance, nor retribution. Justice is about fairness of outcomes over time, including redress of past imbalances and preventing future imbalances.

Self management is arguably, even more a political value than an economic one, both in its origins and its logic, and is therefore certainly a worthy political aim. Politics should facilitate actors

having influence on decisions in proportion as those decisions impact their lives.

So borrowing and adapting from parecon, for politics we have as guiding values solidarity, diversity, justice, and self management. Moreover, accomplishing these values implies accomplishing other more familiar political values including liberty and tolerance, without which both diversity and solidarity are violated, and particularly participation which is a prerequisite to all four aims.

Institutions

“If the misery of the poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin.”
- Charles Darwin

In the participatory conception of a desirable polity, as outlined in part one, there are matters of legislation, adjudication, and collective implementation. For legislation, seeking self management, Shalom advocates “nested councils” where “the primary-level councils will include every adult in the society” and where Shalom suggests, “the number of members in these primary-level councils [might plausibly] be somewhere between 25-50.”

Thus everyone in society is in one of these basic political units. Some folks are elected to higher level councils since, in Shalom’s parpolity vision, “each primary-level council will choose a delegate to a second-level council” where “each second-level council [would again] be composed of 25-50 delegates.” And this would proceed, again, for another layer, and another, “until there is one single top-level council for the entire society.” The delegates to each higher council “would be charged with trying to reflect the actual views of the council they came from.” On the other hand, “they would not be told ‘this is how you must vote,’ for if they were, then the higher council they were attending would not be a deliberative body.”

Shalom suggests that:

“the number of members on each council should be determined on the basis of a society-wide decision, and perhaps revised on the basis of experience, so as to meet the following criteria: small enough to guarantee that people can be involved in deliberative bodies, where all can participate in face-to-face discussions; but yet big enough so that (1) there is adequate diversity of opinion included; and (2) the number of layers of councils needed to accommodate the entire society is minimized.”

Shalom clarifies, perhaps contrary to most people’s intuitions, that:

“a council size of 25, with 5 layers, assuming half the population consists of adults, can accommodate a society of 19 million people; a council size of 40, again would need 5 layers to accommodate 200 million people; a 50-person council could accommodate 625 million people by the fifth level. With a sixth level, even a 25-person council could accommodate a society of about half a billion people.”

Thus making a case that his layered councils are flexible and well within practical possibility.

What happens in these proposed political councils?

Legislation is enacted, which is to say voting on norms and collective agendas takes place. The councils are deliberative and public. The idea is to utilize them to approximate as much as possible within a sensible time frame and in accord with the importance of particular issues - self managed decision making. Sometimes higher level councils vote and decide. Sometimes they deliberate and report back to lower level councils which vote and decide. The exact combination of voting at the base versus voting in higher level councils - and of procedures for presenting, debating, tallying viewpoints, and of how council members are chosen - are all (among many other features), degrees of political detail we don’t have to address in a cursory and overview discussion like this, or perhaps in any discussion at all, before experimentation and experience provides information to guide choices. For purposes of discussing a desirable polity now, however, it is enough to say that a worthy legislative branch will likely incorporate and use face-to-face nested councils using open

methods of information transfer, debate, and voting aimed at providing all actors say over the decisions that affect them.

Suppose we are choosing between one person one vote majority rule and consensus, say, for decisions at some level, on some type of issues. Or we are deciding the mandates of representatives and their responsibilities. Or we are settling on the procedures of debate and evaluation, the means of voting, tallying, and then reconsidering. How do we arrive at a preference for one approach compared to another - again, not universally, but at particular levels and for particular types of decisions - recognizing that favored methods are highly likely to differ in different contexts? The answer is that we try to achieve self management, facilitate arriving at wise calculations, protect and pursue diversity, maintain solidaritous feelings and practices, and get things done without serious delays.

To what extent do we build in diversity by protecting it in spirit and in practice. The former, of course, without limit. But regarding practice - sometimes policies must be undertaken pretty much by all affected in the same manner. For example, you can't do allocation by markets for some folks and by participatory planning for others - both would fail to make any sense unless done for all. Similarly, you can't decide a dispute or arrive at a law using different procedures for some folks and for others where all are involved in the same situation. Yet, even in such cases, it is possible to try to have experiments to keep alive alternative methods that claim to be better than those predominantly preferred. And a polity would by mandate, and presumably by structures, do just that.

But what if some choices and gains tend to compromise, if fully pursued, the pursuit of others? Well, that is the conundrum of politics and values generally. It is when reasonable people can disagree not only due to seeing facts differently, or due to some people calculating wrong while others are accurate, but simply due to having different priorities or intuitions about complex implications. The trick of legislative structure, methods, and all of politics is to have a system that allows self-managed choices, in which everyone agrees that the choices are reached fair for all, and

are flexibly subject to review, even while alternative choices, as much as there remains interest in them, are still explored. This is what the nested council system - guided by commitment to self management, solidarity, and diversity - seeks to achieve.

What about shared executive functions?

Having a participatory economy takes care of a lot of what we typically know as executive functions in contemporary politics and, in doing so, helps pinpoint the remaining political elements. Think of delivering the mail, investigating and trying to limit outbreaks of disease, or providing environmental protection. All of these pursuits involve a production and allocation aspect handled by the structures of participatory economics, including balanced job complexes, remuneration for effort and sacrifice, and participatory decision making. The worker's council delivering mail would in these respects not be particularly different from the workers council producing bicycles, nor would the center for disease control workers' council be very different in these economic aspects from a typical hospital, and likewise for the Environmental Protection Agency and a typical research institute.

But in another sense the three examples are different from their parecon counterparts with other functions. The Post Office, CDC, and EPA operate with the sanction of the polity and carry out tasks that the polity mandates. Particularly in the case of the CDC and EPA, executive agencies act with political authority that permits them to investigate and sanction others where typical economic units would have no such rights and responsibilities.

It follows that the executive branch would be largely concerned with establishing politically mandated functions and responsibilities - typically carried out according to the norms of the participatory economy insofar as they involve workplaces with inputs and outputs - but with a political aspect defining their agendas and perhaps conveying special powers. This overlap between polity and economy is more or less analogous to the overlap between culture and economy visible when churches function in the economy for their inputs and perhaps some of their outputs, but do so with a cultural/religious definition. The change in economics to having a parecon instead of capitalism is part of

what makes a polity or culture or family or other aspect of society new in a new society, but the heart of their alteration is the change in their intrinsic logic.

Presumably the means for an executive branch to politically mandate its agendas and establish lasting mechanisms to oversee them would be through the deliberation and votes of a legislative branch, on the one hand, and economic planning on the other hand, including establishing empowered entities with their own rules of operation like the CDC and other politically empowered agencies.

What would be the role of a judiciary in a parpolity?

As Shalom asserts,

“Judicial systems often address three kinds of concerns: judicial review (are the laws just?), criminal justice (have specific individuals violated the laws?), and civil adjudication (how are disputes between individuals resolved?).”

For the first, Shalom offers a court system that would operate more or less like the Supreme Court does now, with hierarchical levels adjudicating disputes arising over council choices. Is this the best approach we can imagine, and can it be refined or transformed to further enhance self management? I don't know. It certainly merits close consideration.

For criminal matters and civil adjudication, Shalom proposes a court system modestly different from what we have now, plus a police force that would, of course, have balanced job complexes and enjoy remuneration for effort and sacrifice.

Regarding having a police function and associated work force in a desirable society - which is actually for many people more controversial than matters of judicial courts - I agree with Shalom and don't really see any alternative or any intractable problems. There will be crimes in a good society, sometimes violent and sometimes even horribly evil, and the investigation and capture of criminals will be serious matters requiring special skills. It seems obvious that some people will do that kind of work, with special rules and features to ensure they do it well and also consistently with social values - just as some people will spend some of their work time flying airplanes or treating patients or doing other

difficult and demanding jobs that require special skills and have special rules to ensure they are done well and consistently with social values.

The contrary idea that policing would be unnecessary in a humane system is, at best, not realistic. Sure, in a good society many reasons for crime would be eliminated and criminal acts would likely be far fewer, but that doesn't mean there will be no crime at all. And the idea that policing can be done on an entirely voluntary basis makes no more sense than saying flying planes or doing brain surgery can be done entirely on a voluntary basis. It fails to realize that policing, and especially desirable policing, like flying planes or doing surgery, involves special skills and knowledge. It fails to recognize the need for training and likely also for disciplined attention to special rules to avoid misuse of police (or transport or medical) prerogatives. So the the proposal often put forward by libertarians of both the Marxist and anarchist school of thinking - that in a post-revolutionary society social order will be maintained by some kind of "people's militia" - is rejected for good reason. That said, the concerns typically raised relating to police roles being open to abuses of power are legitimate and must be taken into account.

Beyond the powerful implications of pareconish workplace structure and decision making for police motivations and for preventing police or any other workers from accruing undue benefits, might there be a special limited duration for police work due to its particular pressures and requirements? Might there be empowered community review mechanisms to oversee specific rules of police operations and evaluation? Sure. And such things might exist, as well, for various other jobs, too. Will the different approaches of a good society in determining guilt or innocence and administering punishment and rehabilitation impact police functions differently than the old approaches they replace? The answers are all very likely yes, but the details are beyond our purview here.

Why does the above formulation inspire outrage in some very sincere leftists who desire a better society? There are two reasons. The first is emotional, I think. They may have themselves been - or

know people who have been, or empathize with people who have been - on the receiving end of police arrogance, imposition, or violence. And their gut just says no. They hear the above as some kind of manipulation designed to get current police procedures back into a future society.

The second reason extends the first into an argument of sorts. Police often, indeed very often, act in ways that hurt rather than help all but narrow elites. This being so, we must, in a new society, do away with police. If this formulation said, we must do away with police as we now know them, it would be fine. But it doesn't say that. It says and it means, we must do away with institutional solutions for all police functions. This is the problem. Going from rejecting what is vile, to rejecting underlying functions and all possible institutional means to accomplish those functions - which are not only not vile, but in fact essential to viable and worthy social life - is not desirable, but suicidal.

Take a parallel argument. Many anarchists say government often acts in ways that hurt rather than help all but narrow elites. So it follows, they argue, that we must get rid of all political/government functions. This has the same logic. Or let's take another example. An ecological activist might say workplaces often act in ways that spew pollution and in doing so hurt rather than help all but a few elites. So it follows we should get rid of not just current workplace structures, but work in any structured institution at all. Or someone might argue that families, cultures, and schools all impose on people horribly restrictive and destructive habits and beliefs, so we ought to get rid of any institutional structures for addressing nurture, socialization, and education, celebration, communication, etc.

The problem in all these examples is going from a rightful rejection of contemporary means of accomplishing some function to rejecting any institutional means of addressing even refined versions of the function. This is suicidal. If it is a gut reaction - as with some people's feelings about police - it just needs sympathetic examination. But if the rejectionist case rests on what the person believes is careful thought - then the problem is actually greater. For the person who reasons this way is actually, ironically,

agreeing with Margaret Thatcher that “there is no alternative.” Thatcher, of course, never meant by TINA that you literally couldn’t do things any other way than they were currently being done. She only meant all other ways were worse. And the person rejecting institutional means of dealing with social functions is, in fact, saying, like Thatcher, that the only way to accomplish these functions is our current ways, or even worse ways, so we have to reject structurally addressing the functions at all. The only difference with Thatcher is that she took for granted that no one would seriously argue the efficacy of doing away with all institutions - due to not realizing, I guess, how far one can be driven by hatred of what exists.

In any event, it is not the police part of the judicial system, but the courts part, the legal advocates part, and the jury part, that may be most difficult to dramatically improve in a better society.

On the one hand, as Shalom argues, the advocate model in which lawyers work on behalf of clients - regardless of guilt or innocence - makes considerable sense. We don’t want people having to defend themselves so that those who are good at it have a tremendous advantage over those who are not good at it. We therefore need well-trained lawyers and prosecutors available to all disputants.

We also want these advocates to try hard, of course. But the injunction that prosecutors and defense attorneys should seek to win favorable verdicts - regardless of their knowledge of the true guilt or innocence of the accused and by any means that they can muster - because that approach will yield the greatest probability of truthful results - strikes me as about as believable, in certain respects, as the injunction that everyone in an economy should seek selfish private gain as the best means of benefiting society as a whole and engendering sociality. Of course the ills of the competitive legal methodology are incredibly aggravated by role structures in which benefits and losses are a function of gaining sought verdicts, regardless of justice. Yet, even when those involved in jurisprudence are bound by equitable incomes, still, it seems that the pursuit of worthy justice will entail many alterations from current practices. However, as to how to adapt or replace the

combination of courts, judges, juries, and aggressive advocacy with different mechanisms (other than concerning matters of new norms of remuneration and job definition that economic innovations indicate and that would certainly be highly beneficial in curbing anti social motivations and outcomes) we have no good ideas.

The state of shared political vision on the left, whether for legislative, executive, or adjudicative functions, is still modest and incomplete, and needs to be developed further to justify powerful and committed advocacy, perhaps largely by experiment, but perhaps also by careful analysis of options even based on current experiences. In either case, we should at least have some broad guidelines to make it possible to think about the relation of parecon to political prospects and vice versa.

Parpolity and the Economy

*"A fool and his money are soon elected."
- Will Rogers*

Milton Friedman, a right wing University of Chicago-based Nobel prize-winning economist of immense repute, argued that "viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, economic arrangements are important because of their effect on the concentration or dispersion of power." And this is true enough. And indeed economic institutions are also important for the way they train us either to participate in decisions as equals or to be docile as subordinates or domineering without respite, and for the way they help us to attain the social skills and habits of involvement and participatory decision making, or, instead, for the way they diminish those skills and habits.

Friedman went on to add that,

"the kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other."

This claim, however, is one of the most absurd utterances to be found in the domain of political or economic thought. In contradiction to Friedman's view, the truth is that capitalist economics produces gigantic centers of concentrated power in the form of its corporations and their ruling elements. It also produces atomized, weakened, de-centered, and disconnected workers and consumers. Further, it provides diverse means to translate corporate economic might into political influence by corporations controlling communication, information, and the finances of elections, as well as directly buying political officials. Finally, a capitalist economy even ensures that the isolation and disconnection of workers is further enforced by media manipulation and the alienation that comes from the population knowing that political outcomes are predetermined.

The result is that corporate lobbies and other elites determine political agendas and ensure that elections choose between candidates who differ primarily in how best to maintain elite prerogatives and advantages. Most of the population doesn't even participate in the electoral charades and among those who do participate, most have no other option than to repeatedly favor a lesser evil.

Parpolity, or any desirable political system that movements might advocate, will require, instead, an economy that doesn't elevate some to positions of power over others. It will need the economy to immerse the whole populace in an environment of participation, self management, sociality, and solidarity so that all citizens might best fulfill parpolity's requirements and enjoy its possibilities.

Parpolity will need - and in turn help produce - citizens who have broadly the same power, who have a social inclination to participate, and who have habits of sociality and solidarity. The same can be said for a parecon's needs vis a vis the polity.

Likewise a desirable polity will need - and help produce - citizens schooled to positively enhance and benefit from managing their own affairs in accord with collective well being, while respecting diverse needs and outcomes. Which is true for a parecon as well.

Parecon and parpolity are, by design, welcome partners in social organization. They share the same underlying logic of seeking to attain equitable outcomes in a solidaritous and diverse environment, under the self-managing auspices of those affected.

When we think of a parpolity and a parecon each as a kind of social system that takes in and also sends out people after impacting their consciousnesses, habits, degrees of fulfillment, talents, knowledge, skills, and inclinations, then we see that each requires and produces what the other provides and needs.

And, indeed, due to the similar requirements they each offer the other, it is more than plausible that a parpolity and a parecon could mutually combine to become a classless “political economy” that delivers solidarity, diversity, equity/justice, and self management.

Addendum: Parpolity and Political Strategy

"Hitherto philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point however is to change it."

- Karl Marx

Parpolity's main implications for political and social strategy have to do with two dimensions of activism - what we demand and how we organize ourselves. While our main discussions of strategy come in the next volume of Fanfare, let's take just a moment to get some indications, because they may also help to clarify what has been said above.

Having a political vision will hopefully tell us a variety of things we might demand in the present. That is, we could try to win changes in government and political practices now, that will reflect and move toward the logic of parpolity. These might include instant run-off voting procedures, vast extensions of public media and debate, new means of the public choosing executive programs, and judicial reforms.

When movements fight for such demands in the present, two very broad criteria that arise from political vision ought to inform their activity. First, of course, they should be trying to win improvements in people's lives. Second, they should be trying to

make changes that empower people to win still more gains and that educate and inspire people to want to do so.

On both counts, by examining the features of a proposed political vision, we ought to be able to discern present day changes that would benefit, empower, and inspire people, as well as increasing the desire for the political future we seek.

But an additional implication of political vision for present practice has to do with movement organization and structure. If we want the politics of the future to have certain features and properties, we should try as much as we can to incorporate those features and properties into our current operations.

In other words, our movements should, in their internal political structure and practices, elevate solidarity, diversity, justice, and self management. The conditions under which we operate today are constrained in ways unlike those of a future society, of course, since we have to deal with repressive structures all around us. But, nonetheless, a central implication of political vision is that as soon - and as much as we are able to do so - we should seek to build movements based on grassroots organization and participation and even on nested tiers of councils for organizational decision making.

As a political vision becomes more compelling and is shared by more people, desirable ways to adjudicate movement disputes, enact shared movement agendas, legislate movement norms, and otherwise arrive at movement decisions, should become clearer and easier to incorporate in our efforts.

Let us pose just one possible lesson. Typically, contemporary movements have two forms. They are either organized around a single issue that involves a focused organization fighting for wages, or health care, or women's right to choose, or for some other single-issue goal. Or they are coalitions composed of many such organizations teaming up to promote a shared but usually quite narrowly defined agenda. What our movements usually are not, however, are broad and diverse collections of people who mutually respect divergent viewpoints and who operate effectively together despite - and even in celebration of - their differences.

The fragmentation of our movements into single-issue efforts or into coalitions that bury differences and come and go with relatively short campaigns, bears only minimal resemblance to a good society or polity. It isn't that in the future there won't be people with single primary concerns, or even organizations that are narrowly focused, or coalitions that come in and out of fashion. It is that a good society itself will not primarily isolate people and groups into narrow concerns. It will, instead, overwhelmingly be a community with diverse views and agendas in which we all respect and incorporate each other's concerns into our efforts to maintain social cohesion.

If a movement is to be the harbinger of, and a school for, a new society, it should not be primarily atomized and narrow. It should, instead, incorporate differences, deal with them, and - in so doing - make itself steadily stronger.

Suppose that instead of only creating coalitions organized around a narrow list of agreed demands, an encompassing movement of movements - perhaps we might call it a revolutionary bloc - was also created. This would be an amalgam of all organizations, projects, and movements and their members - maybe also including individual members, all of whom subscribe to some broad range of values, priorities, and organizational norms - including and encompassing a wide range of differences.

This new movement structure would take its leadership regarding aspects of its focus from those of its members most directly dealing in the focused areas. Thus, in our countries, the U.S. and UK, we would get leadership from the women's movement about gender issues; from black and Latino movements about race; from the anti war movement about peace issues; and from labor and consumer movements about economic matters. Instead of the whole structure being defined by a little piece of the overall priorities of each component group that they all share, as in a coalition, the whole structure would be the total sum of all the key priorities of all its component groups - contradictions and all - just as a society is. This new movement structure would be a new society in embryo. Its internal organization and operations would reflect our aspirations for the new society we seek, including

incorporating the modes of council organization, election processes, means of communication, etc., of our political vision.

The point is that while the problem of envisioning improved political structures is still in process, it nonetheless seems we can be reasonably confident that participatory economics both produces people and conditions that will contribute to political justice and easily honors a desirable polity's requirements, while parpolity both produces people and conditions that will contribute to economic liberation and easily honor a desirable economy's requirements.

Chapter Four

Via Feminism to Parkinship

"When someone with the authority of a teacher, say, describes the world and you are not in it, there is a moment of psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked into a mirror and saw nothing."
- Adrienne Rich

In discussing visions for gender relations we have in mind a good society's procreation, nurturance, socialization, sexuality, and organization of daily home life with a special eye on three dimensions of implications: relations between women and men, between homo and heterosexuals, and between members of different generations.

Kinship Vision

*"In my heart, I think a woman has two choices:
either she's a feminist or a masochist."*
- Gloria Steinem

A problem with having this discussion, is that there is as yet very little clarity about what revolutionized kinship relations will be like in a new society. What altered or new institutions will organize procreation, nurturance, and socialization? How will the structures and social roles we fill to accomplish upbringing and home life change so as to eliminate the roots of gender and sexual hierarchies.

Our values imply that accomplishing kinship functions should enhance solidarity among the involved actors, preserve diversity of options and choices, apportion benefits and responsibilities fairly, and convey self managing influence - taking into account issues of age, etc.

So with that set of broad desires, will there be families as we now know them? Will upbringing diverge greatly from what we know now? What about courting and sexual coupling? How will

the old and young interact? How will adults react with the elderly and the young?

Fulfilling our values will require that desirable kinship structures liberate women and men rather than causing the former to be subordinate to the latter, and likewise for other hierarchical or degrading relations.

We are therefore talking about removing the features that produce systematic sexism, homophobia, and ageism, plus gaining an array of positive improvements we can only guess at until we have experimented with more complete proposals for visionary kinship institutions. But these will, at the very least, include the benefits of additional people reaching their fullest potentials.

It isn't that all problems associated with gender will disappear in a good society, of course, or that all unmet desires or unmanifested capacities will be perfectly addressed without any pain. Even in a wonderful society, we can confidently predict that there will still be unrequited love. Sex will not lack turmoil. Rape and other violent acts will occur, albeit far less often than now. Social change can't remove the pain of losing friends and relatives to premature death. It can't make all adults equally adept at relating positively with children or with the elderly or vice versa.

What we can reasonably expect and demand, however, is that new forms of engagement will eliminate the systematic violation of women, gays, children, and the elderly which causes these whole groups to suffer material or social deprivations.

We can demand that innovations eliminate the structural coercion of men and women, of hetero and homosexuals, and of all adults and children into patterns that have for so long manifested and preserved systematic violations of solidarity, diversity, equity, and self management.

How will all this happen? Not how will we get to this better future, which is a derivative and even more difficult question that we will take up later in volume three of *Fanfare*, but what will the institutions defining a vastly better kinship future look like?

Some people have good ideas, no doubt, but we have to admit that we have barely an inkling about this visionary question. Indeed, we can find very little in the way of a proposed answer in

the contemporary literature of the left. In the past some women have attempted to provide some visionary sex-gender insights and we would like to mention some of those attempts as being worth trying to elaborate into a gender related vision.

In contemporary societies that elevate men by consigning women to less empowering and fulfilling options, what are the defining structures that intrinsically produce a sexist ordering and therefore need to be profoundly altered to remove that ordering?

Sexism takes overt form in men having dominant and wealthier conditions. It takes more subtle form via longstanding habits of communication and behavioral assumptions. It is produced and reproduced by institutions that differentiate men and women, including coercively as in rape and battering, but also more subtly via what seem to be mutually accepted role differences in home life, work, and celebration. It also includes the cumulative impact of past sexist experiences on what people think, desire, and feel, and on what people habitually or even self consciously do.

If we want to find the source of gender injustice it stands to reason that we need to determine which social institutions - and which roles within those institutions - give men and women responsibilities, conditions, and circumstances, that engender motivations, consciousness, and preferences that elevate men above women.

One structure we find in all societies that have sexist hierarchies is that men father but women mother. That is, we find two dissimilar roles which men and women play vis a vis the next generation, with each role socially defined and in only a very minor sense biologically fixed. One conceptually simple structural change in kinship relations would be to eliminate this mothering/fathering differentiation between men and women.

What if instead of women mothering and men fathering, women and men each parented children? What if men and women each related to children in the same fashion, with the same mix of responsibilities and behaviors (called parenting), rather than one gender having almost all the nurturing as well as tending, cleaning, and other maintenance tasks (called mothering), and the other

gender having many more decision-based tasks, with one gender being more involved and the other more aloof, and so on?

We are not highly confident that replacing gender defined mothering and fathering with gender-blind parenting would eliminate all the defining roots of sexism, but we do think this is likely to be a key innovation critical to removing the underlying causes of sexist hierarchies.

This particular idea comes from the work of Nancy Chodorow, most prominently in a book titled, *The Reproduction of Mothering* (University of California Press). The book made a case that mothering is a role that is socially, not biologically, defined and that as mothers women produce daughters who, in turn, not only have mothering capacities but a desire to mother. "These capacities and needs," Chodorow continues, "are built into and grow out of the mother-daughter relationship itself. By contrast, women as mothers (and men as not mothers) produce sons whose nurturant capacities and needs have been systematically curtailed and repressed."

For Chodorow, the implication was that:

"The sexual and familial division of labor in which women mother and are more involved in interpersonal affective relationships than men produces in daughters and sons a division of psychological capacities which leads them to reproduce this sexual and familial division of labor."

Chodorow summarized by claiming that:

"All sex-gender systems organize sex, gender, and babies. A sexual division of labor in which women mother organizes babies and separates domestic and public spheres. Heterosexual marriage, which usually gives men rights in women's sexual and reproductive capacities, and formal rights in children, organizes sex. Both together organize and reproduce gender as an unequal social relation."

So perhaps one feature of a vastly improved society regarding gender relations will be that men and women will both parent, with no division between mothering and fathering.

Another structure that comes into question for many feminists thinking about improved sex-gender relations is the nuclear family.

This is hard to even define, I think, but has to do with whether the locus of child care and familial involvement is very narrow, such as resting with only two biological parents, or instead involves many more people - perhaps an extended family or friends, community members, etc.

It seems highly unlikely that a good society would have for its gender relations rules that required a few typical household organizations and family structures such that everyone must abide only those. We wouldn't expect that adults would, by law, have to live alone or in pairs or in groups, in any single or even in any few patterns. The key point is likely to be diversity, on the one hand, and that whatever diverse patterns exist, each frequently chosen option embodies features that impose gender equity rather than gender hierarchy.

While we don't feel equipped to describe such possible features, we can say that the men and women that are born, brought up, and then themselves bear and bring up new generations in a new and much better society will be full, capable, and confident in their demeanor and also lack differentiations that limit and confine the personality or the life trajectories of either - whether to some kind of narrow feminine or narrow masculine mold.

The same can be said, broadly, about sexuality and intergenerational relations. We don't think we know or, arguably, even have a very loose picture of what fully liberated sexuality will be like in all its multitude of preferences and practices, or what diverse forms of intergenerational relations adults and their children and elders will enter into. What we think we can say, however, is that in future desirable societies no few patterns will be elevated above all others as mandatory, though all widely chosen options will preclude producing in people a proclivity to dominate, to rule, to subordinate, or to obey, based either on sexual orientation, age, or any other social or biological characteristic, for that matter.

We have very little idea what specific sex-gender patterns will emerge, multiply, and continually develop in a better future. For example, monogamous or not, hetero, homo, or bi-sexual, and

involving transformed care giving institutions, families, schools, and perhaps other political and social spaces for children as well as for adults and the elderly. But we can guess with confidence that actors of all ages and genders, engaging in non oppressive consensual sexual relations, will be free from stigma.

All the above is vague and modestly formulated. Will renovated kinship include the broad structural features intimated above? We don't know. We certainly believe future kinship will be very diverse, at any rate. But even without knowing the inner attributes of new institutions for family life and related interactions and while waiting for kinship vision to emerge more fully from feminist thought and practice, we can still say some useful things about these domains' relations to economics and polity, and vice versa.

Visionary Kinship and Society

*"[History is the] quarrels of popes and kings, with wars
or pestilences in every page; the men all so good for nothing,
and hardly any women at all."*

- Jane Austen

Kinship institutions are necessary for people to develop and fulfill their sexual and emotional needs, organize daily life, and raise new generations of children. But current kinship relations elevate men above women and children, oppress homosexuals, and warp human sexual and emotional potentials.

In a humanist society we will eliminate oppressive socially imposed definitions so that everyone can pursue their lives as they choose, whatever their sex, sexual preference, and age. There will be no non-biologically imposed sexual division of labor with men doing one kind of work and women doing another simply by virtue of their being men and women, nor will there be any hierarchical role demarcation of individuals according to sexual preference. We will have gender relations that respect the social contributions of women as well as men, and that promote sexuality that is physically rich and emotionally fulfilling.

It is likely, for example, that new kinship forms will overcome the possessive narrowness of monogamy while also allowing preservation of the depth and continuity that comes from lasting relationships. New forms will likely destroy arbitrary divisions of roles between men and women so that both sexes are free to nurture and initiate. They will likely also give children room for self-management even as they also provide the support and structure that children need.

But what will make all this possible?

Obviously women must have reproductive freedom - the freedom to have children without fear of sterilization or economic deprivation, and the freedom not to have children through unhindered access to birth control and abortion. There can be no more compromising on this issue than we can have compromising about private ownership of the means of production. Just as private ownership abrogates the rights of employees to control and direct their laboring capacities, denial of birth control and abortion abrogates the rights of women to control and manage their reproductive capacities and, thereby, their lives in general.

But feminist kinship relations must also ensure that child-rearing roles do not segregate tasks by gender and that there is support for traditional couples, single parents, lesbian and gay parenting, and more complex, multiple parenting arrangements. All parents must have easy access to high quality day-care, flexible work hours, and parental leave options. The point is not to absolve parents of child-rearing by turning over the next generation to uncaring agencies staffed mainly by women (or even women and men) who are accorded low social esteem. The idea is to elevate the status of child rearing, encourage highly personalized interaction between children and adults, and distribute responsibilities for these interactions equitably between men and women and throughout society.

After all, what social task could be more important than rearing the coming generation of citizens? So what could be more irrational than patriarchal ideologies that deny those who fill this critical social role the status they merit? In a desirable society,

kinship activity must not only be arranged more equitably, but the social evaluation of this activity must be corrected as well.

Feminism should also embrace a liberated vision of sexuality respectful of individual's inclinations and choices, whether homosexual, bisexual, heterosexual, monogamous, or non-monogamous. Beyond respecting human rights, the exercise and exploration of different forms of sexuality by consenting partners provides a variety of experiences that can benefit all. In a humanist society that has eliminated oppressive hierarchies, sex can be pursued solely for emotional, physical, and spiritual pleasure and development, or, of course, as part of loving relationships. Experimentation to these ends will likely not merely be tolerated, but appreciated.

We need a vision of gender relations in which women are no longer subordinate and the talents and intelligence of half the species is free at last. We need a vision in which men are free to nurture, childhood is a time of play and increasing responsibility with opportunity for independent learning but not fear, and in which loneliness does not grip as a vice whose handle turns as each year passes.

A worthy kinship vision will reclaim living from the realm of habit and necessity to make it an art form we are all capable of practicing and refining. But there is no pretense that all this can be achieved overnight. Nor is there reason to think a single kind of partner-parenting institution is best for all. While the contemporary nuclear family has proven all too compatible with patriarchal norms, a different kind of nuclear family will no doubt evolve along with a host of other kinship forms as people experiment with how to achieve the goals of feminism.

Economics and Women and Men

"If divorce has increased by one thousand percent, don't blame the women's movement. Blame the obsolete sex roles on which marriages were based."
- Betty Friedan

Capitalist economics is more subtle than some critical analysts think vis a vis women and men. There is, in fact, nothing in the defining institutions of capitalism - private ownership of productive property, corporate divisions of labor, authoritative decision making, and markets - that even notices - much less differentiates and hierarchically arrays - men and women due to a strictly economic dynamic and logic. On the other hand, if a society's sex gender system produces a differentiation between men and women, capitalist economy will not ignore that reality but will, indeed, accommodate it or even co-reproduce it, as discussed in the first volume of Fanfare.

Thus, if men and women are arrayed by familial and other kinship relations so that the former have expectations of relative dominance over the latter, capitalist economy will operate in light of this situation.

Suppose an employer seeks to hire a manager. If the workforce is predominately male and a woman and a man apply, and the woman has better credentials and is more suited to the actual tasks involved, in a sexist society the man is far more likely to get the job even if the employer has no gender biases at all.

The reason is because the employer needs the male workforce to feel obedient and subordinate to the manager, and the manager to feel authoritative and superior to the workforce. It is far less likely for this pattern to emerge against the preconceived sexual orderings of society than it is for the sought pattern to emerge in accord with those orderings. In other words, the corporate division of labor typically uses, rather than subverts, the gender hierarchy established by familial and kinship relations.

Similarly, pay patterns will reflect the differential bargaining power that sexism imposes on men and women. Men, all other things equal, will be able to extract more pay for the same work than women, due to owners exploiting the subordinate position and lesser bargaining power of women.

These are the minimal accommodations of capitalist economies to sexist kinship relations. Capitalism's hierarchies don't challenge and largely incorporate gender hierarchies. Women disproportionately occupy subordinate positions. Women earn less.

From this emerges the distressing details including the tremendous incidence of female poverty, ill health, and rape and other violence that we all by now know about.

It is important to realize that there is, however, a deeper impact of the field of force of sexist hierarchy on economic relations. The styles and patterns of male and female behavior produced by a patriarchal sex gender system can impose on economic roles so that production, consumption, and allocation begin to literally incorporate the features of kinship rather than only accommodating or exploiting them.

In other words, women's economic jobs can take on attributes of nurturance and care giving and maintenance which are in no sense required by or even entirely logical in light of only economic dictates, and similarly for men's roles taking on male patterns also imposed by kinship definitions - even contrary to purely economic logic.

In this case we will see jobs in the economy that both reflect and, very importantly, actively reproduce male and female behavior imposed by a patriarchal sex gender system. The economy then becomes complicit in reproducing or co-reproducing sexism.

Parecon and Parpolity's Impact

"When we consider that women have been treated as property, it is degrading to women that we should treat our own children as property to be disposed of as we see fit."

- Elizabeth Cady Stanton

In parecon, however, reproduction of sexist relations emanating from a patriarchal sex gender system disappears. It isn't just that a participatory economy works nicely alongside a liberated kinship sphere. It is that a parecon precludes or at least militates against non-liberated relations among men and women. Parecon unravels sexism.

A parecon will not give men relatively more empowering work or more income than women because it cannot provide such advantages to any group relative to any other.

Balanced job complexes and self management need and seek adults able to engage in decisions and to undertake creative empowering labor, regardless of gender or any other biological or social attribution. If kinship relations press for other results, there is a contradiction and either kinship or economy must give way to the other.

There is no process of a parecon that is functioning properly abiding hierarchies born in gender relations because there are no hierarchies in a parecon that can abide it. Women cannot earn less than men, nor have jobs that are less empowering, nor have less say over decisions.

But what about household labor? Many feminists will, at this point, ask the question, "parecon claims to remove the differentiation at work and in income required by contemporary sexism, but is household labor part of the economy?"

Our inclination is to say that there is no one right answer to this question, just as for most questions beyond issues of core defining relations. In other words, we can imagine a society that treats household labor of diverse types as part of its participatory economy and we can imagine one that doesn't. With our current state of understanding, we would prefer the latter type, for a few reasons. But neither choice is ruled out or made inevitable, purely by the logic of parecon.

Beyond that logical openness, however, we tend to think household labor shouldn't be considered part of the economy subject to the norms of productive labor.

First, nurturing and raising the next generation is not like producing a shirt, stereo, scalpel, or spyglass. There is something fundamentally distorting, to our thinking, about conceptualizing child care and workplace production as being the same type of social activity.

The second reason we think household labor should not be counted as part of economic production is that the fruits of household labor are largely enjoyed by the producer him/herself. Should I be able to spend more time on household design and maintenance and receive more remuneration as a result? If so, I get the output of the work and I get more income, too. This is different

than other work and it seems to us that changing the design of my living room or keeping up my garden is more like consumption rather than production.

Suppose I like to play the piano, or build model airplanes, or whatever. The activity I engage in for my hobby has much in common with work, but we call it consumption because I do it under my own auspices and for myself. What we call work, in contrast, is what we do under the auspices of workers councils to produce outputs that are enjoyed by people other than just ourselves.

Is there a problem with saying that because caring for and raising children is fundamentally different in kind than producing cars or screwdrivers, or that maintaining a household is different in its social relations and benefits than working in a factory, and deducing that on these bases we shouldn't count household labor as work to be remunerated and occur under the auspices of parecon's workplace institutions?

I guess if we think it is impossible to have a transformation of sex-gender relations themselves, then there is a problem, yes. If the norms and structures of households and living units are highly sexist, and if a parecon doesn't incorporate household labor as part of the economy and subject it to parecon's norms, then household labor may be done overwhelmingly by women and will, as a result, reduce their leisure or their time for other pursuits relative to men.

But why assume that? Why shouldn't it be that transformed norms for household labor are produced by a transformation of sex gender relations themselves, rather than by calling household labor part of the economy?

Take it in reverse. If this were a book about feminism and the rest of society and if I had mapped out a feminist sex-gender vision, I don't think many people would ask whether we can count the workplace as a household so that it gets the benefits of the innovative relations that new families and living units have. We would assume, instead, that there would need to be a revolution in the economy, not just in kinship, and we would rely on the former for the chief redefinitions of life at work, even as we also anticipated and required that the economy abide and even abet the

gains in kinship, and even as we worked to ensure that the gains of each meshed compatibly with the other.

In any event, clearly a parecon mitigates sexism because on the one hand it would have no reason to and even could not incorporate sexist hierarchies, and on the other hand it empowers and remunerates women in a manner that precludes their being easily subordinated in any other realm

The situation with polity is even more simple and straightforward. Of course legislative and other structures would not favor one gender versus another. And laws would be consistent with feminist kinship, as feminist kinship must nurture and socialize people capable of participatory self managing political relations. So the polity will have laws, constitutional and otherwise, guaranteeing the character of political relations is consistent with and even reproductive of the feminist benefits of new kinship relations, and vice versa.

Perhaps it is the paucity of our understanding showing, but other than in direct analogy to the above discussion, we honestly don't see a deeper relation of economics or politics and sexuality. If there is homophobia or other sexual hierarchies in a society, and if the economy is capitalist, then the economy will - to the extent owners are able to do so - exploit whatever differentials in bargaining power they are handed. A typically top-down polity will also, at least, reflect and often exacerbate those differentials. Beyond this, however, the capitalist economy and any authoritarian polity may also incorporate gay and straight behavior patterns into economic roles, consumption patterns, etc. With parecon and parpolity, however, no exploitation of sexual difference is even possible - much less enacted in the economy - because there is one norm of remuneration and one logic of labor definition that applies to everyone and which, by their very definition, foreclose options of hierarchy, while the polity derives from and thus reflects and protects the will of men and women schooled by feminist relations.

More positively, it seems to me that whatever liberated sexuality will mean in a future society it can only be hastened and abetted by economic and political relations that bestow on actors self managing power and just allocations, thereby tending to

generate actors expecting to be creative, initiating, and self managing in other spheres of their lives than just the economic.

What about intergenerational conflict? Capitalism will always exploit age differentials for profit via remuneration for the young and the old that is reduced due to these constituencies' reduced bargaining power. It will take advantage of different capacities related to age differences for exploitative divisions of labor and will rush premature labor entry or slower than warranted labor withdrawal, for exploitative reasons. A parecon, however, will not only promote humane behaviors as being in every participant's interests - and, in any event, the only permissible way of being - but will make violations impossible due to being contrary to defining parecon norms and structures. In a parecon, there is no way to exploit age-based differences because there is no way to accrue advantage. Similarly a parpolity will likewise protect and incorporate the will of people of all ages, as self management permits nothing less.

Societies will decide the role of the elderly including retirement age, and likewise for young people's entry into economic and political responsibility as part of parpolity decision making. While familiar and other extra-economic intergenerational relations will certainly not be governed solely by economic or political structures and will arise, instead, due to a host of variables including new kinship and gender forms, the fact that a parecon and a parpolity require developed and fully participatory and self managing actors imposes on life more generally a respect for all actors and gives all actors material equality and behavioral wherewithal and habits contrary to any kind of subordination emanating from any other of society's institutions.

We don't yet fully know what liberating gender, sexual, and intergenerational relations will be like but we can say parecon and parpolity would appear likely to be quite compatible and even nurturing of them, just as they would nurture and socialize young people into preparedness for self managing economic and political life. Before long, hopefully further kinship vision for basic relations will exist and this claim and parecon and parpolity - along

with feminist kinship - can be further elaborated, tested, or refined,
as need be.

Chapter Five

Through Nationalism To Inter-communalism

*"American means white, and Africanist people struggle to make the term applicable to themselves with ethnicity and hyphen after hyphen after hyphen."
- Toni Morrison*

As we discussed in developing our overall conceptual toolbox, humans tend to create diverse communities bound by shared cultures that differ from one another in their artistic, linguistic, and spiritual allegiances and preferences. The problem of cultural communities is not this diversity, per se, but that cultural communities can exploit one another, attack one another, or even obliterate one another. As Noam Chomsky summarizes one case:

"In the US...it was necessary to find some justification for eliminating the indigenous population and running the economy on slavery (including the economy of the north in the early days; cotton was the oil of the 19th century industrial revolution). And the only way to justify having your boot on someone's neck is that you are uniquely magnificent and they are uniquely awful."

In a good society, presumably this type of largely one way or sometimes mutual intercommunity assault and destruction would of course be eliminated.

What kinds of cultural relations would we like to have in a good society?

Community Vision

"I will say, then, that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in any way, the social and political equality of the white and black races. I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race."

- Abraham Lincoln

We will not be magically reborn in a desirable society, free of our past and unaware of our historical roots. On the contrary, our historical memory, sensitivity to past and present social process, and understanding of our own and of our society's history will all very likely be enhanced during the process of reaching a desirable society. Rather than our diverse cultural roots being submerged, on the road to a better world, they will grow in prominence.

So while as Einstein very pithily put it, in its current incarnations, "nationalism is an infantile sickness. It is the measles of the human race." Still, the point of cultural vision is not to erase diverse cultures or to reduce them to a least common denominator.

As Arundhati Roy argued, referring to fundamentalist inclinations to homogenize India:

"Once the Muslims have been 'shown their place', will milk and Coca-Cola flow across the land? Once the Ram Mandir is built, will there be a shirt on every back and a roti in every belly? Will every tear be wiped from every eye? Can we expect an anniversary celebration next year? Or will there be someone else to hate by then? Alphabetically: Adivasis, Buddhists, Christians, Dalits, Parsis, Sikhs? Those who wear jeans, or speak English, or those who have thick lips, or curly hair? We won't have to wait long... What kind of depraved vision can even imagine India without the range and beauty and spectacular anarchy of all these cultures? India would become a tomb and smell like a crematorium."

In other words, instead of homogenizing cultures, in the transition to a better world the historical contributions of different communities should be more appreciated than ever before with greater means for their further development, without destructive mutual hostilities.

Trying to prevent the horrors of genocide, imperialism, racism, jingoism, ethnocentrism, and religious persecution by attempting to integrate distinct historical communities into one cultural niche has proved almost as destructive as the nightmares this approach sought to expunge.

"Cultural homogenization" - whether racist, fundamentalist, or even leftist - ignores the positive aspects of cultural differences that give people a sense of who they are and where they come from. Cultural homogenization offers few opportunities for variety and cultural self-management, and is self-defeating in any event since it heightens exactly the community anxieties and antagonisms it seeks to overcome.

In a competitive and otherwise mutually hostile environment, religious, racial, ethnic, and national communities often develop into sectarian camps, each concerned with defending itself from real and imagined threats, even waging war on others to do so.

And yes, in other contexts, more subtle and less overt racist expressions occur as Al Sharpton notes when commenting on racism's changing face in the U.S. after the gains of the civil rights movement: "We've gotten to an era where people are much more subtle and more manicured. Jim Crow is now James Crow, Jr., Esquire."

But the near ubiquitous presence of racial and other cultural hierarchies throughout society and history no more means we should eliminate cultural diversity than the existence of gender, sexual, economic, or political hierarchies means we should eliminate diversity in those realms. The task is to remove oppression and achieve liberating conditions, not to obliterate difference.

Racism often has a very crass and material component. Consider Desmond Tutu commenting on the South African experience:

"When they arrived, we had the land and they had the Bible and they told us to close our eyes to pray. When we opened our eyes, they had the land and we had the Bible."

But theft is not always the dominant theme of cultural violation and - even when it is highly operative - it is generally only one part of the whole cultural picture. Most of racism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and religious bigotry is based on cultural definitions and beliefs pushing and extending beyond material differences.

Dominant community groups rationalize their positions of privilege with myths about their own superiority and the presumed inferiority of those they oppress. But these often materially motivated myths, in time, attain a life of their own, often transcending material relations. The effects are brutal. For the oppressed, in the American novelist Ralph Ellison's words, "I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie ectoplasms. I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids--and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me. Like the bodiless heads you see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass. When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination--indeed, everything and anything except me."

Some sectors within oppressed communities internalize myths of their inferiority and attempt to imitate or at least accommodate dominant cultures. Einstein wrote: "it seems to be a universal fact that minorities--especially when the individuals composing them are distinguished by physical peculiarities--are treated by the majorities among whom they live as an inferior order of beings. The tragedy of such a fate lies not merely in the unfair treatment to which these minorities are automatically subjected in social and economic matters, but also in the fact that under the suggestive influence of the majority most of the victims themselves succumb to the same prejudice and regard their brethren as inferior beings." Or as Native American activist Ward Churchill more aggressively explained, "White domination is so complete that even American Indian children want to be cowboys. It's as if Jewish children wanted to play Nazis."

Others in oppressed communities respond by defending the integrity of their own cultural traditions while combating as best they can the racist ideologies used to justify their oppression. But as W.E.B. Dubois notes, "It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity."

And as Frederick Douglass wrote in another context:

"For a white man to defend his friend unto blood is praiseworthy but for a black man to do precisely the same thing is a crime. It was glorious for Americans to drench the soil and crimson the sea with blood to escape payment of three penny tax upon tea; but it is a crime to shoot down a monster in defense of the liberty of a black man and to save him from bondage one minute of which (in the language of Jefferson) is worse than ages of that which our fathers rose in rebellion to oppose."

In any event, cultural salvation does not lie in trying to obliterate the distinctions between communities but in eliminating racist institutions, dispelling racist ideologies, and changing the environments within which historical communities relate so that they might maintain and celebrate difference without violating solidarity. An alternative is, therefore, what we might call "intercommunalism" which emphasizes respecting and preserving the multiplicity of community forms by guaranteeing each sufficient material and social resources to confidently reproduce itself.

Not only does each culture possess particular wisdoms that are unique products of its own historical experience, but the interaction of different cultures via intercommunalist relations enhances the characteristics of each culture and provides a richness that no single approach could ever hope to attain. The point is: negative intercommunity relations must be replaced by positive ones. The key is eliminating the threat of cultural extinction that so many communities feel by guaranteeing that every community has the means necessary to carry on their traditions and self definitions. In accord with self management, individuals should choose the cultural communities they prefer, rather than elders or others of

any description defining their choices for them, particularly on the basis of prejudice. And while those outside a community should be free to criticize cultural practices that, in their opinion, violate humane norms, external intervention that goes beyond criticism should not be permitted except when absolutely required to guarantee that all members of every community have the right of dissent, including to leave the community with no material or broader social loss.

Until a lengthy history of autonomy and solidarity has overcome suspicion and fear between communities, the choice of which community should give ground in disputes should be determined according to which of the two is the more powerful and therefore, realistically, the least threatened. Intercommunalism would make it incumbent on the more powerful community that has less reason to fear domination to unilaterally begin the process of de-escalating the dispute. This simple rule is obvious and reasonable, despite being seldom practiced to date. When needed, oversight and enforcement could occur by way of an intercommunal legal apparatus specializing in conflict resolution - of course including balanced job complexes and equitable remuneration. The goal is to create an environment in which no community will feel threatened and each community will feel free to learn from and share with others.

Given the historical legacy of negative intercommunity relations, it is delusional to believe this can be achieved overnight. Perhaps even more so than in other areas, intercommunalist relations will have to be slowly constructed, step by step, until a different historical legacy and set of behavioral expectations are established. For example, it will not always be easy to decide what constitutes the "necessary means" that communities should be guaranteed for cultural reproduction, and what development free from "unwarranted outside interference" means in particular situations. The intercommunalist criterion for judging different views on these matters seems likely to be that every community should be guaranteed sufficient material and communication means to self-define and self-develop its own cultural traditions and to represent its culture to all other communities in the context

of limited aggregate means and equal rights to those means for all - just as all of its members, by virtue of participatory economic, political, and kin relations, are equitably remunerated, self managing, etc.

Race and Capitalism

"Segregation is the adultery of an illicit intercourse between injustice and immorality."
- Martin Luther King Jr.

Contrary to some leftist pronouncements, there is nothing in capitalism's defining institutions that says that people in one cultural community should be treated by the economy differently than people in any other, any more than there is anything in capitalism's defining institutions that says people of different height, or with different pitch voices should be treated differently.

On the contrary, capitalism, unto itself, is what we might call an equal opportunity exploiter. If you have the requisite luck, brutality or, in rare instances, talent plus the needed callousness to rise in power and income, then regardless of any cultural or biological features, you get to own and to profit. Or, one notch down, you get to monopolize empowering circumstances and enjoy the fruits of being in the coordinator rather than the working class.

On the other hand, if you have none of the requisites of success in capitalism, again regardless of your race, nationality, religion, etc., you get to sell yourself as a wage slave doing overwhelmingly rote and obedient work, taking orders and pocketing only small change.

The less derogatory presentation of this insight is made by the Noble prize-winning economist Milton Friedman when he says,

"The great virtue of a free market system is that it does not care what color people are; it does not care what their religion is; it only cares whether they can produce something you want to buy. It is the most effective system we have discovered to enable people who hate each other to deal with one another and help one another."

The first part of Friedman's observation is true of capitalism, per se, but not of capitalism amidst people who, for other reasons, hate each other - which makes the second part of his statement a manipulative lie.

The wrinkle in Friedman's analysis is that capitalism is not race blind, or religion blind, or ethnicity blind, or blind to any other cultural feature whenever a society's broader social structures outside the economy consign the holder of that feature to a subordinate cultural position or convey to them a dominant cultural position. In such cases, the economic logic of capitalism will notice the extra-economic differentials and will operate in accord with them rather than ignore them. Hate outside the economy is not overcome by capitalism, as Friedman implies, but is reproduced and enlarged by capitalism.

If racism in a society - or religious bigotry, or whatever else - consigns some community to having less status and influence, than in the capitalist economy members of that community will not - in general - be elevated above their "superiors" but will, instead, be made subordinate to them. The economy will use the existing expectations of community members - such as the expectation that whites are superior to blacks - to enforce and enlarge its own economic hierarchies of exploitation. It will not violate those external hierarchies at the potential expense of its own operations.

Thus, the capitalist employer, even one who is personally free of racist beliefs or even hostile to racism, will, in general, when racism is ascendant in the broader society, not hire blacks to rule over whites as managers - or in other positions of relative respect and influence - even when they would be more productive. This is ruled out if racism is sufficiently operative, because it risks disobedience and dissension. Capitalism, in other words, uses accustomed patterns from cultural life to enhance desired patterns inside the economy.

Similarly, if, due to its cultural position, a community can be paid less, it will be paid less in light of market competition to reduce costs - again even if this is against some employer's personal preferences.

At the same time, it is also true that to the extent growing opposition to racism begins to make racial hierarchies discordant with expectations and desires and conducive to dissent and resistance, capitalist employers reverse their actions and shy away from more overt exploitation of race, even as they continue to try to extract any pound of flesh that they can get away with when selling products or when buying people's ability to work. Thus, in the case of heightened opposition to racism in society, we will see a shift from Jim Crow racism to James Crow Esquire Jr. racism, as noted by Sharpton earlier.

The statistics and other accountings of racism and of other cultural oppressions and economic life are well known and well revealed in countless studies and sources. How does a desirable society reverse such phenomena?

Race in a Participatory Society

"Communism, instead of making them leap forward with fire in their hearts to become masters of ideas and life, had frozen them at an even lower level of ignorance than had been theirs before they met Communism."
- Richard Wright

If a parecon exists in a society that has cultural hierarchies of race, religion, and other communities, what does it contribute? If it exists within a society that has desirable communities without hierarchies, what then? In general, does a parecon's needs regarding economic life impose any constraints on cultures? Does a participatory polity or kinship sphere?

If we change the U.S. economy, for example, to a parecon without altering the racial, religious, and ethnic landscape, there will be a sharp contradiction. Existent racial and other dynamics in this hypothetical society will pit groups against one another and give people expectations of superiority and inferiority. The participatory economy, however, will provide income and circumstances inconsistent with residual cultural hierarchies. It will tend to overthrow the cultural hierarchies by the empowerment and

material means that it affords to those at the bottom of any and all hierarchies.

People in a participatory economy won't - and indeed can't - systemically economically exploit racism and other cultural injustices. Individuals in a parecon could try to do this, of course, and they could harbor horrible attitudes, of course, but there are no mechanisms for racists to accrue undo economic power or wealth - even as separate individuals, much less as members of some community.

If you are black or white, Latino or Italian American, Jewish or Muslim, Presbyterian or Catholic, southerner or northerner - regardless of cultural hierarchies that may exist in the broader society - in a parecon you have a balanced job complex and a just income and self managing power over your conditions. There just isn't any lower position to be shoved into.

Lingering - or even continually reproduced racism or other cultural injustices - could perhaps penetrate a parecon in the role definitions of actors, but they could not do so in a manner that would bestow economic power, material wealth, or economic comforts unfairly. Thus blacks, Latinos, Asians, etc. in a transformed U.S. might have statistically different characteristics in their balanced job complexes, but the differences could not violate the balance of those complexes. Such disproportionately distributed job features might have otherwise denigrating attributes, it is true, though one would think that if they did, the self managing dynamics of the economy would tend to undo those injustices too.

Indeed, one can imagine that in a parecon members of minority communities in workplaces would have means to meet together in (what are typically called) caucuses to assess events and situations precisely to collectively guard against racial or other denigrating dynamics. Or to fight against those that are present as residues from the past or as outgrowths of other spheres of social life. This would seem to be about the best one can ask of an economy regarding it intrinsically obstructing cultural injustices.

But what about a participatory economy and desirable cultures in a desirable society? There is no reason why cultural norms

established in other parts of society cannot impact economic life in a parecon, and we can predict that they will. The daily practices of people from different cultural communities could certainly differ not only in what holidays their members take off from work, say, but in their daily practices during work or consumption such as arranging periods of prayer or disproportionately engaging in particular types of activity that are culturally proscribed or culturally preferred. There could be whole industries or sectors of the economy that members of a community would culturally avoid, as with the Amish in the U.S., for example.

In a participatory economy the limits on such cultural impositions on the economy would be that the special economic needs of cultural communities would have to be consistent with the self-managing desires of those inside and outside those communities.

One possibility, for example, is that in more demanding cases it might make sense for members of a workplace to nearly all be from one community so that they can easily have shared holidays, workday schedules, and norms about various daily practices that others would find impossible to abide. Self management doesn't preclude such arrangements and may sometimes make them ideal.

Alternatively, a workplace may incorporate members of many diverse communities, as will larger (and sometimes also smaller) consumer units. In such cases there may be minor mutual accommodations - some members celebrate Christmas and others celebrate Hanukkah or some other holiday, and schedules are accorded. Or perhaps there are more extensive accommodations having to do with more frequent differences in schedule or with other practices affecting what type of work some people can undertake.

The point is, parecon's workplaces, consumer units, and planning processes are very flexible infrastructures whose defining features are designed to be classless, but whose details can vary in endless permutations - including accommodating diverse cultural impositions due to people's community practices and beliefs.

Finally, do the needs and requirements of the roles of worker, consumer, and participant in participatory planning in a parecon

put limits on what practices a culture can elevate in its own internal affairs?

The answer is in some sense, yes, they do. Cultural communities in a society with a parecon cannot, without great friction, incorporate internal norms and arrangements that call for material advantages or great power for a few at the expense of many others.

A culture could exist, say, that would elevate some small sector of priests or artists or soothsayers, or elders, or whoever else, and that required all other members to obey them in particular respects, or to shower them with gifts, etc. But the likelihood that such a cultural community would persist for long would be quite low alongside a parecon.

The reason is because the people involved will be spending their economic time in environments that produce inclinations for equity, solidarity, and self-management, as well as diversity, and that "teach" them to respect but not passively obey, others. Why would they submit to inequitable conditions and skewed decision making norms in another part of their life?

Assuming that in a good society people will be free to leave cultures - since people would have both the economic wherewithal, education, and disposition to manage themselves - we guess that many would exercise that freedom to leave any cultural community that denied them the fruits of their labors or denied them their self managing say.

This could also be expected for the connection between a participatory polity or kinship, and culture. The analysis is completely parallel. These other parts of a desirable society, just like its economy, will also impose only equity and self management and solidarity on culture, and will take from cultures that which is compatible with those values. There are no means for oppressive cultural relations to be legitimately and naturally manifested in kin or political relations because the roles available do not include ones seriously subordinate or superior to others. Similarly, while the details of a set of participatory kinship relations or parpolity relations would likely reflect cultural commitments of participants - with a different mix of features in

light of different cultural commitments - these refinements would not undo or restrict the key defining attributes of these spheres of life. Rather than rehash the discussion of economics and race, simply replacing references to workplaces, consumption, and allocation with references to legislative councils or living units, it will likely be more revealing to address one of the potentially more controversial of the related implications.

Addendum: Religion and the Left

"Today is the parent of tomorrow. The present casts its shadow far into the future. That is the law of life, individual and social. Revolution that divests itself of ethical values thereby lays the foundation of injustice, deceit, and oppression for the future society. The means used to prepare the future become its cornerstone."
- Emma Goldman

As expected from the above discussion, the relation between religion and a participatory economy would add no complications to what has been said about relations between culture and parecon. Whatever religions exist in a society that has a parecon, their members will, of course, be treated by the parecon just as those of every other religion and cultural community will be treated. They will have a balanced job complex, enjoy just remuneration, have self-managing decision-making influence, etc.

Of course, if there was a religion that said that jobs should be unequal, or incomes hierarchical, that would be a problem. But such a religion would not remain viable for long in a participatory society since those relegated to inferior positions would be in position to resist or exit.

The situation for a religion and kinship or polity is quite similar, though we can more easily conceive of tensions. The polity or kinship institutions will not mistreat people due to their being in different cultures, nor could communities array hierarchically and expect the polity or kinship to abide it. Then again, if a culture said women must be subordinate, or gays, whether in legislation, adjudication, or daily life relations, that would be a problem, and

not long viable in a participatory society since, again, people would freely exit and such cultures would lose support.

A parecon, participatory family or school, participatory neighborhood or regional councils or court, will have no economic, kin, or political reason or means to elevate or denigrate people on the basis of any cultural commitments they may have, nor will it be easy, or even possible, for people with hostile cultural intents to manifest them in a parecon, parpolity, or parkinship. Likewise, there is nothing in a participatory economy, kinship, or polity that will militate against these realms respecting holidays and practices of particular communities within the broader framework of attaining solidarity, equity, justice, and self management, though the latter caveat isn't minor. But the question of religions and a good society per se, as compared to the question of religions in a good society, is more complex and controversial.

Many on the left think this combination is simply impossible. They believe that religion is intrinsically contrary to justice, equity, and particularly self management. For these critics of religion, participatory institutions won't interface well with good religions in a good society, because in a good society there won't be any religions at all, good or otherwise.

The anti-religion argument first looks at history and finds an endless record of religious violations of humane behavior - and no one can deny this sad story. Then the critics - depending on which religions we consider - may or may not go another step and look at various scriptures showing all manner of explicitly ugly prescriptions and claims. The critics may then highlight instances of religion obstructing reason or art, violating not only free social relations but also honesty and dignity. And finally, at their strongest, the critics will claim to clinch their case by arguing that once one invests extreme powers in a god and requires of oneself and of others obedience unto those powers, it is but a short and inexorable step to counterpoising one god against others, and counterpoising one's own fellow believers against believers of some other faith, finally moving from obedience to a god to obedience to agents of a god, and, by extension, to obedience to authorities of all kinds.

This argument, one has to admit, is not weak either in its predictive logic or its historical explanatory power or evidentiary verification. But it is also, in the end, overstated because it extrapolates from some religions to all religions, as well as from organized authoritarian religions to spirituality of all kinds.

Our inclination is to think that a good society will have good religion rather than no religion, just as a good society will have good economics rather than no economics, good political forms rather than no political forms, and so on.

As to what shape such good religions will have, they will likely vary widely and broadly, emerging from religions we now know - as well as arising in original and new forms - but generally having in common a desire to establish morals and a sense of place in the universe without violating the morals and roles of the rest of a just society.

In our view, a movement in the U.S. - and no doubt in many other countries around the world - in which members are dismissive and even hostile toward religion, much less a movement that denigrates those who are religious simply due to their being religious, is a losing movement.

Even if one isn't convinced that a good religion in a good society will be a positive thing in many people's lives and thinks instead that the best stance will be agnostic or even highly critical of religion in any form, and even if one is not humble enough to hold that view and yet simultaneously respect that others will differ and deserve respect in doing so, surely a serious leftist ought to be able to see that denigrating all things religious is strategically suicidal in a society as religious as the U.S. Whatever views one may have, if one wants to help build a large, participatory, and self managing movement, one must find a way to function congenially and respectfully with those who celebrate and worship in a religious manner, which is a large minority - or more often a large majority of the population.

Trying to be an organizer in the U.S., while exuding disdain for religion is not much wiser than trying to be an organizer in France if you dislike people who speak French. The acerbic wit H. L. Mencken says: "We must respect the other fellow's religion, but

only in the sense and to the extent that we respect his theory that his wife is beautiful and his children smart.” No ridicule. One retains one’s own perceptions, but respects, as well, those of others, even when different. The time for opposition only arises if there is oppression and subservience - and even then it takes the form only of criticizing those failings.

In any event, even short of having a full and convincing vision for the future cultural sphere of life, it seems we can at least deduce that participatory economy, polity, and kinship will compatibly foster and benefit from such innovations, rather than obstructing them.

Chapter Six

Participatory Ecology, Participatory World

*Oh Beautiful for smoggy skies,
insecticided grain,
For strip-mined mountain's majesty
above the asphalt plain.
America, America, man sheds his waste on thee,
And hides the pines with billboard signs,
from sea to oily sea.
- George Carlin*

We now have the main components of a vision for new, desirable institutions for a new, desirable society. What do we call it? Many will call it participatory society. Many others will call it participatory socialism. Having two names is one question we address in this chapter.

A second question is, what will be the place of a participatory society in the environment? Its ecological footprint?

Also, third, what will be the place of a participatory society in the world - its international relations?

Last, to motivate people to want to read volume three of Fanfare, which enters into much more detail - we very briefly outline the relation of participatory society to movements for social change. Let us take these in turn.

Why Two Names

*"In history, in social life, nothing is fixed, rigid or definitive.
And nothing ever will be."*

- Antonio Gramsci

Our vision fulfills the stated aspirations of socialists - also anarchists, feminists, intercommunalists and, really, everyone who stands for justice and freedom. Grassroots socialists typically want justice, people controlling their own lives, classlessness, feminism, cultural diversity, and so on. So our vision suits them. So why not just call it socialism? Well, that term has been claimed for a specific mix of institutions lumped under the terms Twentieth Century Socialism, market socialism, centrally planned, socialism, really existing socialism, and so on. They refer to the old Soviet Union, China, etc. These systems, however, no more fulfill the values we have put forth than the U.S. system fulfills the values its advocates say they favor: diversity, freedom, democracy, fairness, and so on. What has usurped the name socialism has, in fact, not been very feminist, intercommunist (almost the opposite), self managing (but instead grossly authoritarian), and classless - its catchword label - but instead has had its economies ruled by the coordinator class.

Take the economy - which for socialists is what they mainly key in on. Currently socialism in practice - the institutions - has included, at best, paper councils with no real power (often after real ones have been destroyed from above), remuneration for output and power, corporate divisions of labor, allocation by markets, central planning, or a combination of the two - and, due to all that, coordinator class rule.

In contrast, participatory economics has self managing worker and consumer councils as the vehicles of decision making, remuneration for duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially valued labor, balanced job complexes, and allocation by participatory planning - and, due to all that, classlessness. The difference is not apples and oranges. It is arsenic and nutrition.

Okay, so we don't want to call our vision socialism for fear of implying it has something in common with all that. However, most grass-roots socialists around the world also reject - at least in theory - all that. And they propose essentially the same values we do. And many have already indicated their support for the new

formulations. And yet they want to keep touch with the heritage of socialism - not out of loyalty to horrendous institutional choices of the past, but out of allegiance to the memory of all the grassroots activists who had their dreams subverted rather than fulfilled.

Can we accommodate that desire? Maybe. Perhaps calling our economic vision participatory economics - not market or centrally planned socialism - while calling our kinship, cultural, and political visions, participatory kinship, community, and polity - plus calling the amalgamation of it all participatory socialism - is enough to make the distinction. For those who think it is, and who want to continue the legacy not of one party states, class rule, incomplete feminism, and cultural homogenization, but of truly socialist values, calling the vision in Fanfare participatory socialism will make sense. For those who worry about clarifying the differences with the past, calling it participatory society will make sense. Which name will emerge as most prevelant, time will tell. In either case, the shorthand version is parsoc and the system in mind is the same.

Parsoc and Ecology

*"Thank God men cannot fly, and lay
waste the sky as well as the earth."
- Henry David Thoreau*

When asking about the implications of participatory society/ socialism regarding the ecology, the main issue is economics since it is via production and consumption that by far the largest social impact on ecology occurs. Economies add new contents to the environment, such as pollutants; deplete natural contents from the environment, such as resources; and alter the arrangement and composition of attributes in the environment - or the way in which people relate to the environment - such as by building dams or creating changed patterns of human habitation. Each of these - and other possible ways an economy can affect the environment - can, in turn, have ripple effects on nature's composition and, via those changes, back again on people's lives.

Thus, for example, an economy can add economic byproducts to the environment by exhaust spewing from cars or smokestacks accumulating chemicals in the atmosphere. In turn these effluents can impede breathing or alter the way the sun's rays affect atmospheric temperatures. Both of these economic implications can have ripple effects on people's health, or on air currents which then impact sea currents, in turn affecting polar ice caps, and then altering weather patterns, sea levels, and crop yields.

Or an economy can use up oil, water, or forests, leading to people having to reduce their use of depleted resources, affecting the total level of both production and consumption around the world, the availability of nutrients essential to life, or building materials needed for creating dwellings in many parts of the world.

Or an economy can alter the shape and content of the natural environment's dynamics, for example by reducing forests we reduce the supply of oxygen they emit into the atmosphere, or by increasing the number of cows and affecting their eating patterns (to produce more tasty steak for ourselves) increasing the methane they expel, again leading to greenhouse effects that in turn alter global weather patterns. Or economies can alter human living patterns and thus transportation patterns and other consumption patterns and attitudes, in turn affecting people's on-going relations to mountains, rivers, air, and other species.

In the above cases and countless others, what we do in our economic lives affects either directly - or by a many-step process - how we environmentally prosper or suffer in our daily lives - whether now or in the future - as well as how the environment itself adapts.

In other words, economic acts have direct, secondary, and tertiary affects on the environment and the changed environment, in turn, has direct, secondary, and tertiary affects on our life conditions.

Sometimes these effects are horrifying, as in seas rising to swallow coastal areas and low lying countries. Or in crop, resource, or water depletion that causes starvation or other extreme widespread deprivations. Or maybe the effects are slightly less severe but still horrific as in tornados, hurricanes, droughts and

floods devastating large populations, or inflated cancer rates caused by polluted ground water or escalated radiation cutting down large numbers of people early in life, or dams eliminating whole towns or villages due to their footprint. Or maybe the effects are limited to smaller areas suffering loss of enriching environmental surroundings when natural environments are paved over or when noise pollution arises from loud production or consumption.

It follows from all these possibilities that the relation of an economy to the surrounding natural environment is deadly serious and that to fail to regard this relation to the environment, even if succeeding on all other criteria, would be a damning weakness for any proposed economic model or new society.

Capitalism and Ecology

*“The use of solar energy has not been opened up
because the oil industry does not own the sun.”
- Ralph Nader*

Capitalism fails miserably regarding the environment. First, capitalism's market system prioritizes maximizing short-run profit regardless of long-run implications. Second, markets ignore environmental effects and have built in incentives to violate the environment whenever doing so will yield profits or, for that matter, consumer fulfillment at the cost of others. And, third, there is the capitalist drive to accumulate regardless of effects on life and all other variables.

In markets, to explain the above, a seller encounters a buyer. The seller tries to get as high a price as possible for the object sold while also diminishing costs of production. This is done to maximize profits which, in turn, not only yields higher income, but also facilitates competition-enhancing investments to win market share and stay in business.

The buyer, meanwhile, tries to pay as low a price as possible and then consume it with as much fulfillment as possible regardless of the impact of these actions on others - about whom little or no information is available.

For both parties market exchange obscures the effects their choices have beyond the buyer and seller and prevents taking into account the well being of those who feel external effects.

More, if some course of action will lower the cost of producing an item or increase the fulfillment of its consumption, but will also incur environmental degradation that affects someone other than the buyer or seller, that course of action will typically be undertaken. Thus we routinely use production techniques that pollute and consume items with no regard for environmental impact.

Rock salt, it turns out, is a very effective tool for “keeping both private driveways and public highways from icing up.” Andrew Bard Schmookler reports that:

“...the runoff of the salt...causes damage to underground cables, car bodies, bridges, and groundwater. The cost of these damages is twenty to forty times the price of the salt to the persons or organization buying and using it.”

In other words, rock salt has unaccounted adverse effects beyond the buyers and sellers who choose to produce it, sell it, buy it, and use it to keep roads and driveways from icing up. Schmookler then reports that “there is an alternative product to rock salt that produces no such damage from runoff. It is called CMA, and it costs a good deal more than the salt. It costs less, however, than the damages the salt inflicts.” But “No highway department, homeowner, or business would purchase large quantities of CMA today even if it were widely available, because the individual doesn't care about [social] cost, only [about private] price.”

In other words, markets create incentives to violate the environment and anything else external to the buyer and seller whenever doing so will enhance the producer's profit.

This is just one of countless examples, and, as Schmookler rightly concludes, it shows that market forces “will make changes flow in a predictable direction, like water draining off the land, downhill, to the sea.”

That is, sellers will use production methods that spew pollution but that cost less for them than using clean technologies; that damage groundwater or use up resources but that cost less for them than methods that don't; or they will build into products secondary effects which consumers who buy the product won't directly suffer but others will, and which cost less to produce or induce more purchases. And the same logic will typically hold for consumer choices about how to utilize the items they have bought. The impact of their use on others will most often be unknown and ignored.

And it isn't only that in each transaction the participants have an incentive to find the cheapest, most profitable course of production and the most personally fulfilling course of consumption, it is that markets compel the absolute maximum of exchanges to be enacted. There is a drive to buy and sell even beyond the direct benefits of doing so because each producer is weighing not the benefits of a little more income versus a little more leisure due to working less but, instead, the benefits of staying in business versus going out of business. That is, each actor competes for market share to gain surpluses with which to invest to reduce future costs, pay for future advertising, etc. These surpluses must be maximized in the present lest one is out-competed in the future.

The race for market share becomes a drive to continually amass profit without respite, which means to do so even beyond what the greed of owners might otherwise entail.

In all market systems, and particularly in capitalist markets, growth is god. The guiding philosophy is grow or die, regardless of contrary personal inclinations. This not only violates attentiveness to sustainability of resources but also produces a steadily escalating flow of garbage and pollution. Transactions multiply and in each transaction the incentive to pollute and to otherwise violate the environment persists. In the end, what we get is an economy spewing into, using up, and damaging the environment on a massive scale. What we get is an economy turning communities into dump sites, making cities sick with smog, polluting ground waters that in turn escalate cancer rates, and

causing global warming that threatens not only raging storms but even vast upheavals of ocean levels and agriculture, with untold costs to follow.

Parsoc and Ecology

“Humanity has been endowed with reason, with the power to create, so that he can add to what he's been given. But up to now he hasn't been a creator, only a destroyer. Forests keep disappearing, rivers dry up, wild life's become extinct, the climate's ruined and the land grows poorer and uglier every day.”
- Anton Chekhov

Will a participatory economy be any better for the environment than capitalism? Yes, for a number of reasons.

First, in a parecon there is no pressure to accumulate. Each producer is not compelled to expand surplus in order to compete with other producers for market share. Instead, the level of output reflects a true mediation between desires for more consumption and desires for a lower overall amount of work.

In other words, in capitalism the labor/leisure tradeoff is biased heavily toward more production at all times due to the need for overall growth to avoid shrinkage that brings on failure. In parecon it is an actual, real, unbiased tradeoff.

In a parecon, that is, we each face a choice between increasing the overall duration and intensity of our labor to increase our consumption budget, or, instead, working less to increase our overall time available to enjoy labor's products and the rest of life's options. And since society as a whole faces this exact same choice, we can reasonably predict that instead of a virtually limitless drive to increase work hours and intensity, a parecon will have no drive to accumulate output beyond levels that meet needs and develop potentials. This will, therefore, stabilize at much lower output and work levels - say thirty hours of work to produce socially useful products a week - eventually, even less. Interestingly, and revealingly, some mainstream economists criticize that in a parecon people will decide their work levels and

will likely decide on less than now. The mainstream economists call this a flaw rather than celebrating it as a virtue.

The second issue is one of valuation. Again, unlike in capitalism, or with markets more generally, participatory planning doesn't have each transaction determined only by the people who directly produce and the people who directly consume, with these participants having structural incentives to maximize purely personal benefits regardless of the broader social impact. Instead, every act of production and consumption in a parecon is part of a total overall integrated economic plan. The interrelations of each actor with all other actors and of each action with all other actions, are not just real and highly consequential in the material plane - which is of course always true - but are also properly accounted for at the decision making point.

In a parecon, production or consumption of gas, cigarettes, and other items with either positive or negative effects on people - beyond the buyer and seller - take into account those effects. The same holds for decisions about larger projects, for example, building a dam, installing wind turbines, or cutting back on certain resources. Projects are amended in light of feedback from affected councils at all levels of society, from individuals, neighborhoods, counties, states, or the whole population.

The key point is relatively simple. By eliminating the market drive to accumulate and to have only a short time horizon and the market-compelled ignorance of economic effects that extend beyond buyers and sellers (such as on the environment) - and the consequent market mispricing of items - parecon properly accounts costs and benefits and provides means to sensibly self manage environmental impacts.

It isn't that there is no pollution in a parecon. And it isn't that non-renewable items are never used. These norms would make no sense. You can't produce without some waste and you can't prosper without using up some resources. Rather, what is necessary is that when production or consumption generates negative effects on the environment, or depletes resources that we value and cannot replace, the decision to do these things ought to be made while taking into account the implications.

We should not transact when the benefits don't outweigh the detriments. And we should not transact unless the distribution of benefits and detriments is just, rather than some people suffering unduly.

This is what parecon via participatory planning ecologically accomplishes and really all that we can ask an economy to do by its own internal logic. We don't want the economy to prejudge outcomes, deciding by the pressure of its institutional dynamics results that humans have no say in, as, for example, the accumulation drive propelled by markets which decides the labor/leisure tradeoff regardless of participant preferences. We want a good economy to let people who are affected make their own judgments with the best possible knowledge of true and full costs and benefits by bringing to bear appropriate self managing influence. If the economy presents this spectrum of possibility and control to its actors, as parecon does, what is left to assess is what people will then likely decide. All that we can ask of an economy is that people not be biased by institutional pressures or made ignorant or ineffectual due to institutional biases. Parecon guarantees both these aims. It provides for people to be free and self managing, and simultaneously ensures that the logic of the economy is consistent with the richest possible human comprehension of ecological connections and options.

Similarly, we can ask of the rest of society - its culture, its kinship relations, and its polity - that these, too, by their roles, not bias people against the environment or future generations. This means a polity manifests people's wills and has no institutional bias regarding ecology. It means kinship occurs in context of the environment and is attuned to husbanding it. And the same for culture. This last can have many forms - ranging from respecting norms from other spheres but otherwise having marginal specific attitudes to ecology to the more typically indigenous-type cultures with very rich and detailed ecological attitudes. In any event, it means there will not be disdainful - much less polluting - attitudes and inclinations within cultural norms.

Of course we can refine our understanding of participatory kinship, community, and polity beyond the fledgling descriptions

in our vision to date, and thus also their ecological interface. Yet, even as they are now, we hope readers will agree participatory society would yield people with sensible care taking attitudes toward their surroundings and with nurturant attitudes toward future generations.

Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to think that parecon and parsoc's citizens will not only make wise choices for their own interests, but for their children and grandchildren as well, regarding not only direct production and consumption and daily life celebrations, but also the myriad ripple effects of economic and social activity on the environment.

Other Species

*"Keep a green tree in your heart
and perhaps a songbird will come."
- Chinese proverb*

We live on a planet, the earth, which is a gigantic rock swirling in space around an almost unfathomably larger and hugely energy generating sphere of combustion, the sun, in an even vaster sea of similar entities born billions of years ago, and maturing ever since. We share the bounty or resources and energy of our planet and particularly the sun's rays with a huge diversity of other species, who themselves contribute in a multitude of ways to defining how the planet produces, processes, and presents its assets to us.

Indeed, our own existence arose from a sequence of other species modified by chance occurrences and selected by dynamics of cooperation and competition, and our existence depends for its continuation on a vast number of current species as well.

A capitalist economy views other species as it does everything else, in terms of their profit-making possibilities. If directly preserving or nurturing a species is profitable, capitalists do it. If ignoring another species and leaving it on its own is profitable, capitalists do that. If directly consuming or indirectly obliterating another species is profitable, again, that is the capitalist way to go.

Capitalist market competition looks around and assesses short-term profitable possibilities and pursues them. If we add governments or other agencies with priorities other than solely short-term profit seeking, they may ameliorate many ills. But if these bodies significantly defy or impede profit-making, it will be difficult for them to maintain themselves against the logic of capitalist accumulation. This occurs both because the economy fights back against efforts to restrain accumulation and capitalism tends to produce a population unreceptive to even thinking about the long-term benefits of other species to people, much less the independent rights of other species.

These insights encapsulate the well known history of environmental concerns. The results we see around us are indicative of the destruction wrought by profit-seeking pressures.

What would replace capitalism's possibly suicidal and certainly horribly gory interspecies relations if we instead had a parecon?

- First, a parecon would move us from profit as the guiding norm of economic choice to human fulfillment and well being in accord with solidarity, diversity, equity, and self management.
- Second, parecon would move us from having a driving profit-seeking logic that constantly overpowers and undoes any ecologically or otherwise non profit-justified restrictions placed on the economy, to instead be flexibly responsive to constraints imposed by forces and concerns that are not economic.
- Third, parecon moves its producers and consumers from having a very narrow and fragmented approach to economy, to instead comprehending the interconnectedness of all acts and their multiple implications.
- And fourth, parecon moves us from a me-first, anti-social interpersonal mindset that can easily extend beyond relations to people toward relations to nature, to a solidaristic interpersonal mindset, which can plausibly extend to nature and species as well.

The first point is a change of guiding logic or motivation. The second point is a change in its intensity. Together they ensure that parecon doesn't have the negative impetus toward other species typical of capitalism. The third and fourth points bear upon a less structural issue, more conjectural, which is whether people who operate as workers and consumers in a parecon are likely to be more receptive to arguments regarding the rights of other species.

Regarding its guiding logic, a parecon intrinsically views other species at least as it views everything else, which is in light of pursuing human fulfillment and development possibilities consistent with promoting solidarity, advancing diversity, maintaining equity, and ensuring self management. In a parecon, if directly preserving or nurturing a species is beneficial for humans, the incentives will be strong to do it. If leaving a species to its own devices is beneficial for humans, again, the incentives will point in that direction. If directly consuming or indirectly obliterating a species by taking away its habitat is beneficial for humans, again, that is the purely economic path that a good economy would intrinsically arrive at.

Parecon, via its participatory planning, assesses beneficial possibilities for humans and provides means and reasons for producers and consumers to pursue them. It does not, of its own accord, incorporate the interests of non-human species, *per se*. And, regrettably, such species cannot be incorporated as decision-makers to attend to their own interests.

However, a parsoc's citizens can decide that they want to add to their participatory economic institutions, political or other agencies to act on behalf of diverse species, and these structures can be smoothly incorporated even if they defy or impede possible human benefits on behalf of the rights of other species. Indeed, such structures or agencies would be added to parecon because there is no process that allows species other than people to express their intentions and desires. While these structures will, therefore, presumably need to have popular support manifested through political choices, maintenance of such restraints on economic activity will not require a continuous and difficult struggle against

the continually re-impinging logic of capitalist accumulation because the latter is absent.

In participatory economics, that is, once there is a political restriction placed on the economy - let's say, the economy is not to interfere with the nesting habitats of caique parrots, or the economy must, if altering those habitats, move all potentially affected caiques to new and at least as sustainable environments - the economy functions thereafter in accord with that external ruling and does not continually produce structural pressures and practices that try to overcome or remove the restriction. Individuals might try to reverse such a decision, but the system as a whole has no built-in tendency to compel people to do so.

The question arises, however, can we expect the kinds of external constraints I have mentioned so far to arise in a society with a participatory economy? Will producers and consumers who use self managed councils, balanced job complexes, equitable remuneration, and participatory planning be inclined toward stewardship for species other than their own and therefore incorporate rules and norms on behalf of such species on top of the economic means they share to manifest their own preferences?

It is hard to answer a question like this definitively before the fact, of course. But it seems quite plausible that whatever factors tend to cause people to become concerned for other species will be less thwarted and more enhanced in a system that promotes solidarity and diversity than in a system that promotes antisociality and homogeneity. And the same holds for participatory kinship, community, and polity as compared to patriarchy, racism and bigotry, and authoritarianism.

Additionally, a parecon exalts not only the benefits that accrue from diversity, but also the need to avoid narrow scenarios that eliminate options we might later find superior. We can expect parecon's respect for diversity in social situations to extend to a popular awareness of the richness of biodiversity and its intricate interconnectivity. Hurting or eliminating species curbs diversity and risks long-term currently unknown losses to humanity as well.

In sum, then, participatory economics and a participatory society puts in place a concern for human well being and

development that doesn't forcefully preclude harming other species, but which is receptive to and respectful of governmental or other social or ecological restraints on behalf of other species. If other species had votes, they would vote for parecon.

Chapter Seven

Parsoc and the World

Parsoc and the World

*"War does not determine who is right, only who is left."
- Bertrand Russell*

Current international market trading overwhelmingly benefits those who enter today's exchanges already possessing the most assets. When trade occurs between a U.S. multinational and a local entity in Guatemala, Kenya, or Thailand, the benefits do not go more to the weaker party with fewer assets, nor are they divided equally - they go disproportionately to the stronger traders who, thereby, increase their relative dominance.

Opportunist rhetoric aside, capitalist globalizers try to disempower the poor and already-weak and to further empower the rich and already-strong. The result: of the 100 largest economies in the world, over half aren't countries, they are corporations, and tens of millions throughout the world not only live in abysmal poverty, but starve to death each year.

Similarly, international market competition for resources, revenues, and audience is most often a zero sum game. To advance, each market participant preys off the defeat of others so that capitalist globalization promotes a me-first attitude that generates hostility and destroys solidarity between individuals, corporations, industries, and states. Public and social goods are downplayed, private ones are elevated. Businesses, industries, and nations augment their own profits while imposing losses on other

countries - and even on most citizens of their own country. Human well being is not a guiding precept.

Capitalist globalization swamps quality with quantity. It creates cultural homogenization, not diversity. Not only does Starbucks proliferate, so do Hollywood images of women and minorities and Madison Avenue styles elevating greed and self centeredness - not to mention violence. What is indigenous, non-commercial, gender equitable - much less feminist - must struggle to even survive. Diversity declines.

In the halls of the capitalist globalizers, only political and corporate elites are welcome. Indeed, the point of capitalist globalization is precisely to reduce the influence of whole populations, and even of state leaderships, save for the most powerful elements of Western corporate and political rule. Capitalist globalization imposes corporatist hierarchy not only in economics, but also in politics and culture - and because it carries the seeds of patriarchy, in gender relations as well. Authoritarian and even fascistic state structures proliferate. The number of voices with even marginal say declines.

As the financiers in corporate headquarters extend stockholders' influence, the earth beneath is dug, drowned, and paved without attention to other species, to by-products, to ecology, or even to humanity. Only profit and power drive the calculations.

Anti-globalization activists oppose capitalist globalization because capitalist globalization violates the equity, diversity, solidarity, self-management, and ecological balance that activists pursue.

Capitalist globalization also establishes norms and expectations of international dominance and subordination. To establish, enforce, defend, and punish violations of those norms, the strong will often use violence against the weak. Domestically this means growing police state apparatuses and repression. Internationally it means local, regional, and international hostilities and war.

So the question naturally arises, what is the alternative to capitalist globalization?

Supporting Global Justice

"Peace is not merely a distant goal that we seek but a means by which we arrive at that goal."

- Martin Luther King Jr.

What do anti-globalization activists propose to put in place instead of the institutions of capitalist globalization, including, most prominently, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization?

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were established after World War II. The IMF was meant to provide means to combat financial disruptions adversely impacting countries and people around the world. It initially used negotiation and pressure to stabilize currencies and to help countries avoid economy-disrupting financial machinations and confusion.

The World Bank was meant to facilitate long-term investment in underdeveloped countries and to expand and strengthen their economies. It was set up to lend major investment money at low interest rates to correct for the lack of local capacity.

Within then-existing market relations, these limited IMF and World Bank goals were progressive. Over time, however - and accelerating dramatically in the 1980s - the agenda of these institutions changed. Instead of facilitating stable exchange rates and helping countries protect themselves against financial fluctuations, the IMF began bashing any and all obstacles to capital flow and unfettered profit seeking, despite being the opposite of its mandate.

Instead of facilitating investment on behalf of local poor economies, the World Bank became a tool of the IMF, providing and withholding loans as carrot or stick to compel open corporate access. It financed projects not with an eye to accruing benefits for the recipient country, but with far more attention to accruing benefits to major multinationals.

In addition, the World Trade Organization (WTO) that was first proposed in the early postwar period actually came into being only decades later, in the mid 1990s. Its agenda became to regulate

trade on behalf of ever-greater advantages for the already rich and powerful.

Beyond imposing on third world countries low wages and high pollution, the idea emerged that the rich could also weaken all governments and agencies that might defend workers, consumers, or the environment - not only in the third world, but everywhere. Why not, wondered the truly powerful, remove any efforts to limit trade due to the implications of labor, ecology, social or cultural, or developmental - leaving as the only legal criteria of trade's regulation whether there are immediate, short-term profits to be made? If national or local laws impede trade - say an environmental, health, or labor law - why not have a new organization of world trade to adjudicate disputes and render an entirely predictable pro-corporate verdict in all cases? The WTO was thus added to the IMF/World Bank team to trump governments and populations on behalf of corporate profits.

The full story about these three centrally important global institutions is longer than this brief synopsis can present, but improvements are not hard to conceive.

First, why not have - instead of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO - an International Asset Agency, a Global Investment Assistance Agency, and a World Trade Agency. These three new (not merely reformed) institutions would work to attain equity, solidarity, diversity, self-management, and ecological balance in international financial exchange, investment, development, trade, and cultural exchange.

They would try to ensure that the benefits of trade and investments accrue disproportionately to the weaker and poorer parties involved, not to the already rich and more powerful.

They would not prioritize commercial considerations over all other values, but would prioritize national aims, cultural identity, and equitable development.

They would not require domestic laws, rules, and regulations designed to further worker, consumer, environmental, health, safety, human rights, animal protection - or other non-profit centered interests - be reduced or eliminated, but they would work

to enhance all these, rewarding those who attain such aims most successfully.

They would not undermine democracy by shrinking the choices available to democratically controlled governments, but would work to subordinate the desires of multinationals and large economies to the survival, growth, and diversification of smaller units.

They would not promote global trade at the expense of local economic development and policies, but vice versa.

They would not force Third World countries to open their markets to rich multinationals and abandon efforts to protect infant domestic industries, but would facilitate the reverse.

They would not block countries from acting in response to potential risks to human health or the environment, but would help identify health, environmental, and other risks, and assist countries in guarding against their ill effects.

Instead of downgrading international health, environmental, and other standards to a low level through a process called "downward harmonization," they would work to upgrade standards by means of a new "upward equalization."

The new institutions would not limit governments' ability to use their purchasing dollars for human rights, environmental, worker rights, and other non-commercial purposes, but would advise and facilitate doing just that.

They would not disallow countries to treat products differently based on how they were produced - irrespective of whether they were made with brutalized child labor, with workers exposed to toxins, or with no regard for species protection - but would instead facilitate just such differentiations.

Instead of bankers and bureaucrats carrying out policies of presidents to affect the lives of the very many, these new institutions would be open, democratic, transparent, participatory, and bottom up, with local, popular, and democratic accountability.

These new institutions would promote and organize international cooperation to restrain out-of-control global corporations, capital, and markets by regulating them so people in local communities could control their own economic lives.

They would promote trade that reduces the threat of financial volatility and meltdown, expands democracy at every level from the local to the global, defends and enriches human rights for all people, respects and fosters environmental sustainability worldwide, and facilitates economic advancement of the most oppressed and exploited groups.

They would encourage domestic economic growth and development, not domestic austerity in the interest of export-led growth.

They would encourage the major industrial countries to coordinate their economic policies, currency exchange rates, and short-term capital flows in the public interest.

They would establish standards for the regulation of financial institutions by national and international regulatory authorities, encouraging the shift of financial resources from speculation to useful and sustainable development.

They would establish taxes on foreign currency transactions to reduce destabilizing, short-term, cross-border financial flows and to provide pools of funds for investment in long-term environmentally and socially sustainable development in poor communities and countries.

They would create public international investment funds to meet human and environmental needs and ensure adequate global demand by channeling funds into sustainable long-term investment.

And they would develop international institutions to perform functions of monetary regulation inadequately performed by national central banks, such as a system of internationally coordinated minimum reserve requirements on the consolidated global balance sheets of all financial firms.

These new institutions would also work to get wealthy countries to write off the debts of impoverished countries and to create a permanent insolvency mechanism for adjusting debts of highly indebted nations.

They would use regulatory institutions to help establish public control and citizen sovereignty over global corporations and to curtail corporate evasion of local, state, and national law, such as

by establishing a binding Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations that includes regulation of labor, environmental, investment, and social behavior.

Beyond all the above, anti-globalization activists also advocate a recognition that international relations should not derive from centralized but rather from bottom-up institutions. The structures mentioned above should gain their credibility and power from an array of arrangements, structures, and ties enacted at the level of citizens, neighborhoods, states, nations and groups of nations on which they rest. And these more grassroots structures, alliances, and bodies defining debate and setting agendas should, like the three described earlier, also be transparent, participatory and democratic, and guided by a mandate that prioritizes equity, solidarity, diversity, self-management, and ecological sustainability and balance.

The overall idea is simple. The problem isn't international relations, per se. Anti-corporate globalization activists are, in fact, internationalist. The problem is that capitalist globalization alters international relations to further benefit the rich and powerful.

In contrast, activists want to alter relations to relatively weaken the rich and powerful and empower and improve the conditions of the poor and weak. Anti-corporate globalization activists know what we want internationally - global justice in place of capitalist globalization. But there is still a vision problem for anti-globalization activists, even after we describe alternative global economic institutions. Everyone knows that international norms and structures don't drop from the sky. Once in existence they impose severe constraints on domestic arrangements and choices, but global relations sit on top of, and are propelled and enforced by, the dictates of domestic economies and institutions.

The IMF, World Bank, and WTO impose capitalist institutions such as markets and corporations on countries around the world, of course. But the existence of markets and corporations in countries around the world likewise propels capitalist globalization.

So when anti-globalization activists offer a vision for a people-serving and democracy-enhancing internationalism in place of capitalist globalization, we are proposing to place a very good

International Asset Agency, Global Investment Assistance Agency, and Global Trade Agency - plus a foundation of more grassroots democratic and transparent institutions - on top of the very bad domestic economies we currently endure. The problem is that the persisting domestic structures inside our countries would continually work against the new international structures we construct on top of them. Persisting corporations and multinationals would not positively augment and enforce our preferred new international structures, but would, at best, temporarily succumb to pressures to install them and then perpetually exert pressures to return to their more rapacious ways.

So when people ask anti-globalization activists “what are you for?” They actually aren’t asking only what are we for internationally. They also mean, what are we for in place of capitalism?

If we have capitalism, they reason, there will inevitably be tremendous pressures for capitalist globalization and against anti-capitalist innovations. The new IAA, GIAA, and GTA sound nice, but even if we put them in place, the domestic economies of countries around the world would push to undo them.

Capitalist globalization is, after all, domestic markets, corporations, and class structure on a large scale. To really replace capitalist globalization and not just mitigate its effects, we would have to replace capitalism, too. Reducing or ameliorating corporate globalization via the proposed new international institutions shouldn’t be an end in itself, but should be part of a larger project to transform the underlying root capitalist structures as well.

If we have no alternative to markets and corporations, many feel, our gains would be temporary. This assessment is widely held and fuels the reactionary slogan that “there is no alternative.”

To combat this mentality and underlying reality we need an alternative vision regarding international agencies and global economics, such as the proposed new institutions discussed above, but also an alternative vision regarding markets, corporations, and domestic economies, which is, of course, participatory economics.

Parsoc and International Relations

"I do not want the peace which passeth understanding, I want the understanding which bringeth peace."

- Helen Keller

What are parecon's implications for international relations?

First, the pressure of capitalism to conquer ever-expanding market share and to scoop up ever-widening sources of resources and labor is removed. There is no drive to accumulate, per se, and there is no tendency to endlessly expand market share or to exploit international profit-making opportunities, because there is no profit-making. The sources of imperialism and neo-colonialism, not merely some of their symptoms, are removed.

If the whole world has participatory economies, then nothing structural prevents treating countries like one might treat locales - neighborhoods, counties, states - within countries. And, likewise, there is no structural obstacle to approaching the production side similarly, seeing the world as one international system.

Whether this would occur or not, or at what pace, are matters for the future and also affected by other dimensions of social life. However, a participatory polity writ large into international relations, leads toward equitable and participatory international adjudication and legislation. Intercommunalism and feminism writ large, into international relations, tends to mitigate and remove the traffic in women and racial and ethnic bases for nation attacking nation. It certainly seems that the natural and logical international long-run extension of domestic advocacy of participatory economics, kinship, polity, and community would favor internationalism over imperialism. If balanced job complexes, self management, justice, feminist, and intercommunalist relations are morally, economically, and socially sound choices in one country, why not across countries? Likewise, if it makes sense to plan each country's economic life in a participatory manner, and to govern its polity in a self managing way, why wouldn't it make sense to do these things from country to country?

Of course, even with the structural obstacles emanating from capitalist relations of production gone, and even assuming cultural

and political forms would also welcome internationalism and even extending the logic of domestic parecons and parsocs to a worldwide participatory economy, there remains the difficulty of the magnitude of the inter-nation gaps that would need to be overcome. Even if one wanted to, one simply cannot sanely equilibrate income and job quality between a developed and an underdeveloped society, short of massive and time-consuming campaigns of construction, development, and education. Moreover, if there are some parecons and some capitalist economies, the situation is still more difficult, with gaps existing in development and also in social relations.

So the real issue about parecon, parsoc, and international relations becomes: as countries adopt participatory economies and become participatory societies domestically, what happens to their trade and other policies with still capitalist countries?

No outcome is inexorable. We can conceive, I suppose, of a country with a participatory economy that is rapacious regarding the rest of the world, or with a participatory polity that is authoritarian toward the rest of the world, or with feminist kinship that is sexist toward the rest of the world, or with intercommunalism that is racist toward the rest of the world. It is very difficult to imagine these things, yes, but it is not utterly inconceivable. What we are assessing is a policy choice.

How should a parecon interact with other countries who do not share its logic of economic organization and practice?

A good answer seems to me to be implicit in the whole earlier discussion of international global policies. The idea ought to be to engage in trade and other relations in ways that diminish gaps of wealth and power while respecting cultural integrity and adjudicating and legislating in a self managing and just manner.

One obvious proposal is that a parecon trades with other countries at either market prices or parecon prices, depending on which choice does a better job of redressing wealth and power inequalities.

A second proposal would be that a parecon engage in a high degree of socially responsible aid to other countries less well off than itself.

A third proposal would be that a parecon supports movements seeking to attain participatory economic relations elsewhere.

There is every reason to think that the workers and consumers of a parecon would have the kind of social solidarity with other people that would drive them to embark on just these kinds of policies. But such actions would involve a choice, made in the future, not reflect an inexorable constraint that is imposed on society by a systemic economic pressure.

The long and short of this discussion is that seeking just international relations leads, rather inexorably, toward seeking just domestic relations and vice versa. A participatory society fulfills both agendas.

Parsoc and Revolutionary Strategy

*"You may encounter many defeats,
but you must not be defeated."
- Maya Angelou*

What is the connection between having a vision - whether we call it participatory society or participatory socialism - and what we actually do to create social change?

First, why the term "revolutionary," above? The answer is simple enough. Moving from a typical contemporary society to a parsoc is a revolution. It doesn't matter how it transpires. If it happened by a vote, if it happened via extended insurrections, strikes, by a more violent set of confrontations, or even an extended military struggle - in all cases, it is a revolution. This is because being a revolution means switching from one social system to another that is different in its defining features. And regardless of how the switch from capitalism to participatory socialism/society occurs, it is definitely a change in the defining features of society.

However, how does it happen? What do we do to make it happen? How do we get more people to desire and seek a new society? How do we organize so we can manifest our collective energies effectively? How do we avoid our choices leading us

astray from what we want? How do we build the key features of the new society and ensure and preserve them?

Strategy is about amassing support, channelling its power into gains, solidifying gains into lasting structures, and building and utilizing the features of the new society. So, having a vision called *parsoc* should impact our strategy for activism by guiding all these components of our thinking. Strategy, however, is largely contextual. What works in one place may be foolhardy in another place. What works in one time period may be foolhardy later. Nonetheless, some strategic principles and concepts are pretty generally applicable. Using our understandings of existing society and *parsoc* we should hopefully be able to (a) generate general insights, and (b) develop methods applicable in cases that are more contextual and gain some operational insights into how such thinking might be done. Examples of trying to do that are the subject of the third and last volume of *Fanfare*.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

*"What happens to a dream deferred?
Does it dry up Like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like a sore—And then run?
Does it stink like rotten meat?
Or crust and sugar over—like a syrupy sweet?
Maybe it just sags like a heavy load.
Or does it explode?"*
- Langston Hughes

We have described desirable defining institutions for four key spheres of social life and two overarching contexts. This is not a finished, complete, and final vision. It is, instead, a flexible core vision people can share, refine, adapt, and use as part of a conceptual toolbox to undertake social change. Some parts are more developed than others. Some parts may need more improvement. But taken together, the preceding chapters provide, we hope, sufficient institutional clarity to fuel hope, inspire struggle, inform understanding of the present, and, as we will try to do in the third volume of Fanfare, aid in creating strategy and program. To conclude this volume, however, we would like to briefly discuss overall attitude to vision and our use and potential abuse of it.

We Are Minimalist

"Reason, or the ratio of all we have already known, is not the same that it shall be when we know more."
- William Blake

In talking about vision for a future society, one could go into far more detail than we have provided. Indeed, we have been minimalist in addressing only a few institutions in each sphere and, even regarding those few, we have only addressed broad attributes.

In presenting the vision from this book publicly, in talks, audiences often ask many different exploratory questions.

- What will sex life look like?
- What will people consume?
- How long will the work day be?
- How will Catholicism or Islam change?
- What will happen to population sizes?
- How long will the school day be?
- How old will people be when they retire?
- How big will workplaces be?
- What job will I personally have?
- Will everyone be vegetarian?
- What legislation will pass?

Is our imagination lacking, or is there a positive reason we neglect such matters?

There are actually four reasons why we restrain ourselves.

- First, to delve into visionary details is to risk the idiocy of arrogant excess. That is, we can't, in fact, know visionary details. The future is not an open book but a complex product of choices and conditions no one can fully know in advance.
- Second, nor, for that matter, are there any singularly right details to know. A future society will opt for many different choices regarding its detailed features. Saying what those choices will be now, not only ignores that what they will be will depend on lessons learned in the future, but also ignores that in different places, and different communities, not only due to lessons we haven't learned, but due to different

tastes, there will be different choices. There aren't singularly correct future choices.

- A third reason is we wish to avoid a slippery slope that leads beyond arrogant excess to stultifying rigidity. The more visionary details one offers, even if such details could be confidently known - which they can't - and even if such details wouldn't vary from place to place and time to time - which they would - the more one is likely to see vision as some fixed, finished, final and complete result and thus the less likely one is to be flexible about assessing, improving, adapting, and refining it. To get overly detailed is a fool's errand not only because it will yield gross errors and not only because there are no universal details to foresee, but because it risks corrupting the whole process by rigidifying attitudes.
- Finally, there is a fourth fundamental reason. The details of vision are not our concern. The task we face is to provide future generations with a society whose institutions facilitate their making their own decisions. Our task is to provide institutions which do not dictate, bias, or even constrain outcomes away from human well being and development. Our task is to provide a societal setting consistent with human well being and development for all, but not specifying the shapes people opt for within that freedom. The actual choice of policies and details in future settings is, in other words, for future people to decide. For us to act like those choices are our province would violate self management (for them) and is a slippery slope toward us dictating for others how they will live.

So we have been and we need to remain minimalist. Of course all sides of life interest us. Of course there are times when discussing in more detail some topic - maybe answering a question or developing an edifying example - can be useful for showing the general benefits and implications of our institutional commitments. But to actually think we can know, or that there is even something to know, or that it is our right to make such choices would violate the self managing, diverse, and flexible values and processes we favor.

We Are Maximalist

*"Listen, Revolution,
We're buddies,
see Together;
We can take everything."
- Langston Hughes*

Our minimalism regarding institutional proposals does not mean we don't aim high. To deliver a society that is without oppressive class, race, gender, and power hierarchies, and in which just outcomes, diversity, solidarity, and self management are produced by society's institutions even as those institutions also facilitate people fulfilling and developing themselves and others as the highest priority, is no small goal.

The relatively few institutions we choose to describe and advocate are not randomly chosen. They are a minimal list, yes. But they are a minimal list that can and are essential to accomplishing the maximal goal of carrying out society's core defining functions in a manner that allows future citizens to self manage their own choices in a solidaritous, diverse, and just setting.

So we are not only minimalist in trying not to overstep what is our rightful task and province and what we can sensibly know. We are also maximalist in trying not to under specify vision in a way that would leave the possibility that a basic defining feature we adopted would subvert the goals we aspire to.

Minimalist Maximalism

*"Will the people in the cheap seats clap?
And the rest of you, if you'll just rattle your jewelry."
- John Lennon*

In the first volume of *Fanfare*, we were minimalist maximalist about theory. We wanted the most succinct list of concepts we could assemble in our conceptual toolbox, sufficient, however, to understand society and history in ways sufficient to guiding our work to change them.

In this volume, we were minimal maximalist about vision. We sought to specify enough future aims to inform our thoughts about the present, to inspire our desire for a new society, and to guide our practice to attain it, without, however, overextending beyond what we can reasonably know and beyond what is our province on behalf of our future selves and future citizens.

In the next volume, we will be minimal maximalist about strategy - respecting limits of knowledge and province, but providing sufficient conceptual tools and insights to facilitate efficient thought about program and struggle in the years to come.

Perhaps we should also add what is obvious, but nonetheless important. Offering new ideas of any sort, particularly bearing on how society ought to be arranged, is unlikely to be initially popular. It isn't only critics and revolutionaries who can become sectarian about their views and hostile to what challenges them, nor is this confined to overt ideology and religion. One needn't have succumbed to an explicit coherent brand of fundamentalism to be fundamentalist - one can display such behavior even in daily life. As the philosopher William James warned, quite rightly, "By far the most usual way of handling phenomena so novel that they would make for serious rearrangement of our preconceptions is to ignore them altogether, or to abuse those who bear witness for them." Amassing sufficient support for new vision to enact it is not solely a matter of insightful argument calmly and rapidly winning over open and eager minds. There is much more to it, which is why we need another volume of *Fanfare* to address how to win change, not merely how to envision it.

